Marra v. Commissioner Social Security
Filing
33
OPINION AND ORDER re: 1 Complaint. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED; and The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Commissioner and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick on 9/22/2017. (RN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
SHIEILA ANN MARRA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:16-cv-936-Orl-DCI
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Sheila Ann Marra (Claimant) appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision
denying her application for disability benefits. Doc. 1. Claimant argues that the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) erred by: 1) failing to properly develop the record; 2) finding she has no more
than mild impairments in social functioning; 3) relying on Dr. J. Jeff Oatley’s opinion finding she
has no more than mild impairments in social functioning; 4) finding her testimony concerning her
pain and limitations “not fully credible;” and 5) failing to include certain limitations in his
hypothetical to the vocational expert (VE). Doc. 32 at 12-18, 20-26. Claimant requests that the
matter be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 27. For the reasons set forth
below, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
This case stems from Claimant’s application for supplemental security income. Ex. 1D,
pg. 1-8.1 Claimant alleged a disability onset date of August 1, 2011. Ex. 1D, pg. 1. Claimant’s
1
The administrative record customarily contains sequential record citations on each page of the
record. That is not the case here. The first 25 pages of the administrative record do not contain
sequential record citations or exhibit citations. The Court will, nevertheless, cite to these pages,
which include the ALJ’s decision, using the sequential record citations delineated in the
application was denied on initial review, and on reconsideration. The matter then proceeded before
the ALJ. The ALJ held a hearing on July 8, 2014. R. 82-107. The ALJ determined that Claimant
should undergo a one-time mental health examination during the hearing. R. 101-02. Thus, the
ALJ adjourned the hearing so that Claimant could undergo a one-time mental health examination.
The ALJ continued the hearing on October 15, 2014. R. 52-79. The ALJ entered his decision on
October 30, 2014, and the Appeals Council denied review on April 4, 2016. R. 1-4, 10-20.
II.
THE ALJ’S DECISION.
The ALJ found that Claimant has the following severe impairments: a history of
hypertension; hyperlipidemia; history of possible chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
secondary to tobacco abuse and medical non-compliance. R. 12. The ALJ also found that
Claimant has the following non-severe impairments: chronic low back pain and chest pain; and
mood disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS). R. 12-13.
The ALJ found that Claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals any listed impairment. R. 13-14.
The ALJ found that Claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform
medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c),2 with the following specific limitations:
Within a normal 8-hour workday, the claimant can sit, stand or walk
for 6 hours each and she can lift 50 pounds occasionally and 25
pounds more frequently. The claimant is limited to only frequent
use of foot/pedal controls and push/pull activities with her lower
administrative record’s index. The administrative record contains sequential record citations for
pages 26 through 107. The remaining pages of the administrative record, however, do not contain
sequential record citations, but, instead, contain exhibit citations. Thus, the Court will cite to the
first 107 pages of the administrative record using the sequential record citations (R. #), and will
cite to all remaining pages using exhibit and page citations (Ex. #, pg. #).
2
Medium work is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium work,
we determine that he or she can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).
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extremities; she is limited to only occasional climbing of ramps and
stairs, but she should do no climbing or ropes, ladders or scaffolds
and she is limited to no more than frequent postural movements
otherwise (i.e., balance, stoop, squat, crouch, crawl or kneel). The
claimant should work in a temperature controlled climate, have no
exposure to extreme temperatures; no exposure to pulmonary
irritants such as dusts, fumes, gases or odors and she must avoid
exposure to dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. Lastly,
the claimant has no impairments regarding her ability to interact
with others and she is limited to performing simple, rote and
repetitive tasks free from meeting any production goals or quotas.
This latter limitation is necessary due to her lack of any past work
and not due to any mental impairment.
R. 14. The ALJ found that Claimant did not have any past relevant work experience. R. 19. The
ALJ found that Claimant could perform other work in the national economy. R. 19-20. Thus, the
ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled between her alleged onset date, August 1, 2011, through
the date of the decision, October 30, 2014. R. 20.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards, and whether the Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quotations omitted). The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by
substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is defined as “more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis
v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court must view the evidence as a whole,
taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision,
when determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The court may not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner, and, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s
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decision, the reviewing court must affirm it if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
IV.
