Southern Atlantic Companies, LLC et al v. School Board of Orange County, Florida

Filing 137

ORDER denying 135 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 5/26/2016. (ED)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
SOUTHERN ATLANTIC COMPANIES,
LLC, EDWARD HUTCHINS and
RAYMOND MCINTOSH,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 6:15-cv-254-Orl-31TBS

SCHOOL BOARD OF ORANGE
COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendant.

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 135) filed by
the Plaintiffs.
I.

Background

The Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of this Court’s order (Doc. 104) granting summary
judgment to the Defendant as to the First Amendment retaliation claims of Edward Hutchins and
Raymond McIntosh. The Court granted Defendant’s motion based on a finding that neither of
these Plaintiffs “ha[d] suffered retaliatory acts that would likely deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights.” (Doc. 104 at 6).
II.

Legal Standard

While the federal rules do not specifically provide for the filing of a “motion for
reconsideration,” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 828, 113 S. Ct. 89, 121 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992), it is widely known that Rule 59(e)
encompasses motions for reconsideration. 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary

Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 2810.1 (2007). However, due to the need to
conserve scarce judicial resources and in the interest of finality, reconsideration is an extraordinary
remedy that is to be employed sparingly. U.S. v. Bailey, 288 F.Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (M.D. Fla.
2003). The decision on whether to alter or amend a judgement is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992).
The authorities generally recognize four basic grounds upon which Rule 59(e) motion may
be granted:
First, the movant may demonstrate that the motion is necessary to
correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is
based. Second, the motion may be granted so that the moving party
may present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.
Third, the motion will be granted if necessary to prevent manifest
injustice. Serious misconduct of counsel may justify relief under this
theory. Fourth, a Rule 59(e) motion may be justified by an
intervening change in controlling law.
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 2d §
2810.1 (2007).
Importantly, parties may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate old matters, Michael
Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005), or to raise new legal
arguments which could and should have been made during the pendency of the underlying motion,
Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). To avoid repetitive
arguments on issues already considered fully by the court, rules governing reargument are
narrowly construed and strictly applied. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Heath Fielding Ins.
Broking Ltd., 976 F.Supp 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
III.

Analysis

The Plaintiffs contend that reconsideration is necessary to prevent “manifest error” but fail
to identify any such error in this Court’s original order. Instead, the Plaintiffs simply assert that

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the First Amendment retaliation claims “were supported by law” (Doc. 135 at 6) and reiterate
arguments that were considered and rejected in connection with the order at issue. As noted
above, the grant of summary judgment was based on an absence of retaliation against them, and
nothing the Plaintiffs now point to suggests that this conclusion was in error. Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 135) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on May 26, 2016.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

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