Coffey v. Crews et al

Filing 11

ORDER dismissing case Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 2/18/2015. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CHARLES M. COFFEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 6:14-cv-2122-Orl-37KRS

MICHAEL D. CREWS,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This cause is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Civil
Rights Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) (Doc. 7). Plaintiff, who is a prisoner
incarcerated at the Avon Park Correctional Institution and proceeding pro se, filed the
Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis in this action. For the reasons stated herein, the Complaint will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has brought this action against Michael D. Crews as Secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff alleges that, while incarcerated at the

Central Florida Reception Center (“CFRC”), he “witnessed an altercation . . . in which
weapons were used and [his] safety . . . was jeopardized.” (Doc. 7 at 6). Plaintiff told a
staff member at CFRC that “he was in fear for his life,” and Plaintiff was then placed in
administrative confinement. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, he was treated “unfairly,” and

he mentions that “his food was tainted” and that he received less food than others. (Id.).
Plaintiff states that he “no longer trusts any D.O.C. staff and continues to live in fear of
staff retribution.” (Id.). He requests to be moved out of the State of Florida or released
on parole. (Id.).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee, and, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. section 1915A(a), the Court is obligated to screen such a prisoner civil rights
complaint as soon as practicable. On review, the Court is required to dismiss the
complaint (or any portion thereof) under the following circumstances:
(b)

Grounds for Dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint-(1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or

(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

28 U.S.C. §1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (“[n]otwithstanding any filing
fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or
malicious.”). 1 Additionally, the Court must read a plaintiff's pro se allegations in a
liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or in fact.” Bilal
v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
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1“A

“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a violation
of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005).
III.

ANALYSIS

The Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. First,
none of the allegations in the Amended Complaint refer to any personal involvement
by Crews nor does the Amended Complaint state that Crews had knowledge of these
matters.

Plaintiff has failed to allege or otherwise indicate any personal action or

inaction by Crews whatsoever within the scope of his responsibilities that would make
him personally liable for damages under section 1983. Plaintiff simply has failed to
demonstrate a sufficient basis on which to hold Crews liable. See Sanders v. United States,
760 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1985) (dismissal appropriate when none of the allegations
refer to personal involvement by the defendant, nor does the complaint state that the
defendant had knowledge of the alleged wrongful acts). Any conceivable liability on
the part of Crews would be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, which has
clearly been rejected as a theory of recovery under section 1983. Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir.
1985).
Second, Plaintiff requests that he be “moved out of [the] State of Florida or
release[d] . . . from incarceration to parole or probation.” (Doc. 7 at 6). In seeking his

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release from prison, Plaintiff challenges the legality of his present confinement. Claims
attacking the legality of a prisoner's confinement must be presented in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, following the exhaustion of state court remedies, not in a section
1983 action. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody
cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’”)
(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).
Finally, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at CFRC. He presents no allegations
demonstrating that his constitutional rights currently are being violated. As a result, it
appears that his claims are now moot. Under the circumstances, Plaintiff fails to state a
claim for relief under section 1983, and this case is dismissed as frivolous.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

This case is DISMISSED.

2.

Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 8) is DENIED.

3.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and to enter judgment

accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on February 18th, 2015.

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Copies furnished to:
OrlP-2 2/18
Charles M. Coffey

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