Heffield v. United States of America

Filing 34

OPINION AND ORDER. 1.Petitioner's claim that "his guilty plea was entered into unintelligently because he thought he was pleading guilty to possession and production of child pornography, when in fact he pleaded guilty to sexual exploi tation of a minor and possession of child pornography" is DENIED. Consequently, the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence 1 is DENIED. 2. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. 3. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealabi lity. 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent and to close this case. A copy of this Order and the judgment shall also be filed in criminal case number 6:13-cr-67-Orl-36DCI. 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any related section 2255 motion filed in criminal case number 6:13-cr-67-Orl-36DCI. Signed by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 5/23/2019. (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
DANIEL HOFFIELD,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No: 6:15-cv-644-Orl-36DCI
(6:13-cr-67-Orl-36DCI)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

/
ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Order (Doc. 28) entered by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals on January 17, 2019. 1 Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence (“Motion to Vacate,” Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
Court entered an Order (Doc. 18) on July 13, 2017, dismissing the case. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Alter (Doc. 20), which the Court denied. Petitioner appealed the denial of the
Motion to Vacate, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (“Eleventh Circuit”) entered
a written, unpublished opinion finding that the Court failed to address Petitioner’s claim
that “his guilty plea was entered into unintelligently because he thought he was pleading
guilty to possession and production of child pornography, when in fact he pleaded guilty
to sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography.” (Doc. 28 at 4).2

1

The Mandate issued on March 11, 2019. (Doc. 29).

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals construed this “as a stand-alone claim for
relief and not another claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 28 at 5).
2

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment without prejudice and remanded the case for
the Court to consider the claim.
The Government filed a Supplemental Response in Opposition to the Motion to
Vacate (“Supplemental Response,” Doc. 31) in compliance with this Court's instructions
and with the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 33) to the Supplemental Response.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The procedural background of this case is set forth in the Court’s Order of July 13,
2017 (Doc. 18) and is incorporated herein. As set forth therein, Criminal Case No. 6:13cr-67-Orl-36DCI will be referred to as “Criminal Case.”
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 permits a federal prisoner to bring a collateral challenge by moving
the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A
petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he “alleges facts that, if true, would
entitle him to relief.” Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and
quotation omitted). However, “a defendant must support his allegations with at least a
proffer of some credible supporting evidence.” United States v. Marsh, 548 F. Supp. 2d
1295, 1301 (N.D. Fla. 2008). Moreover, the Court “is not required to grant a petitioner an
evidentiary hearing if the § 2255 motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” Rosin, 786 F.3d at 877 (citation and
quotation omitted).

2

III.

ANALYSIS

As mentioned above, Petitioner claims that “his guilty plea was entered into
unintelligently because he thought he was pleading guilty to possession and production
of child pornography, when in fact he pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor
and possession of child pornography.” (Doc. 28 at 4).
Petitioner was charged by Superseding Indictment with three counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor (Counts One, Two, and Three), four counts of transportation of
child pornography (Counts Four, Six, Seven, and Eight), and two counts of possession of
child pornography (Counts Five and Nine). (Criminal Case Doc. 20). Petitioner entered
into a Plea Agreement (Criminal Case Doc. 31) in which he agreed to enter a guilty plea
to Counts Two and Nine of the Superseding Indictment. Petitioner signed the Plea
Agreement, initialed each page thereof, and certified that he had read it and fully
understood its terms. (Id. at 20).
Petitioner acknowledged in the Plea Agreement that Count Two charged him
“with sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e)” and that
Count Nine charged him “with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2).” (Id. at 1) (emphasis added). Petitioner also “acknowledge[d]
understanding the nature and elements of the offense[s] with which he ha[d] been
charged and to which [he was] pleading guilty.” (Id. at 2). In particular, the elements of
Count Two were set forth as follows:
First:

That the defendant used a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct;
3

Second:

That the defendant did so for the purpose of producing
visual images of such conduct;

Third:

That the defendant knew or had reason to know that
the visual depictions would be mailed or transported
in interstate commerce or that the visual depictions
were mailed or actually transported in interstate or
foreign commerce or that the visual depictions were
produced using materials that were transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.

