Jackson National Life Insurance Company v. Cook et al

Filing 48

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 44 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas B. Smith on 12/14/2015. (Smith, Thomas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
In Re: Proceeds of Jackson National
Life Insurance Company Policy #’s
04124519 and 04148540
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Case No: 6:15-cv-261-Orl-31TBS

ORDER
Plaintiff Jackson National Life Insurance Company filed this interpleader action to
determine the interests of Yvonne Bechard as personal representative of the Estate of
Richard Denisco (the “Estate”), and Cathy Cook in the proceeds of two life insurance
policies (Doc. 1). Denisco purchased the policies while he was married to Cook and she
was the named beneficiary on both policies (Doc. 38, ¶¶ 5, 8). In 1997, Denisco and
Cook entered into a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”), and their marriage was
dissolved (Doc. 19, ¶ 9). Denisco continued to pay premiums on the policies until he
died in 2014 (Doc. 38, p. 6).
Bechard has cross-claimed against Cook, alleging that by virtue of the MSA and
FLA. STAT. § 732.703, the proceeds of the insurance policies are property of the Estate
(Doc. 37). Cook has answered and cross-claimed for declaratory relief, alleging that she
“is in doubt as to her rights under the insurance policies, MSA, and FLA. STAT. § 732.703,
and is in need of an immediate determination of her rights.” (Doc. 38, p. 9). Jackson
National deposited the proceeds of the policies into the registry of the Court and was
dismissed from the case (Docs. 26, 31).
On September 18, 2015, Bechard filed an offer of judgment, offering to allow Cook
to take judgment in the amount of $5,000 to be paid from the proceeds of the insurance
policies, with the balance of the funds going to Bechard as personal representative of the
Estate (Doc. 40). On October 22, 2015, Cook filed a motion to strike the offer of

judgment on the basis “that the Florida offer of judgment statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.79, does
not apply to cases such as this one, which involves a claim for declaratory relief.” (Doc.
41, p. 1). Cook also sought leave to amend her cross-claim by interlineation and for an
extension of time to respond to the offer of judgment (Id.). The Court denied Cook’s
motion, finding that the Florida offer of judgment statute applies in this case, it was
unnecessary for Cook to amend her cross-claim, and Cook’s request for an extension of
time to respond to the offer of judgment was untimely (Doc. 43, pp. 3-4).
This matter is now before the Court on Claimant Cathy Cook’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Strike Claimant Bechard’s Offer of
Judgment; Amend Counter-Crossclaim by Interlineation; and Extend Time to Respond to
Offer (Doc. 44). “Cook respectfully requests that the Court: (1) reconsider its prior order;
(2) strike Bechard’s offer of judgment on the ground that it was not made in good faith;
and (3) in the alternative, grant her an extension of time in which to respond to the offer.”
(Id. at p. 3). Bechard opposes the motion (Doc. 47).
District Courts have inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory orders and
reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment. Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v.
Lamb, No. 2:07-CV-666-FTM-29DNF, 2010 WL 2734728, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2010).
See also Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943). “ʻA
motion for reconsideration should raise new issues, not merely readdress issues litigated
previously.’” Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (quoting PaineWebber Income Props. Three Ltd. P’ship v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1995)). “The motion must set forth facts or
law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the Court the reason to reverse its
prior decision.” Id. (citing Taylor Woodrow Const. Corp. v. Sarasota/Manatee Airport
Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1072 (M.D. Fla. 1993); PaineWebber, 902 F. Supp. at 1521).
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“[C]ourts have recognized three (3) grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct
clear error or manifest injustice.” Fla. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc. v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (citing Major v. Benton, 647
F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981)).
Cook argues that the Court should “reconsider its order denying her motion to
strike the offer of judgment because she discovered, after the motion to strike was filed,
that Bechard was not aware of the Strict Compliance Doctrine in Florida, which shows
that Bechard’s $5,000 offer of judgment was not made in good faith.” (Doc. 44, p. 6).
Cook also argues that “the Court should strike the offer of judgment on the ground that it
was not made in good faith” “because Bechard’s nominal offer of judgment does not bear
any reasonable relationship to the damages at issue or any realistic assessment of
liability.” (Id. at p. 9).
Cook failed to raise in her original motion that the offer of judgment was made in
bad faith, that the offer was of a nominal amount, and that the offer did not bear any
reasonable relationship to the damages at issue. Cook now argues that reconsideration
is necessary because she did not discover until after filing her original motion that
“Bechard was not aware of the Strict Compliance Doctrine in Florida” and that this “shows
that Bechard’s $5,000 offer of judgment was not made in good faith.” (Doc. 44, p. 6).
According to Cook, the strict compliance doctrine renders “irrelevant” a change of
beneficiary form that purportedly revoked Cook’s beneficiary designation in favor of the
Estate. Cook’s argument in this regard is not well taken; it is entirely unclear how
Bechard’s lack of knowledge regarding a doctrine that, according to Cook, would be a
detriment to Bechard’s case would show that Bechard’s offer of judgment was not made
in good faith. In any event, Cook has failed to offer any evidence, or even an
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explanation, on how the strict compliance doctrine would be applied in this case. Cook’s
conclusory statements that the doctrine applies and that she only newly discovered that
Bechard was unaware of the doctrine is not sufficient to justify reconsideration of the prior
order, especially when the issue of bad faith was not previously raised. Accordingly,
Cook’s motion to reconsider the Court’s order denying the motion to strike is DENIED.
Cook also seeks reconsideration of the order denying an extension of time to
respond to the offer of judgment. The Court denied Cook’s motion for an extension of
time on the basis that the motion was untimely (Doc. 43, p. 4). The statute provides for
30 days after service to accept an offer of judgment. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(4). Bechard’s
offer was served on September 18, 2015. Thirty days after service of the offer was
October 18, 2015, which was a Sunday. Under Rule 6(a), Cook would have had until
October 19, 2015 to respond to the offer. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Rule 6(d) provides
for an additional three days “after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a).”
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). Cook therefore had until October 22, 2015 to respond to the offer.
Accordingly, Cook’s motion for an extension was timely filed on October 22, 2015. I also
note that Cook has shown good cause for an extension. Cook’s motion to reconsider is
therefore GRANTED in part. Cook has seven (7) days from the rendition of this order to
respond to Bechard’s offer of judgment.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on December 14, 2015.

Copies furnished to Counsel of Record
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