ANALYSIS.
A. Duty to Develop.
Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record by not obtaining an
opinion from an examining source that identifies the physical limitations caused by her physical
impairments. Doc. 32 at 12-13. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ was under no duty to
obtain such an opinion. Id. at 13-14.
The ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d
1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).3 This duty generally requires the ALJ to assist in
gathering medical evidence, and to order a consultative examination when such an evaluation is
necessary to make an informed decision. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b). There must be a showing that
the ALJ’s failure to develop the record led to evidentiary gaps in the record, which resulted in
unfairness or clear prejudice, before the court will remand a case for further development of the
record. Graham, 129 F.3d at 1423 (citing Brown, 44 F.3d at 934-35).
The ALJ satisfied his duty to develop a full and fair record. The record, as Claimant notes,
does not contain any treating or examining source opinions setting forth specific physical
limitations. See Exs. 1F-12F. Claimant argues that the ALJ should have obtained such evidence.
Doc. 32 at 13 (citing Delgadillo v. Colvin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142104 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2013); Stringer v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121841 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2009)). The cases
3
The basic duty to develop the record rises to a “special duty” where the claimant is not represented
during the administrative proceedings. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1995).
Claimant was represented during the administrative proceedings. See R. 52-79, 82-107.
Therefore, the ALJ, in this case, only had a basic duty to develop the record.
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Claimant relies on are distinguishable from this case, and, thus, do not support Claimant’s
argument.4 It is axiomatic that the ALJ is responsible for determining the claimant’s RFC. 20
C.F.R. § 416.946(c). The ALJ must consider all the evidence, including evidence from treating,
examining, and non-examining medical sources, in determining the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(3). The ALJ had ample information to determine Claimant’s RFC, including numerous
treatment records (Exs. 6F-7F) and a consultative examination report (Ex. 5F) detailing
unremarkable physical examination results. Thus, the Court finds, under the circumstances of this
case, that the ALJ was not required to obtain a treating or examining source opinion setting forth
specific physical limitations. See Gregory, 2008 WL 4372840, at *8 (“A medical opinion is . . .
not required to validate a RFC finding by the ALJ.”). Further, Claimant has failed to demonstrate
that the lack of a treating or examining source opinion setting forth specific physical limitations
resulted in unfairness or clear prejudice. See Doc. 32 at 13. Thus, in light of the foregoing, the
4
The Delgadillo case, for instance, does not address whether the ALJ must obtain a treating or
examining source opinion setting forth specific physical limitations where there are no such
opinions in the record. The Delgadillo case, instead, involves a situation where the ALJ relied on
a medical opinion that was rendered prior to the onset of several severe impairments. Delgadillo,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142104, at *34-39. The court found that the ALJ erred by relying on the
earlier medical opinion, and instructed the ALJ to order a consultative examination that addressed
the impact of claimant’s other severe impairments. Id. That issue is not present in this case, and,
thus, Delgadillo is distinguishable. The Stringer case, on the other hand, appears to be more on
point. The Stringer court found, in relevant part, that the ALJ should have obtained an opinion
containing a function-by-function analysis, because the record did not contain a treating,
examining, or non-examining source opinion containing a function-by-function analysis. Stringer,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121841, at *11-14. The Court, as an initial matter, is not persuaded that
the finding in Stringer is consistent with the jurisprudence in this Circuit. See Gregory v. Astrue,
Case No. 5:07-cv-19-Oc-GRJ, 2008 WL 4372840, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2008) (“A medical
opinion is . . . not required to validate a RFC finding by the ALJ.”). Further, the Stringer case is
factually distinguishable from this case, because there is a physical RFC report in this case from a
non-examining medical source containing a function-by-function analysis, which the ALJ
considered and weighed at step four. R. 18 (citing Ex. 4A, pgs 8-9).
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Court finds that Claimant has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ did not develop a full and fair
record.
B. Social Functioning.
Claimant argues that the ALJ’s determination that she has mild impairments in social
functioning is not supported by substantial evidence, because the “the record as a whole establishes
that [she] has more than mild limitations in the area of social functioning.” Doc. 32 at 25-26. The
Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s determination that Claimant has mild impairments in social
functioning is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 26-27.
