Bostick v. Sheriff of Orange County, Florida Sheriffs Office et al
Filing
89
ORDER denying 87 Motion for Judgment NOV. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 7/14/2017. (VMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
TYRONE BOSTICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 6:15-cv-1533-Orl-37GJK
DEPUTY LATASHA McGUIRE,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the following matters: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial
(Doc. 87), filed May 2, 2017; and (2) Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for New Trial
(Doc. 88), filed May 16, 2017.
BACKGROUND
This civil rights action—which concerns Defendant Latasha McGuire’s
warrantless arrest of Plaintiff Tyrone Bostick after midnight on August 22, 2011
(“Arrest”)—was tried before a jury over three days in April 2017. (See Docs. 70, 71, 76.)
After the Court denied the parties’ respective motions for directed verdict (Docs. 72–75),
the jury deliberated and reached a verdict in favor of Defendant (Doc. 83 (“Verdict”)).
On April 7, 2017, the Court entered final judgment in accordance with the Verdict.
(Doc. 84 (“Judgment”).) Pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil
-1-
Procedure, Plaintiff then filed a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
(“JMOL Motion”) or in the Alternative a Motion for a New Trial (“New Trial Motion”).
(Doc. 87 (“Motion”).) Defendant filed a response (Doc. 88 (“Response”)), and the matter
is ripe for adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Once a “party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial,” the opposing
party may move for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on the grounds that “a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find” for the
non-moving party on the issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). If denied, the JMOL motion may
be renewed after trial, and the Court then may either: (1) “allow judgment on the verdict”;
(2) “order a new trial”; or (3) “direct the entry of [JMOL].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The
Court has discretion to order a retrial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore
been granted in an action at law in any federal court.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
THE TRIAL
Trial commenced on April 3, 2017. 1 (Doc. 70.) After counsel’s opening statements,
Plaintiff testified on direct examination about the Arrest. According to Plaintiff, he visited
his mother’s home on the evening of August 21, 2011. Sometime after 10:30 p.m., he
departed her home with plans to walk to his father’s home as he “normally” did. After
1Based
in part on the defense of qualified immunity, the Defendant moved for
entry of partial summary judgment. (See Doc. 38 (“SJ Motion”).) The Court granted the
SJ Motion as to most of Plaintiff’s state law claims, but denied the SJ Motion as to his
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest, unlawful search, and excessive force.
(See Doc. 50.)
-2-
walking for 30 or 45 minutes, Plaintiff reached the intersection of Ivey Lane and Lenox
(“Intersection”), where Plaintiff first noticed a Dodge Intrepid (“Unmarked Car”):
Well, once I reached the [I]ntersection, I basically had seen
this Dodge Intrepid with dark tinted windows roll by me on
Ivey Lane. And I was looking at this [C]ar, and something just
told me . . . to like keep my eyes on this [C]ar.
And when it got towards the light, it did like a sudden U-turn.
And when it did a sudden U-turn, I had just made it to the
other side of Lenox from corner to corner. Just going this way.
Now, when I get on this side, this is when I see the same [Car]
drive past me and actually make a turn onto Lenox. And
when [it] turned onto Lenox, it went like five feet from back
of me. And once I seen the back doors open, I decided to jet
across the street, straight across the street, at [a] right angle
where the light was set. Because at that time I was in fear of
my life. I didn’t know what to do. I didn’t know who these
people [were].
* * *
When I started to decide to run across the street, the back
doors swung up. I seen . . . a gloved hand, a black gloved hand
open the door. And before I could even actually get halfway
across to Ivey Lane . . . two males . . . jumped out in all black.
And once I got halfway across Ivey, they had already caught
up to me. So by the time I got to the corner to get to where the
light was, I felt two hands push down on me hard to the point
where I fell.
Plaintiff testified that once he was on the ground, the two males (“Male Officers”):
(1) placed Plaintiff’s hands in plastic tie restraints (“Hand Ties”) behind his back;
(2) lifted and dragged him down the street; and (3) repeatedly hit and beat him until a
marked police car arrived with activated lights and sirens (“Marked Car”). Plaintiff
testified that he did not realize that the Male Officers were police officers until the Marked
Car arrived because: (1) no one identified themselves as law enforcement officers at any
-3-
time; (2) no one ordered him to stop or gave him a command at any time; (3) other than
curses and racial epithets, Plaintiff did not hear the passengers of the Unmarked Car say
anything at all to him; and (4) Defendant and the Male Officers were not dressed in
uniforms, rather, they were dressed “in all black” clothes.
