Suevsky v. Walt Disney World Parks and Resorts
Filing
24
ORDER granting 12 motion to dismiss, dismissing amended complaint without prejudice. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 7/2/2015. (ED)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MICHAEL SUEVSKY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:15-cv-342-Orl-31KRS
WALT DISNEY WORLD PARKS AND
RESORTS,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) filed by the
Defendant, Walt Disney World Parks and Resorts Online, Inc. 1 (henceforth, “WDWPRO”), the
response in opposition (Doc. 14) filed by the Plaintiff, Michael Suevsky (“Suevsky”), and the
reply (Doc. 18) filed by WDWPRO.
According to the allegations of the Amended Complaint, Suevsky is a Russian American
male who practices the Jewish religion. (Doc. 2 at 1). He was employed by WDWPRO as a
Staff Assurance Engineer in the Online Shared Services Technology Department. (Doc. 2 at 2).
While working for WDWPRO, Suevsky alleges, he was disparaged by some of his supervisors
(one of whom commented negatively about his national origin); he also alleges that he was
subjected to a hostile work environment and denied promotional opportunities, eventually
resulting in his resignation. (Doc. 2 at 3-4). On November 11, 2014 he filed the instant suit,
asserting three claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), §§ 760.01 et seq., Fla. Stat.:
1
The Defendant was erroneously named in the Amended Complaint (Doc. 2) as simply
“Walt Disney World Parks and Resorts.” (See Doc. 17).
harassment based on national origin and religion (Count I); constructive discharge based on
national origin and religion (Count II); and failure to promote based on national origin and religion
(Count III).
WDWPRO asserts that the Amended Complaint contains numerous fatal flaws, but the
Court need concern itself with only one. WDWPRO contends that the instant suit has no relevant
connection to the state of Florida, and therefore the FCRA cannot apply. A review of the
Amended Complaint confirms WDWPRO’s contention. The Plaintiff never asserts that he lived
or worked in Florida, or that any of the supervisors at issue did so, or that any action was ever
taken in Florida that is relevant to this case.
[U]nless the intention to have a statute operate beyond the limits of
the state or country is clearly expressed or indicated by its language,
purpose, subject matter, or history, no legislation is presumed to be
intended to operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state or
country enacting it. To the contrary, the presumption is that the
statute is intended to have no extraterritorial effect but to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state or country enacting it.
Thus, an extraterritorial effect is not to be given statutes by
implication.
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 243. See also Burns v. Rozen, 201 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
(stating same). The Plaintiff has not identified any section of the FCRA in which the Florida
Legislature expressed an intent to have the statute operate beyond the limits of the state, and the
Court’s review has not uncovered any. In the absence of, at a minimum, any assertion that any
relevant activities took place in Florida or that any of the relevant actors resided there, the
Amended Complaint therefore fails to state a claim under the FCRA. Accordingly, it is hereby
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ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED, and the Amended
Complaint (Doc. 2) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If the Plaintiff wishes to file an
amended pleading, he may do so on or before July 15, 2015.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on July 2, 2015.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party
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