The ALJ, as previously mentioned, found that Claimant suffers from several non-severe
impairments, including mood disorder, NOS. R. 12. The ALJ, as a result, considered the four
broad functional areas set forth in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders, which
includes social functioning. R. 12-13. The ALJ stated, in relevant part, as follows:
The next functional area is social functioning. During the hearing,
the claimant testified she significantly struggles in getting along
with others and she does not like to interact with people. However,
according to the record, multiple treatment providers and examining
medical sources have noted the claimant’s socially appropriate
responsive behavior and have described the claimant as
“cooperative” during the course of treatment and medical
examinations. Therefore, the claimant has no more than mild
limitations in social functioning (Exhibits 6F-8F and 12F).
R. 13. The ALJ relied on treatment records from Claimant’s primary care physician (PCP),
Stewart-Marchmann-Act Behavior Healthcare (SMA), and the emergency room, as well as Dr.
Oatley’s mental health evaluation, in determining that Claimant has mild limitations in social
functioning. Id. (citing Exs. 6F-8F, 12F).
The ALJ’s determination that Claimant has mild limitations in social functioning is
supported by substantial evidence. Claimant does not challenge the reasons supporting the ALJ’s
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determination that she has mild limitations in social functioning, but, instead, argues that other
evidence (her mental impairments and testimony) reveals that she has more than mild limitations
in social functioning. Doc. 32 at 25-26. The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, not whether other evidence supports a
different outcome. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1558. Thus, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence. This is true even if the Court found that the evidence the
Claimant cites preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at
1239. The ALJ, here, noted that Claimant testified that she had difficulty interacting with others.
R. 13. The ALJ, however, found this testimony was inconsistent with Claimant’s treatment records
and Dr. Oatley’s mental health evaluation, which, as the ALJ discussed, routinely contained
normal mental evaluations and no evidence of social impairment. See Exs. 6F-8F, 12F. A pattern
of normal mental evaluations, coupled with no documented evidence of significant social
impairments supports the ALJ’s conclusion concerning Claimant ability to socialize. Thus, the
Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Claimant has mild limitations in social functioning
is supported by substantial evidence.5
5
The Court, despite its narrow scope of review, has considered whether the evidence Claimant
relies on (her mental impairments and testimony) undermines the ALJ’s determination that she has
mild limitations in social functioning. First, the mere existence of Claimant’s mental impairments
does not reveal whether those impairments cause social limitations. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405
F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, the mere fact Claimant has been diagnosed with
various mental impairments bears little, if any, significance in demonstrating that she has more
than mild limitations in social functioning, because the diagnoses, in and of themselves, do not
provide any insight as to whether those impairments (none of which were diagnosed by a mental
health professional) caused any social limitations. Second, the ALJ found that Claimant’s
testimony, including her testimony concerning her social limitations, was not entirely credible. R.
17-18. The Court, as discussed below, finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported
by substantial evidence. See infra pp. 11-14. Thus, Claimant’s reliance on her testimony to
undermine the ALJ’s determination that she has mild limitations in social functioning is
unavailing. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the presence of Claimant’s
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C. Dr. Oatley.
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred by assigning Dr. Oatley’s opinion that she had no severe
mental impairments significant weight, because the record reveals that she, in fact, was diagnosed
with and suffers from several mental health impairments. Doc. 32 at 22-24. The Commissioner
argues that the ALJ’s decision to assign Dr. Oatley’s opinion significant weight is supported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 24-25.
An examining physician’s opinion is generally not entitled to any deference. McSwain v.
Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987). The more consistent a physician’s opinion is with the
record as a whole, the more weight an ALJ can place on that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4).
Dr. Oatley performed a psychological evaluation of Claimant on September 22, 2014. Ex.
12F. Dr. Oatley considered treatment records from SMA, Claimant’s physical and mental health
history, and conducted a mental status examination, which was unremarkable. Ex. 12F, pg. 2-4.
Dr. Oatley essentially found that Claimant did not suffer from any severe mental impairments,
and, thus, her ability to perform tasks and socialize were not impaired as a result of any mental
impairments. Ex. 12F, pg. 4-7.