Plaintiff testified that he was thrown into the Marked Car where he sat in fear for
his life and not knowing “who to talk to.” At that point, Plaintiff also noticed that he was
“bleeding from the scrapes off [his] arms and [his] hands.” Fire department personnel
(“EMS”) then arrived and—according to Plaintiff—they attended to the Male Officers
“because [Plaintiff’s] blood was on them.” Plaintiff testified that the EMS then checked
him and offered him a Sprite, but they did not treat his injuries. 2 Finally, Plaintiff testified
that he was driven to jail in the Marked Car, and—once at the jail—Plaintiff waited while
Defendant “wrote her statement up” (“Arrest Report”), which charged him with
resisting an officer without violence (“ROWV”), which is a violation of Florida Statutes,
§ 843.02 (“ROWV Statute”).
On cross-examination, Plaintiff testified that: (1) the area where the Arrest
occurred—which is where Plaintiff lived his entire life—was “not a high crime area”;
(2) the area was dark, but not “completely dark” at the time of his Arrest; (3) Plaintiff
could not see who was in the Car because it had tinted windows—including a tinted front
2A
report from the Fire Department (“FD Report”) was admitted into evidence as
Exhibit A6, which indicated that Plaintiff suffered abrasions to his hands and forearm,
but his head and back were “normal.” Plaintiff testified that the FD Report was
“inaccurate” because it did not reflect that his head and back were injured when the Male
Officers beat him, and the Fire Department did not care for his injuries as stated in the
FD Report.
-4-
windshield; and (4) Plaintiff ran because he felt that his life was in danger:
I felt like my life was in danger to the point where I seen this
action, the [black] gloves and the doors open up. And I wasn’t
going to sit there and just be in the dark [so] something could
blindside me. I decided to run across to where a light was.
When I was running across to where a light was, they [had]
already exited . . . Once they exited the car, they started calling
me these cuss words.
Under cross-examination, Plaintiff further testified that he saw Defendant for the
first time when the Male Officers replaced the Hand Ties with hand cuffs, and “threw”
him in the Marked Car. Plaintiff also reiterated that: (1) the Male Officers were dressed
in black clothes that the police would not wear; (2) the Male Officers were wearing gun
belts, but they were not wearing badges; (3) Plaintiff did not realize that the Male Officers
were police officers when they were in the Unmarked Car or while they chased him,
pushed him down, restrained him, and beat him; and (4) Plaintiff was “sure” that nobody
yelled for him to stop running and neither Defendant nor the Male Officers were wearing
uniforms.
Defendant was the second witness called by Plaintiff. On direct examination,
Defendant testified that the night of the Arrest, she and the Male Officers were assigned
to “proactive patrol”, which involved going into a “high crime area” to “gather
intelligence, stop people, [and] see what we can find.” Defendant confirmed that the
Unmarked Car, which she was driving, bore no markings on the outside that would
“notify a person . . . that the [Car] belonged to the Orange County Sheriff’s Office.”
Defendant further testified that when she first observed Plaintiff, he was not doing
anything illegal or suspicious: (1) he fit no “be on the lookout” notice; (2) his clothing was
-5-
not indicative of having criminal intelligence; (3) he did not appear to have a weapon or
burglary tool; and (4) he did not peer into any business that he walked past. Nonetheless,
Defendant decided to see if Plaintiff was willing to stop and talk—which she described
as a “Consensual Encounter.”
Defendant testified that she attempted to initiate the Consensual Encounter by
pulling the Unmarked Car to a stop approximately five feet behind Plaintiff without
saying anything to him. 3 According to Defendant:
(1)
she and the Male Officers simply exited and “walked
to the rear” of the Unmarked Car;
(2)
Plaintiff “looked at” her and the Male Officers;
(3)
once Plaintiff saw Defendant and the Male Officers,
“he began running” toward Ivey Lane on the
passenger side of the Unmarked Car where he passed
Defendant and Male Officers;
(4)
while she and the Male Officers chased Plaintiff, she
“articulated ‘Stop we are the police’” (“Command”);
(5)
after the Command, Plaintiff continued to run;
(6)
Plaintiff stopped running when he tripped on a
drainage ditch (“Ditch”) and fell to the ground;
(7)
once Plaintiff was on the ground, the Male Officers
grabbed him and held him—but did not beat him—
while Defendant put the Hand Ties on Plaintiff;
(8)
she searched Plaintiff, but she found no contraband;
3Plaintiff
and Defendant both estimated that the Unmarked Car was
approximately five feet from Plaintiff. The Male Officers estimated that Plaintiff was
seven to ten yards from the Unmarked Car.
