Claudet v. Sheriff of Osceola County et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 13 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file. Signed by Judge Paul G. Byron on 10/20/2016. (SEN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CLAIRESE CLAUDET,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:16-cv-301-Orl-40TBS
SHERIFF OF OSCEOLA COUNTY, in
his official and individual capacities, and
JOHN DOES 1–100,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13), filed
March 11, 2016.
Plaintiff has elected not to respond to Defendant’s motion. 1
Upon
consideration, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted and this case will be closed.
I.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of a state court foreclosure judgment entered against pro se
Plaintiff and the subsequent actions taken by the Sheriff of Osceola County (the “Sheriff”)
and other unnamed individuals to enforce that judgment. In her operative complaint, Plaintiff
alleges six claims. First, Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court finding that the state
court foreclosure judgment is void. Second, Plaintiff claims that the Sheriff conspired with
others to violate her rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692–1692p. Third, Plaintiff brings a claim against the Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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On May 19, 2016, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss should not be granted. (Doc. 19). Plaintiff has not responded either to
Defendant’s motion or to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. The Court accordingly
considers Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without opposition from Plaintiff.
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for allegedly violating her constitutional rights. Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff
conspired with others to enforce a wrongful foreclosure. Fifth, Plaintiff alleges violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act (the “Sherman Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–15. And sixth, Plaintiff
claims that the Sheriff violated her rights under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Fla. Stat. § 501.201–.213. The Sheriff now moves to dismiss all
six claims for various reasons.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
All Claims Against Fictitious Parties Must be Dismissed
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff alleges some of her claims
against 100 John Doe defendants who she has not been able to identify but is nevertheless
convinced have engaged in misconduct. However, “[a]s a general matter, fictitious-party
pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam). A limited exception to this rule arises when the plaintiff, although
without knowledge of the fictitious party’s true identity, describes the party with such
particularity that the party can reasonably be found and served with the complaint. See id.
Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint wholly fails to describe any of the John Doe defendants.
Indeed, Plaintiff essentially concedes in her pleading that she has no idea who any of the
John Does are. Accordingly, all claims against the 100 John Doe defendants will be
dismissed.
B.
The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s
Declaratory Judgment Claim
In his motion, the Sheriff first moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim
based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established
jurisdictional limit which prohibits federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction
over final state court judgments or proceedings. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268
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(11th Cir. 2009). The doctrine specifically applies to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In her claim for
declaratory judgment, Plaintiff specifically asks the Court to invalidate the final foreclosure
judgment entered against her by the state court, thereby directly invoking the RookerFeldman doctrine. As a result, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
declaratory judgment claim and it will be dismissed.
C.
Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Bring a Claim Under the Sherman Act
Next, the Sheriff moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim for lack of standing.
A plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring a claim deprives a federal court of subject matter
jurisdiction over that claim. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
In order to have standing to assert a claim under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate that she suffered an antitrust injury. Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. Estee Lauder Cos.,
797 F.3d 1248, 1272 (11th Cir. 2014). An antitrust injury is “injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent” and should “reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of the anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.” Palmyra Park Hosp.,
Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Upon review of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint claim, Plaintiff alleges no injury reflecting the anticompetitive
nature of any conduct by the Sheriff. Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to bring a claim under
the Sherman Act and that claim will be dismissed.
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D.
Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Sheriff also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In order to survive a motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6),
a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff alleges
enough facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The mere
recitation of the elements of a claim is not enough and the district court need not give any
credence to legal conclusions that are not supported by sufficient factual material. Id. The
district court must accept all well-pleaded allegations within the complaint as true and must
read the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc.,
29 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). When a party proceeds pro se, the district
court owes an additionally duty to liberally construe the pro se party’s pleadings and briefs.
Tennyson v. ASCAP, 477 F. App’x 608, 609–10 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism for vindicating constitutional rights
violated by persons acting under color of state law. Accordingly, in order to state a § 1983
claim, “a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting
under color of state law.” Woods v. Miller, 215 F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)). As the
Sheriff observes in his motion to dismiss, it is entirely unclear what conduct Plaintiff alleges
the Sheriff engaged in which deprived Plaintiff of her federal constitutional rights. The most
the Court is able to glean from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is the unsupported and
conclusory assertion that the Sheriff aided and protected certain unnamed “attorneys and
corporate financial entities” in enforcing the state court foreclosure judgment. Without more,
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Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 will consequently be dismissed.
E.
The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over
Plaintiff’s FDUTPA and Civil Conspiracy Claims
Finally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining FDUTPA and civil conspiracy claims. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 permits a district
court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims
where the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Here, the Court has dismissed all claims which invoke the Court’s federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because the parties in this case are not
diverse and the Amended Complaint asserts no other basis for exercising original jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law FDUTPA and civil conspiracy claims, the Court will decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.
Plaintiff’s FDUTPA and civil
conspiracy claims will therefore be dismissed.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant
Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 5)
is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 20, 2016.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
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