The ALJ considered Claimant’s testimony, various medical records, and medical source
opinions in reviewing Claimant mental impairments. R. 15-18. The ALJ, for example, discussed
the following evidence concerning Claimant’s mental impairments:
Concerning her mental impairments, SMA mental health treatment
records reflect the claimant reporting generally mild mental
symptoms as well as positive response to treatment (when she
actually took medication as prescribed). For example, according to
a December 2013 SMA therapy notes, the claimant reported feeling
“ok;” and that her “meds really help” in relation to mental symptoms
(Exhibit 8F/6).
mental impairments and her testimony do no undermine the ALJ’s determination that she has mild
limitations in social functioning.
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Moreover, during the course of her routine SMA mental status
exams, the claimant consistently demonstrated a cooperative
attitude; normal speech; appropriate affect; normal mood; logical
thought processes; unremarkable thought content; good insight;
adequate judgment; adequate attention and concentration and no
memory impairments. Treating SMA providers also assigned the
claimant Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 65
(Exhibit 8F), which indicates no more than mild limitations in
mental functioning, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders – Fourth Edition. Consequently, it appears the claimant’s
mental impairments remain manageable with ongoing therapy and
medication compliance and her mental symptoms are far from
debilitating in relation to the degree of severity as reflected in the
available records (Exhibit 8F).
Furthermore, the claimant recently presented for a mental status
evaluation (MSE) in September 2014 by non-treating psychological
consultant, J. Jeff Oatley, Ph.D., who reported no significant mental
limitations in her overall functioning. Specifically, Dr. Oatley noted
the claimant’s relevant medical history, troubled childhood history
and history of legal troubles relating to marijuana possession and
marijuana use. During the mental status exam, Dr. Oatley recorded
the claimant demonstrated appropriate mood, normal energy level,
adequate self-esteem, adequate fund of knowledge, no evidence of
any concentration deficits and no severe mental health impairments
in concluding that the claimant suffered from tobacco use disorder,
moderate; alcohol use disorder, mild; hypertension, hyperlipidemia
and rule out back pain (Exhibit 12F).
R. 16-17 (citing Exs. 8F, 12F). The ALJ also considered Claimant’s testimony and treatment
records from Claimant’s PCP and the emergency room. R. 15-17. The ALJ proceeded to consider
the opinion evidence, including Dr. Oatley’s opinion, stating:
Dr. Oatley completed a medical questionnaire on the claimant
subsequent to his September 2014 consultative evaluation.
Ultimately, Dr. Oatley opined the claimant showed no limitations in
her ability to understand, remember and carry out instructions and
no limitations in her ability to interact appropriately with
supervisors, co-workers and the public or respond to changes in a
routine work setting (Exhibit 12F). In the instant case, the [ALJ]
finds Dr. Oatley’s mental assessment consistent with the other
credible evidence of record in its entirety and therefore accords his
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medical opinion significant probative weight in determining the
claimant’s relevant mental limitations in a work setting.
R. 18. Thus, the ALJ assigned significant weight to Dr. Oatley’s opinion because it was consistent
with other evidence that the ALJ found to be credible. Id.
The ALJ thoroughly considered the record evidence in determining whether Claimant’s
mental impairments resulted in any functional limitations. Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in
relying on Dr. Oatley’s opinion, because “the record as a whole establishes that the Plaintiff has
mental health issues inclusive of [difficulty] getting along with people and . . . a low frustration
tolerance.” Doc. 32 at 23-24. This argument suggests that the ALJ relied solely on Dr. Oatley’s
opinion in determining that Claimant’s mental impairments resulted in no functional limitations.
The ALJ, however, considered and relied upon treatment records from Claimant’s PCP, the
emergency room, and SMA, in addition to Dr. Oatley’s opinion, in determining whether
Claimant’s mental impairments resulted in any functional limitations. R. 15-18. Thus, the ALJ
did not fail to consider the record as a whole in determining whether Claimant’s mental
impairments resulted in any functional limitation.
Further, the ALJ’s decision to assign Dr. Oatley’s opinion significant weight is supported
by substantial evidence. Dr. Oatley’s opinion is, as the ALJ found, consistent with other evidence
in the record, including treatment records from Claimant’s PCP, the emergency room, and SMA.
