Pankey v. Aetna Life Insurance Company et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 14 motion to dismiss; denying as moot 26 Motion to stay discovery. On or before Friday, December 2, 2016, Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 11/17/2016. (VMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
JUDSON CLAY PANKEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 6:16-cv-1011-Orl-37GJK
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;
and MES GROUP, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the following matters:
(1)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Supporting Memorandum of Law
(Doc. 14), filed July 14, 2016;
(2)
Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27), filed
August 30, 2016;
(3)
Defendants’ Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32),
filed September 9, 2016; and
(4)
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending the Court’s Determination of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [DE 14] with Incorporated Memorandum of
Law (Doc. 26), filed August 30, 2016.
BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2016, pro se plaintiff Judson Clay Pankey (“Plaintiff”) filed a
seven-count Complaint against Defendants Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”) and
MES Group, Inc. (“MES”). (Doc. 1.) In accordance with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint with
prejudice (Doc. 14 (“MTD”)), Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 27 (“Response”)), and
Defendant filed an authorized reply (Doc. 32 (“Reply”)). Finally, Defendant filed an
unopposed motion for stay of discovery pending resolution of the MTD (Doc. 26 (“Stay
Motion”)). These matters are now ripe for adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth the minimum
requirements for complaints filed in this Court. In particular, complaints: (1) must include
“short and plain” statements of the basis for jurisdiction and the pleader’s claims; (2) must
be organized in “numbered paragraphs each limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances”; and (3) may not provide only labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic
recitation of the elements of a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 8(d), 10(b); see also Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Local Rules 1.05, 1.06. Failure to fulfill
these minimum requirements may be raised in motions to dismiss brought pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1)—for deficient jurisdictional allegations—and Rule 12(b)(6)—for deficiently
stated claims. Further, courts should–sua sponte—require repleader when confronted
with a shotgun pleading. See Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1127–28
(11th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint cannot stand
because it is a confusing and impermissible shotgun pleading. Each of the seven counts
incorporate by reference the first thirty paragraphs of the Complaint and then summarily
allege purported violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id.
¶¶ 31–47.) Specifically, after indiscriminately and repeatedly incorporating the first thirty
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paragraphs of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Aetna violated:
(1)
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) when it allegedly discriminated against
Plaintiff because of his disability—a profound hearing impairment
(“Disability”)—“by failing to provide the accommodation of”
Communication Access Real-Time Translation (“CART”) for use
during a proposed meeting in 2012 (“2012 Meeting”), which
concerned Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under long term disability
insurance policy number GP-474696-GI (“Policy”) (id. ¶¶ 1, 7–9, 31,
32 (“Count I”));
(2)
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) when it allegedly discriminated
against Plaintiff by directing one of its subsidiaries to “conduct a
home visit, if needed, with no adaptive devices” for Plaintiff (id. ¶¶ 33,
34 (“Count II”));
(3)
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) when it allegedly interfered with Plaintiff’s
“exercise of his rights for the use of CART . . . by taking 117 days to
schedule CART services, by changing the [2012 Meeting] to a
conference call” (“2012 Call”), “by ceasing efforts to schedule” the
2012 Call (id. ¶¶ 35, 36 (“Count III”)) and by “populating its internal
notes system” with unsupported negative statements concerning
Plaintiff (id. ¶¶ 37, 38 (“Count IV”)); and
(4)
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) when—as retaliation against Plaintiff for
asserting his rights under the ADA—Aetna allegedly disclosed
Plaintiff’s confidential information to an unnamed person (id. ¶¶ 43,
44 (“Count VI”)) and demanded repayment of $142.12 from Plaintiff
(id. ¶¶ 45, 46 (“Count VII”)).
Plaintiff further alleges that Aetna and MES (“Defendants”) violated 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)
when—to further retaliate against Plaintiff for asserting his rights under the ADA—the
Defendants failed to follow the standard of care established under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6
(“HIPPA”). (See id. ¶¶ 39–42 (“Count V”).)
Notably, the thirty paragraphs incorporated by reference in each count describe
varied events that occurred over approximately five years. (See id. ¶¶ 1–30.) This
quintessential shotgun pleading style is confusing and cannot be permitted. For this
reason alone, repleader is required. See Paylor, 748 F.3d at 1127–28; Hickman v.
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Hickman, 563 F. App’x 742, 744 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs.
of Cent. Fla. Cmty College, 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir.1996).
Although dismissal of the Complaint is required, the Court briefly addresses
Defendants’ arguments that: (1) Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because they are
preempted under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1001, which provides “the exclusive means by which an ERISA-plan
beneficiary may challenge an insurer’s processing of benefits” (see Doc. 14, pp. 6–9
(“Preemption Argument”)); and (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because
Plaintiff “lacks Article III standing” (“Standing Argument”). (Doc. 14.)
Plaintiff contends that his claims are not preempted because they concern his
federal civil rights and “the manner in which Defendants administer” the Policy—not a
benefits determination (see id. at 4–6). Plaintiff also contends that the Standing Argument
fails because an ongoing “contractual relationship” exists between Plaintiff and
Defendants (Doc. 27, pp. 6–10).
As to the Preemption Argument, the Plaintiff is correct that ERISA’s preemption
provision is limited to state laws—not federal laws like the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d);
see also Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 2015); Olson v. Dex
Imaging, Inc., 63 F. Supp.3d 1353, 1361–62 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss).
Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are not due to be dismissed at the pleading stage based on
preemption. In contrast, Defendant has the better Standing Argument. Plaintiff seeks only
injunctive and declaratory relief, yet he provides an entirely conclusory and insufficient
allegation that he “will continue to be irreparably injured by the conduct of the Defendants
unless this [C]ourt grants the declaratory and injunctive relief which he seeks.” (See
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Doc. 1, ¶ 47.) Further, Plaintiff’s “Prayer for Relief” seeks little more than compliance with
non-specific “requirements of Title III of the ADA.” (See id. at 14.) Although these
allegations plainly are deficient, the Court does not agree with Defendants that
amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the Complaint is due to be dismissed without
prejudice, and the Stay Motion is due to be denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
(1)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Supporting Memorandum of Law
(Doc. 14) is GRANTED.
(2)
On or before Friday, December 2, 2016, Plaintiff may file an Amended
Complaint in accordance with this Order and Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3)
If Plaintiff fails to timely file an Amended Complaint, the Court will dismiss
this action for failure to prosecute and will close this file without further
notice to Plaintiff.
(4)
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending the Court’s Determination of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [DE 14] with Incorporated Memorandum of
Law (Doc. 26) is DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on November 17, 2016.
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Copies:
Counsel of Record
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