Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. DCCM Restaurant Group, LLC
Filing
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ORDER denying 22 Motion to stay discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas B. Smith on 10/16/2015. (Smith, Thomas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MILLER’S ALE HOUSE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:15-cv-1109-Orl-22TBS
DCCM RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case comes before the Court without oral argument on Defendant’s Motion to
Stay Discovery (Doc. 22). Defendant seeks “to stay discovery in this case pending the
Court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.” (Id.). Plaintiffs have filed a response
in opposition to the motion (Doc. 28). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is
due to be DENIED.
I. Background
Plaintiffs filed this action on July 8, 2015, under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051
et seq.; the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT. § 501.201 et
seq.; and Florida common law for “unfairly competing against Plaintiff by using outdoor
signage at its restaurant to attract customers that is nearly identical to Plaintiff’s signage.”
(Doc. 1, ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s signage uses the phrase “Ale House”
“preceded by the geographic location of the particular restaurant” in a similar font, color,
and style as Plaintiff’s signs. On September 18, 2015, Defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by issue preclusion in that the 11th Circuit has already
determined that Plaintiff “has no protectable interest in the words ‘ale house’ because
they are generic words for a facility that serves beer and ale, with or without food.” (Doc.
21, p. 1 (quotations omitted)). Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss is due
October 19, 2015 (Doc. 26). Defendant seeks a stay of all discovery until the Court rules
on the motion to dismiss.
II. Standard
District courts have inherent power to control their dockets and manage their
cases. The Andersons, Inc. v. Enviro Granulation, LLC, No. 8:13-cv-3004-T-33MAP,
2014 WL 4059886, at * 2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2014). This includes the discretionary
power to enter a stay of the proceedings. Id. The decision whether to enter a stay
requires a weighing of the parties’ competing interests and the maintenance of an even
balance in the case. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); AXA Equitable
Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, No. 08-80611-CV, 2012 WL 602709, at * 2 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 23, 2012).
Motions to stay discovery “are not favored because when discovery is delayed or
prolonged it can create case management problems which impede the Court’s
responsibility to expedite discovery and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and
problems.” Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (citing Kron Med.
Corp. v. Groth, 119 F.R.D. 636 (M.D. N.C. 1988)). “ʻIn deciding whether to stay
discovery pending resolution of a pending motion, the Court inevitably must balance the
harm produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will be
granted and entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.’” Holsapple v. Strong Indus.,
Inc., No. 2:12-cv-355-UA-SPC, 2012 WL 3946792, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2012)
(quoting Panola Land Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1985)). The
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party moving for a stay of discovery has “the burden of showing good cause and
reasonableness.” Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652 (citing Howard v. Galesi, 107 F.R.D. 348
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
III. Discussion
Defendant contends that the Court should stay discovery because it “is a small
business” that “owns a small, independent restaurant … and does not have the same
resources at its disposal that a large chain like Miller’s does for addressing discovery.”
(Doc. 22, p. 4). “Discovery is expensive and time consuming” and, according to
Defendant, “may also be entirely unnecessary if this Court agrees with DCCM that Miller’s
is collaterally estopped from retrying issues regarding rights the Eleventh Circuit already
told Miller’s it does not have.” (Id. at p. 2). Defendant also cites Chudasama v. Mazda
Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997), and argues that “[f]acial challenges to the
legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on failure to
state a claim for relief, should … be resolved before discovery begins.” (Doc. 22, p. 2).
Defendant’s arguments are not well taken.
First, Defendant’s reliance on Chudasama is misplaced. In Chudasama, the
district court failed for more than a year and a half to rule on a motion to dismiss, and it
repeatedly failed to rule on the defendant’s objections to abusive discovery propounded
by the plaintiffs. Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1356-60. Eventually, the district court
entered orders compelling discovery and sanctioning the defendant. Id. at 1364. On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s orders and directed that the case
be reassigned to a different judge. Id. at 1374. Here, the parties have not even begun
discovery, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is not yet fully briefed, and the Court has not
shirked or delayed the exercise of any of its responsibilities.
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Defendant also misinterprets the holding in Chudasama. As the Eleventh Circuit
has stated, it “only found an abuse of discretion [in Chudasama] because the district court
ordered the parties to engage in substantive discovery despite failing to rule on the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for over eighteen months.” Zow v. Regions Fin. Corp.,
595 F. App’x 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2014). As this and other courts have explained,
“Chudasama and its progeny ‘stand for the much narrower proposition that courts should
not delay ruling on a likely meritorious motion to dismiss while undue discovery costs
mount.’” Houston v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-441-FtM-29CM, 2015 WL 412523, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2015) (quoting Koock v. Sugar & Felsenthal, LLP, No. 8:09-CV-609-T17EAJ, 2009 WL 2579307, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009)). See also S. Motors
Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors, LLC, No. CV414-152, 2014 WL 5644089, at *1 (S.D.
Ga. Nov. 4, 2014); Latell v. Triano, No. 2:13-cv-565-FtM-29CM, 2014 WL 5822663, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2014); Holsapple v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-355-UA-SPC,
2012 WL 3946792 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2012); Gannon v. Flood, No. 08-60059-CIV, 2008
WL 793682, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2008).
Defendant argues that it “is a small business” and that “[d]iscovery is expensive
and time consuming,” (Doc. 22, pp. 2-3), but it has not shown that discovery will be
unduly burdensome. Indeed, Plaintiff has not yet propounded discovery requests, so
there is no indication that discovery will be unusually or unnecessarily expensive or time
consuming. Defendant argues that Plaintiff “does not need discovery in order to respond
to the motion” to dismiss (id. at p. 4), but that adds nothing to the argument, because
discovery is not necessary for the resolution of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
Finally, having reviewed Defendant’s motion to dismiss, it is not readily apparent
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that it will be granted, or case dispositive. Even if the motion is granted, it is likely that
Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. Under these circumstances, the Court is not
persuaded that a stay of discovery will do more good than harm. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. 22) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 16, 2015.
Copies furnished to Counsel of Record
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