These treatment records, for example, reveal that Claimant’s mental status examinations were
routinely unremarkable. See Exs. 6F-8F. The treatment records also revealed that Claimant’s
mental health impairments were well controlled when Claimant was compliant with her treatment
and medications. Ex. 8F, pg. 3, 6.6 These records are relatively consistent with Dr. Oatley’s
6
This fact is highlighted by the treatment notes from SMA. Claimant reported doing well while
she was on her medications. Ex. 8F, pg. 3, 6. These reports were corroborated by Claimant’s
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observations and opinion. Compare Exs. 6F-8F with Ex. 12F. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in
assigning Dr. Oatley’s opinion significant weight, because his reasons for doing so were supported
by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4) (a medical opinion is generally entitled to
more weight where it is consistent with the medical record as a whole).
D. Credibility.
Claimant argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. Doc. 32 at 14-18. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 18-20.
A claimant may establish “disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective
symptoms.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). A claimant seeking to
establish disability through his or her own testimony must show:
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a)
objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged
pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can
reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). If the ALJ determines
that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the
claimant’s alleged pain or other symptoms, the ALJ must then evaluate the extent to which the
intensity and persistence of those symptoms limit the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(c)(1). In doing so, the ALJ considers a variety of evidence, including, but not limited to,
the claimant’s history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements,
mental status examinations, which were largely unremarkable. Ex. 8F, pg. 4, 7. Claimant,
however, began to experience issues when she ran out of her medications. Ex. 8F, pg. 9. This
aberration appears to have occurred due to Claimant’s failure to remember that she could request
free re-fills, and not because of an inability to afford her medication. Id. This issue was apparently
rectified, since Dr. Oatley’s mental status examination of Claimant, which occurred after this issue,
was unremarkable. See Ex. 12F, pg. 2-5.
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medical source opinions, and other evidence of how the pain affects the claimant’s daily activities
and ability to work. Id. at § 416.929(c)(1)-(3). “If the ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s
testimony as to her pain, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Foote, 67
F.3d at 1561-62. The Court will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding that is supported
by substantial evidence. Id. at 1562.
The ALJ considered Claimant’s testimony and her credibility, explaining:
Despite the above claimant-reported allegations and limitations, the
[ALJ] notes that the record establishes the claimant’s ability to
engage in a broad range of activities of daily living including taking
public transportation; she regularly obtains cigarettes and alcohol
and she is able to attend to her personal care (bathing, grooming,
dressing, etc.) without difficulty. Furthermore, non-treating
examining physicians and regular treating physicians/providers
have consistently noted the claimant’s ability to attend to activities
of daily living without assistance. Also pertinent, the claimant
testified that, due to her history of arrests and incarceration,
background checks prevent her from employment; however, such
reasoning is unrelated to any medically determinable impairments
or medical related issues connected with her disability claim
(Exhibits 6F-8F and 12F).
Also, as previously discussed, the claimant’s mood disorder is
deemed “non-severe” based on the claimant’s comments that her
symptoms remained well managed on prescribed medication from
her PCP and SMA therapy. Moreover, the claimant’s treating
physicians and examining medical sources consistently noted the
claimant presenting with normal affect, appropriate mood, alert and
oriented and demonstrating adequate attention span (Exhibits 6F8F).
Therefore, after careful consideration of the evidence, the
undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the
alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning
the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not fully credible for the reasons explained herein. Also pertinent
in assessing the claimant’s credibility, the [ALJ] notes the
claimant’s exceedingly poor work history and little motivation to
work (Exhibit 3D). When queried about her ability to do very
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simple jobs, she was unable to articulate any cogent reason as to why
she would be unable to work saying only “I am not able to work.”
R. 17-18 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the ALJ found that Claimant’s allegations concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were “not fully credible” based on
the success of her treatment, her routine and largely unremarkable mental status examinations, the
scope of her daily activities of living, her inability to articulate why she is unable to work due to
her medical impairments, her poor work history, and lack of motivation to work. Id.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. Claimant argues that the reasons the ALJ articulated in support of his credibility
determination either provide little support to the ALJ’s credibility determination, or supports her
allegations concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her impairments. Doc. 32
at 17-18. Claimant, for instance, argues that since she performed few activities of daily living due
to her homelessness, her daily activities do not provide sufficient insight into her ability to perform
work-related activities. Id. at 18. The Court disagrees. The ALJ articulated several representative
activities of daily living that, taken together, demonstrate that Claimant, despite her homelessness,
is able to perform simple tasks to maintain her independence. R. 17. Thus, the Court finds that
Claimant’s activities of daily living do weigh against Claimant’s allegations, and, consequently,
support the ALJ’s credibility determination.
