Irons v. City of Holly Hill et al

Filing 101

ORDER granting 88 Motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 12/5/2017. (PKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
DEREASE L. IRONS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:16-cv-479-Orl-37GJK

JAMES PATTON,
Defendant.
_____________________________________
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant James Patton’s (“Defendant”)
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 88 (“Motion”).) Plaintiff Derease L. Irons
(“Plaintiff”) initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an incident that
occurred on July 10, 2012 between him and Defendant, a Sergeant at the Holly Hill Police
Department at the time. (Doc. 23.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by performing an unlawful search of the vehicle Plaintiff was driving,
and seeks damages accordingly. (Id. ¶¶ 35–44.) Defendant opposes, and moves for
summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is due to be granted.
I.

BACKGROUND 1

Around noon on July 10, 2012, Plaintiff drove to Wal-Mart to purchase a gas card

The facts recited here are not the actual facts of the case. See Davis v. Williams, 451
F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). Rather, they reflect Plaintiff’s “best case”—that is, the Court
must consider the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Robinson v. Arrugueta,
415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Walker v. City of Riviera Beach, 212 F. App’x 835,
837 (11th Cir. 2006).
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in a car he borrowed from his ex-girlfriend (“Vehicle”). (Doc. 87, pp. 50–52.)
Accompanying him for the ride was his six-month-old daughter (“Child”) who Plaintiff
placed in her car seat in the back on the driver’s side, reverse-situated to face the trunk.
(Id. at 51; see also Doc. 86, pp. 6–7; Doc. 85-2, p. 12.) When Plaintiff arrived at the WalMart, he parked the Vehicle directly in front of the store, close to the fire lane. (Doc. 87,
p. 55.) Believing the stop to be a quick transaction, Plaintiff left the engine running, doors
unlocked, windows up, air conditioning on, and his Child inside. (Id. at 53, 54, 93–94).
The radio was not turned on. (Id. at 96–97.) Plaintiff went directly to the customer service
counter at the front of the store and entered the queue. (Id. at 53.)
As Plaintiff waited in line, he noticed a police car parked by the Vehicle. (Id. at 56.)
From inside, he observed Defendant approach the Vehicle and open its door. (Id. at 62.)
While watching, Plaintiff dialed his mother from his cell phone to come meet him at WalMart. (Id. at 62–63.) He had been driving on a suspended license, and upon seeing
Defendant at the Vehicle, thought that he would be arrested. (Id. at 63.) He stayed in WalMart for another seven minutes and then exited the store. (Id. at 65.)
On leaving the store, Plaintiff lingered by the entrance. (Id. at 67.) He did not say
anything to Defendant or inch toward the Vehicle, whose door was still open. (Id. at 67–
68.) He stayed on the phone, and then Defendant walked up to him to ask whether he
knew anything about the Vehicle or the Child. (Id. at 68.) Eventually, Plaintiff
acknowledged both. (Id.; see also Doc. 86, pp. 10–11.) Defendant then arrested Plaintiff for
child neglect. (Doc. 87, p. 68.)

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After Plaintiff’s arrest, Plaintiff’s mother and Officer Misty Howey arrived at the
scene. (Id. at 68, 71; see also Doc. 86, pp. 13–14.) Officer Howey transported Plaintiff to the
police station where he was charged and then incarcerated pending trial. (Doc. 86, p. 14;
see also Doc. 23, ¶¶ 23–24.) While incarcerated, Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress in state
court all evidence obtained from the Vehicle, claiming Defendant performed an unlawful
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 23, ¶¶ 25–27.) The court granted
Plaintiff’s motion to suppress, which resulted in his release from custody with the charges
against him dropped. 2 (Id. ¶¶ 28–30.)
Plaintiff then commenced this § 1983 action, bringing various claims against
Defendant, the City of Holly Hill, and Holly Hill Police Department Chief of Police
Stephen Aldrich. (Doc. 23.) Whittled down, the sole claim left alleges that Defendant
violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unlawful search of the
Vehicle. (Docs. 37, 40.) On this, Defendant moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 88.)
Plaintiff failed to submit a timely response, so the Motion is now ripe for the Court’s
consideration. (See Doc. 97.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). As to issues for