-6-
(9)
upon seeing Plaintiff’s scrapes, she summoned the Fire
Department; and
(10)
ultimately, she went to the jail with Plaintiff, authored
the Arrest Report, and charged Plaintiff with ROWV.
Defendant testified that the “factual” ground for the ROWV charge was that she
“ordered him to stop, [she] identified as law enforcement, [and] he continued to run
thereby disobeying my lawful [C]ommand to stop.” Further, Defendant testified that she
had “two reasons” to issue the Command: (1) first, Plaintiff “took off at the sight of law
enforcement in a high-crime area”; and (2) second, when Plaintiff “started running across
the roadway from one side of Lenox to the other across Ivey Lane . . . he actually ran at a
diagonal instead of a 90 degree angle to the sidewalk,” which is a “violation” of Florida’s
jaywalking statute, Florida Statutes, § 316.130(12) (“JW Statute”).
On cross-examination, Defendant testified that the night of the Arrest, she was
wearing a “duty uniform” (“Uniform”) as depicted in a photograph (“Uniform Photo”),
which was admitted into evidence without objection. 4 The Uniform consisted of long
pants and a short-sleeved collared shirt with patches on both sleeves that said “Orange
County Sheriff.” The Uniform also included a badge on the left breast and a “utility belt”
that held a taser, gun, magazine pouches, a handcuff case, and a radio. Defendant denied
that the windshield of the Car was tinted, and she testified that there was “not a single
vehicle in our fleet that has a tinted windshield.” Defendant also denied that she saw
4 On
redirect examination, Defendant admitted that the Uniform Photo was taken
in well-lit conditions that differed from those that existed on the night of the Arrest.
-7-
Plaintiff struck, beat, or dragged by any law enforcement officer. Finally, Defendant
reasserted that Lenox and Ivey was a “high crime area” and it was well-lit the night of
the Arrest.
On the second day of trial, Plaintiff called the Male Officers to testify—Ryan
Donovan (“Officer Donovan”) and Brian Hummel (“Officer Hummel”). Both Officers
testified on direct examination that Plaintiff took “head long flight” after: (1) Defendant
stopped the Unmarked Car; (2) Defendant and the Male Officers exited the Unmarked
Car; and (3) Plaintiff looked at them and could identify them as law enforcement officers.
Officer Donovan also testified that: (1) he observed Plaintiff violate the JW Statute;
(2) he did not say anything to Plaintiff upon exiting the Unmarked Car or while chasing
Plaintiff; (3) he did not believe that any of the officers said anything to Plaintiff upon
exiting the Car; (4) “after the fact,” Defendant informed him and Deputy Hummel that
she made the Command; and (5) he did not “recall” hearing the Command. 5 Officer
Hummel similarly testified that: (1) he did not give Plaintiff any order “at any point”;
(2) he did not recall hearing any other Officer issue any command to Plaintiff upon exiting
the Unmarked Car or during the chase; and (3) he did not recall hearing Defendant issue
the Command. Finally, both Officers testified that: (1) they were wearing Uniforms
similar to the one depicted in the Uniform Photo; (2) the windshield on the Unmarked
Car was not tinted; and (3) they did not push, shove, or beat Plaintiff.
On redirect examination, Officer Donovan testified that he could not “speculate”
concerning what Plaintiff heard or didn’t hear, but Officer Donovan “went on”
Defendant’s word that she yelled the Command.
5
-8-
Plaintiff rested his case after Officer Hummel testified, and Defendant then
advised that it would present no testimonial evidence. Both parties then moved for
directed verdicts in their favor (Docs. 72, 74), and the Court denied both motions
(Docs. 73, 75). In rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that the record plainly established that
Plaintiff’s flight was provoked by Defendant, the Court noted the conflicting testimony
and concluded that it was for the “jury to determine whether or not [Plaintiff’s] flight
under the circumstances was provoked or unprovoked.”6
After denying the parties’ directed verdict motions, the Court: (1) provided the
parties with copies of the Court’s proposed jury instructions (Doc. 80) and an explanatory
index (Doc. 81 (“Index”)); and (2) conducted a jury charge conference (“Conference”). 7
During the Conference, Plaintiff objected to instructing the jury that Florida law
authorizes law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless arrests of persons who violate
the JW Statute (“JW Objection”). The Court overruled the JW Objection.