The ALJ’s other reasons, when viewed together, support his credibility determination.
Claimant argues that her treatment and her poor work history do not support the ALJ’s credibility
determination, but, instead, support her allegations concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her impairments. Doc. 32 at 17-18. The Court disagrees. The record, as
previously mentioned, demonstrates that Claimant’s mental health impairments were well
controlled when Claimant was compliant with her treatment and medications. Ex. 8F, pg. 3, 6.
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Claimant’s improvement was evidenced by her largely unremarkable mental status examinations.
Ex. 8F, pg. 4, 7. Thus, the Court finds this evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.
Further, Claimant’s poor work history also supports the ALJ’s credibility determination. Claimant
cites no evidence demonstrating that her poor work history was caused by her impairments. See
Doc. 32 at 17-18. The record, as the ALJ discussed, instead, reveals that Claimant testified that
she could not find work, in part, due to her criminal history. See R. 93. Thus, the ALJ properly
considered Claimant’s poor work history, which was related, to some extent, to factors unrelated
to her impairments.
The Court, having considered Claimant’s arguments challenging the ALJ’s credibility
determination, finds that Claimant’s arguments are unavailing. The Court finds that the reasons
articulated by the ALJ support his credibility determination, and are supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
E. Hypothetical to VE.
Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to present a hypothetical to the VE that contained all
of her limitations. Doc. 32 at 21-22. The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ properly rejected
the limitations Claimant argues should have been included in his hypothetical to the VE, and thus
was not required to include the same in his hypothetical to the VE. Id. at 22.
The ALJ may consider the testimony of a VE in determining whether the claimant can
perform other jobs in the national economy. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.
2004). The ALJ is required to pose hypothetical questions that are accurate and that include all of
the claimant’s functional limitations. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir.
1985). The ALJ, however, is not required to include “each and every symptom” of the claimant’s
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impairments, Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007), or
“findings . . . that the ALJ . . . properly rejected as unsupported” in the hypothetical question,
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the ALJ relies on
the VE’s testimony, but fails to include all the claimant’s functional limitations in the hypothetical
question, the final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Pendley, 767 F.2d at
1562 (quoting Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980)).
The ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE that was consistent with his RFC determination.
R. 60-61. The VE, based on the ALJ’s hypothetical, found that Claimant would be able to perform
the following representative jobs: tagger; ticket taker; table worker; paper pattern folder. R. 6364. The ALJ found the VE’s testimony credible, and relied on the same in determining that
Claimant could perform other work in the national economy. R. 20.
The ALJ committed no error with respect to his hypothetical to the VE. Claimant argues
that the ALJ’s hypothetical should have indicated that she has difficulty interacting with others,
and occasionally needs to take a 10 to 15 minute break when she becomes frustrated with others.
Doc. 32 at 21. The only evidence supporting these limitations stems from Claimant’s testimony.
R. 55-57. The ALJ, as previously mentioned, considered Claimant’s testimony and found her
testimony, including testimony concerning her difficulty interacting with others and need for
breaks when she becomes frustrated with others, not entirely credible. R. 17-18. The Court
concluded that the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See
supra pp. 11-14. Thus, the ALJ properly rejected Claimant’s testimony concerning her social
limitations, and, consequently, was not required to include those limitations in his hypothetical to
the VE. Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ committed no error
with respect to his hypothetical to the VE.
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V.
CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that:
1. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED; and
2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Commissioner and close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 22, 2017.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
The Court Requests that the Clerk
Mail or Deliver Copies of this order to:
The Honorable John D. Thompson, Jr.
Administrative Law Judge
c/o Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
SSA ODAR Hearing Ofc.
Desoto Bldg., Suite 400
8880 Freedom Crossing Trail
Jacksonville, FL 32256-1224
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