The fact that the state court found the search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment does not foreclose Defendant’s qualified immunity argument. See Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987) (rejecting the argument that officials alleged to have
violated the Fourth Amendment cannot receive qualified immunity).
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which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively show the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and support its motion with credible evidence
demonstrating that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on all of the
essential elements of its case. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993)
(citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. in Green & Tuscaloosa Ctys, 941, F.2d 1428,
1438 (11th Cir. 1991)).
As to issues for which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the
movant has two options: (1) it may simply point out an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) it may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating
that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Four Parcels,
941 F.2d at 1438 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). “The burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence
to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320
(11th Cir. 2006) (citing Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115–17).
“A factual dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A court must view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006), such that “when
conflict arises between the facts evidenced by the parties, [the] court credit[s] the
nonmoving party’s version,” Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005).
However, “[the] court need not permit a case to go to a jury . . . when the inferences that
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are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the nonmovant relies, are ‘implausible.’”
Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996). “When opposing parties
tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
III.

ANALYSIS

Defendant asserts several arguments to support summary judgment in his favor.
(See Doc. 88, pp. 8-24.) This Order focuses on Defendant’s meritorious qualified immunity
argument that: (1) his actions did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) even
if a violation occurred, it was not clearly established law at the time that his actions were
unconstitutional. (Id. at 19–24.)
Section 1983 provides aggrieved persons with a procedural mechanism to seek
redress for constitutional violations that are committed while a defendant is acting under
color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Acts performed by law enforcement officers—even if
illegal or unauthorized—are considered to have been performed under color of state law
so long as the acts are done in the defendant’s capacity as a law enforcement officer. See
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988). To avoid individual liability under § 1983, law
enforcement officers may invoke the defense of qualified immunity, which protects “all
but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating federal law.” See Depalis-

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Lachaud v. Noel, 505 F. App’x 864, 867 (11th Cir. 2013). 3 Qualified immunity is a question
of law to be decided by the Court, and it is evaluated under an “objective-reasonableness”
standard. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1486–87 (11th Cir. 1991).
“In order to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful
acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, this element is
undisputed. Therefore, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity
is not appropriate. Id.; see also Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). To do
so, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the facts of the case make out a violation of a
constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time
of the putative misconduct. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The Court
may address the prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry in any order. Id. at 236.
With this, and taking into account Plaintiff’s pro se status and the lack of responsive
filings, the Court assumes for purposes of the Motion that Plaintiff meets the first prong—
that Defendant’s actions rose to the level of a constitutional violation. See id. Thus, the
analysis centers on the second prong: whether Defendant’s actions violated clearly
established law at the time of the incident.
The inquiry of whether a constitutional right is clearly established turns on the
specific facts of the case. Loftus v. Clark–Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012). “The