On the third day of trial (Doc. 76), the Court instructed the jury on the law (see
Doc. 82), the parties made their closing arguments, and the jury deliberated and reached
their Verdict (Doc. 83). After the Court entered Judgment (Doc. 84), Plaintiff filed his
Motion (Doc. 87), and Defendant filed her Response (Doc. 88). Upon consideration, the
In denying Defendant’s motion, the Court noted that “there is certainly evidence
from which the jury could reasonably determine there was no [C]ommand given.”
7 Prior to trial, the parties were required to jointly submit a set of proposed jury
instructions, which may include “contested instructions” in accordance with the Court’s
Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 21 (“CMSO”)). (Doc. 61, pp. 1–2.) The
CMSO instructs parties to designate the contested charge as such “with the name of the
requesting party and bearing at the bottom a citation of authority for its inclusion,
together with a summary of the opposing party’s objection.” (Doc. 21, p. 10.)
6
-9-
Court finds that the Motion is due to be denied.
DISCUSSION
A.
JMOL Motion
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 50(b) because: (1) “as a
matter of law, the Defendant’s actions provoked [Plaintiff’s] flight, and it was
unreasonable to arrest [Plaintiff] for ‘jaywalking’ or for [ROWV]” (Doc. 87, p. 5); and
(2) “there was no evidence presented that [Plaintiff] heard [the Command], only that it
may have been given by [Defendant]” (id. at 6).
In resolving a JMOL motion, the Court must be “squarely and narrowly focused
on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Chaney v. City of Orlando, Fla., 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th
Cir. 2007). Although the Court may not defer to the jury’s findings, see id., it must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, see U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus.,
Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 993 (11th Cir. 1993). The Court will grant a JMOL motion “only if the
evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor” of the moving party that a reasonable jury could
not have resolved the matter in favor of the non-moving party. See Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest
Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001). The Court will deny the motion if the jury
verdict is supported by “enough evidence that reasonable minds could differ concerning
the material facts.” See U.S. Anchor Mfg., 7 F.3d at 993.
Here, the jury’s Verdict is supported by sufficient evidence upon which reasonable
minds could find in favor of Defendant. Although Plaintiff’s testimony supported his
contention that Defendant provoked his flight, it is evident that the jury rejected this
-10-
narrative. The jury’s rejection was reasonable given the testimony of the Defendant and
the Male Officers that Plaintiff did not flee until he had sufficient opportunity to view
them in their full law enforcement uniforms. Although the evidence that Defendant
issued the Command and that Plaintiff continued to run after hearing such Command is
far less weighty (see supra note 6), it is nonetheless sufficient to defeat the JMOL Motion.
B.
New Trial Motion
Plaintiff alternatively argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the Verdict
was against the great weight of the evidence and the Court instructed the jury with a
misstatement of Florida law that “misled the jury into believing [that Plaintiff] could be
arrested for jaywalking.” (Doc. 87, pp. 8–9 (contending that the Court should have
sustained his Jaywalking Objection because, “based on the ‘plain language’ of Fla. Stat.
§§ 318.14, 316.130(19), and 316.665,” jaywalking is “a non-arrestable offense”).)
Courts may order a retrial if, after reweighing all of the evidence, it “believes that
the verdict rendered by the jury was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” See
Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964, 973 (11th Cir. 1982). After reweighing the
evidence here, the Court finds that the evidence concerning whether the Command was
given and heard by Defendant was static, and the great weight of the remaining evidence
supported the Verdict. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that a new trial is
warranted based on the record evidence. See id. (reversing the trial court’s grant of new
trial in § 1983 action because there was “no great weight of evidence in any direction”).
Courts also may grant a new trial to prevent the miscarriage of justice that would
result from a jury verdict that is based on improper jury instructions. See Costa v. Sam’s
-11-
East, Inc., 524 F. App’x 548, 550 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming trial court’s denial of new trial
motion). Jury instructions must be examined in context and “as a whole to determine
whether they fairly and adequately addressed the issue and correctly stated the law.”
Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 184, 90–91 (11th Cir. 1995).
As explained in the Index, the Court overruled the JW Objection based on clear
and controlling law. (See Doc. 81, p. 4 (referencing Florida Statutes, § 901.15 and Durruthy
v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2003).) Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that this
decision was erroneous, and he has not established that he suffered prejudice as a result
of the ruling. Thus, the New Trial Motion is due to be denied.
CONCLUSION
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 87) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, this 14th day of July, 2017.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
-12-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?