(Id.). The Plea Agreement also contained a lengthy recitation of the facts, which fully
described Petitioner’s involvement in the offenses set forth in Counts Two and Nine.
At the plea hearing, Petitioner stated that he had read the Superseding Indictment
and that he had discussed the Superseding Indictment with his attorney. (Criminal Case
Doc. 72 at 7-8). The Court informed him that he was being charged with “sexual
exploitation of a minor” in Count Two and with “knowing possession of child
pornography” in Count Nine.

(Id.).

The Court specifically described what the

Government would be required to prove with regard to Count Two: that Petitioner
“use[d] a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating visual
images and that you knew or had reason to know that the--those images would be
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, including over the Internet.” (Id. at 7).
Petitioner described in his own words the charges and what he had done. In particular,
he stated that he made videos that were “considered to be child pornography” and that
he “placed a video camera in a bathroom and recorded [young girls] using the restroom.”
(Id. at 21). He then uploaded the videos to “the Internet, to a news group.” (Id. at 22).

4

Petitioner knew that the images “were transmitted elsewhere by use of the Internet.”
(Id.).
Petitioner stated that he had not been threatened, coerced, or pressure into
entering his guilty plea. (Id. at 9). He also stated that he was pleading guilty “because I
am guilty.” (Id.). Petitioner further indicated that he had initialed each page of the Plea
Agreement, signed the Plea Agreement, read the Plea Agreement, discussed the Plea
Agreement with his attorney, and fully understood its terms. (Id. at 9-11). Petitioner also
stated that the statement of facts set forth in the Plea Agreement was true and correct.
(Id. at 13). The Court found that his plea had been made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily and was not the result of force or of threats or of promises except for the
matters set forth in the plea agreement. (Id. at 24).
The record establishes that Petitioner knew at the time of his guilty plea that he
was pleading guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child
pornography. Petitioner’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. 3 The lengthy plea
colloquy confirms not only that the Court complied with the requirements of Rule 11 for
considering and accepting a plea, but that Petitioner understood the charges against him,
the sentence he faced, and the consequences of his plea. Consequently, the record in this
case reflects that Petitioner understood the charges against him, understood the
consequences of his plea, and voluntarily chose to enter his pleas of guilty without being

As the Supreme Court held in Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977), "the
representations of the defendant [at the plea hearing], as well as any findings made by
the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral
proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity."
3

5

misled or otherwise misinformed. The Court finds that Petitioner’s guilty plea was
knowingly and voluntarily made and that Petitioner knew he was pleading guilty to
sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography. As a result, this
claim will be denied. 4
Allegations not specifically addressed herein have been determined to be without
merit.
IV.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

This Court should grant an application for a certificate of appealability only if the
petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
' 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Lamarca v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
568 F.3d 929, 934 (11th Cir. 2009). However, the petitioner need not show that the appeal
will succeed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Moreover, Petitioner
cannot show that jurists of reason would find this Court’s procedural rulings debatable.
Petitioner fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Thus,
the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

Alternatively, this claim was not raised on direct appeal and is procedurally
barred. Petitioner has not shown either cause or prejudice that would excuse the default.
Likewise, Petitioner has neither alleged nor shown the applicability of the actual
innocence exception. See Mills v. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055 (11th Cir. 1994).
4

6

V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Petitioner’s claim that “his guilty plea was entered into unintelligently

because he thought he was pleading guilty to possession and production of child
pornography, when in fact he pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor and
possession of child pornography” is DENIED. Consequently, the Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence (Doc. 1) is DENIED. 5
2.

This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3.

Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability.

4.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent

and to close this case. A copy of this Order and the judgment shall also be filed in criminal
case number 6:13-cr-67-Orl-36DCI.
5.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any related section 2255

motion filed in criminal case number 6:13-cr-67-Orl-36DCI.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on May 23, 2019.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party
5

18).

Petitioner’s other claims were denied in the Court’s Order of July 13, 2017. (Doc.
7

OrlP-2 5/23

8