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, but may be considered as
persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2; see also United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312,
1316 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
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relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is
whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Whittier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted). “For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must
dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about) the
conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is
doing violates . . . law in the circumstances.” Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of
Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 823 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146,
1150 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc)).
In the Fourth Amendment context, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if
“arguable probable cause” existed at the time of the search, as opposed to “actual”
probable cause. See Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Fish v.
Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir. 2016). To show arguable probable cause, “the facts
and circumstances must be such that the officer reasonably could have believed that
probable cause existed.” Montoute, 114 F.3d at 184 (emphasis added). Thus, the qualified
immunity inquiry focuses on “the information [that] the officer possessed” to objectively
analyze a reasonable officer’s belief of probable cause in that situation. See id. “Even law
enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is
present are entitled to immunity.” Id. (quoting Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227). In this respect,
qualified immunity protects some mistakes in judgment to protect “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)).
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Here, Defendant had at least arguable probable cause to search the Vehicle, so his
actions did not violate clearly established law at the time. The circumstances surrounding
the search speak for themselves, even taking the facts in Plaintiff’s best light: On a 92
degree July day in Florida, around noon, Defendant entered the Wal-Mart parking lot to
conduct a standard patrol. (Doc. 86, p. 5.) Upon first entering the lot, Defendant noticed
the Vehicle idling in or near the fire lane, but did not approach it right away, despite its
obstructing nature. (Id. at 5–6.) Rather, he followed his routine by first driving straight
through the lot and then going around the back of the store. (Id.) Only after he finished
his patrol round did he pay the Vehicle closer attention, because it remained in the same
location. (Id. at 6.) He drove next to it to ask the driver to move, but could not see anyone
in the driver’s seat. (Id.) He parked his patrol vehicle and then approached the Vehicle,
whose engine was running. (Id.) This fact alone raised concern, based on Defendant’s
familiarity with the Wal-Mart parking lot as a high-crime area where vehicle thefts and
carjacking were common, not to mention Defendant’s experiences involving abandoned
children in vehicles. (Id. at 9–10.) With this, while standing next to Vehicle on the driver’s
side, Defendant analyzed the situation and looked around to see if anyone in the area
was attempting to lay claim to the vehicle. (Id. at 6.) No one appeared to do so, and then
something within the car sparked the officer’s attention—he either saw movement or
heard a cry coming from inside the vehicle. 4 (Id. at 6.) At that point, Defendant acted and

In Plaintiff’s initial pleadings, he disputed whether Defendant could see the
Vehicle’s backseat because its windows were “tinted.” (See Doc. 23, ¶ 14.) But in his
deposition, Plaintiff offered contradictory testimony on this point, at first saying that he
could clearly see into the vehicle to watch the Child while inside Wal-Mart, but then
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opened a door to look inside, believing his actions were justified because someone in
distress was in the Vehicle. (Id. at 6–7.) All this while, Plaintiff stayed in the store watching
the situation unfold. (Doc. 87, p. 65.)
Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that Defendant’s actions comport
with those of a reasonable law enforcement officer. Under Florida law, it is a criminal
offense for a parent to leave a child younger than six unattended or unsupervised in a
motor vehicle for over fifteen minutes, and a civil offense if the child is left “[f]or any
period of time if the motor vehicle is running, the health of the child is in danger, or the
child appears to be in distress.” Fla. Stat. § 316.6135 (1)–(3). Furthermore, “[a]ny law
enforcement officer who observes a child left unattended or unsupervised in a motor
vehicle . . . may use whatever means are reasonably necessary to protect the minor child
and to remove the child from the vehicle.” Id. § 316.6135 (5). Thus if Defendant
“observed” the Child in the running Vehicle, his actions were justified under Florida law.
But, even if Defendant were unsure whether a child was in the Vehicle and opened
the door to investigate, the Court still finds that Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. A reasonable officer, armed with Defendant’s knowledge and experience, in
this situation—a running vehicle parked near the fire lane that had not moved in several
minutes without anyone nearby acknowledging it, in a high-crime area prone to
carjacking and auto thefts, plus the alert of something inside the Vehicle—would have

backtracked and said that no one could see inside the backseat. (Doc. 87, pp. 57, 60, 88–
89, 92–93.) The Court notes this discrepancy and finds that even if Defendant could not
see in the vehicle, arguable probable cause existed under the circumstances to justify
Defendant’s actions.
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believed there was probable cause to search the Vehicle, and done so. See Montoute,
114 F.3d at 184. As such, Defendant’s actions did not violate clearly established law at the
time. Defendant is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and the Motion is due to be
granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Defendant James Patton’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 88) is
GRANTED.

2.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant James
Patton and against Plaintiff Derease L. Irons on Plaintiff’s unreasonable
search and seizure claim set forth in the Complaint. (Doc. 23, ¶¶ 35–44.)

3.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on December 5, 2017.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Pro Se Plaintiff

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