Bruton v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 38

ORDER adopting 32 Report and Recommendations. Defendant Commissioner of Social Security's Objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 33) are OVERRULED. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 9/21/2017. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
REGINALD BRUTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:16-cv-1209-Orl-37DCI

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________
ORDER
In the instant action, Plaintiff Reginald Bruton appeals a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his
application for disability and disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 1.) On referral, U.S.
Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick issued a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32 (“R&R”))
recommending that the Commissioner’s final decision be reversed. The Commissioner
then filed an objection (Doc. 33 (“Objection”)) to the R&R, and Plaintiff responded (Doc.
37).
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s objection is due to
be overruled, and Magistrate Judge Irick’s R&R is due to be adopted.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff first filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits on September 6, 2012, alleging disability beginning June 30, 2012. (Doc. 16-2,
p. 11.) His claim was initially denied and denied again upon reconsideration. (Id.)
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Plaintiff then requested a hearing, which was held on September 11, 2014 in front of an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with counsel present. (Id.) On January 8, 2015, the ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.) Plaintiff
requested review of the ALJ’s decision before the Appeals Council of the Social Security
Administration, which was denied. (R. 1.) As such, the ALJ’s decision finding no
disability became the Commissioner’s final decision.
Plaintiff then filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with the Court requesting review of the
Commissioner’s decision and reversal for an award or benefits or remand. As grounds,
Plaintiff proffers four non-harmless errors committed by the ALJ. (Doc. 25, p. 2.) Only the
first is relevant here: that the ALJ failed to accord great weight to Plaintiff’s 80% disability
rating from the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). (Id.) On this ground, Magistrate
Judge Irick found that the ALJ erred by failing to appropriately weigh and consider the
VA’s rating, which led to his recommendation that the decision be reversed and
remanded. (Doc. 32, p. 7.) The Commissioner objected to his recommendation (Doc. 33),
and Plaintiff filed a response in support of the R&R. (Doc. 37).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s findings, the district court must
“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. The
district court must consider the record and factual issues based on the record
independent of the magistrate judge’s report. Ernest S. ex rel. Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ.,
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896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990).
III.

ANALYSIS

The Commissioner objects to Magistrate Judge Irick’s first recommendation to
remand this case for additional consideration of Plaintiff’s VA disability rating. (Doc. 33,
p. 1.) Specifically, the Commissioner contends that such remand is unnecessary because
the ALJ adequately considered the VA rating in her ultimate determination of Plaintiff’s
disability status. (Id.) Therefore, the Commissioner requests that the Court reject the R&R
and uphold the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 7.) Upon de novo review of the record, the Court
agrees with Magistrate Judge Irick’s findings and conclusion in the R&R.
Determining whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security
Administration

(“SSA”)

involves

a

five-step

sequential

evaluation

process.

20 CFR 404.1520(a). This evaluation takes into account many different sources of
information on the applicant’s disability status, as set forth in SSA regulations and
rulings. Amidst a potentially vast body of evidence to sift through and consider when
determining an individual’s disability status, ALJs have been told what evidence should
be accorded greater weight. As long-instructed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, a disability rating from the VA is “evidence that should be given great
weight.” Brady v. Hecker, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (quotation
omitted).
“Great weight” does not mean controlling, but “the ALJ must seriously consider
and closely scrutinize the VA’s disability determination and must give specific reasons if
the ALJ discounts that determination.” Brown-Gaudet-Evans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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673 F. App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2016). 1 To remedy an ALJ’s failure to do so, courts will
reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand the case for the ALJ to appropriately
weigh the VA disability rating. See Williams v. Barnhart, 180 F. App’x 902, 902
(11th Cir. 2006) (reversing and remanding with the instruction that “in its decision the
ALJ should specifically also consider and address the VA’s Rating Decision itself”); see
also Hogard v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (“The only reason given
by the ALJ rejecting the VA disability rating was that the two agencies used different
criteria to evaluate disability claims. This is not sufficient justification for not according
great weight . . . .”). 2
Here, the Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ was required to “explain in
detail why [the VA’s disability rating] was not entitled to great weight.” (See Doc. 33, p.
3 (citing Boyette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 605 F. App’x 777, 779–80 (11th Cir. 2015).) To that
end, the Commissioner cites the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s VA disability rating in an
attempt to convince the Court that this standard was met. (Doc. 33, p. 3, 6–7.) Not so. The
ALJ gave Plaintiff’s VA disability rating one paragraph of mention in her twelve-page
opinion. (Doc. 16-2, pp. 17–18.) Of that, two sentences state her “reasoning” for

While unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, they may be considered
as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2; see also United States v. Almedina,
686 F.3d 1312, 1316 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
2 Recent cases from courts in this district confirm the trend of reversal and remand
when the ALJ has not adequately considered the VA’s disability rating. See, e.g., Collier v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-527-FtM-CM, 2017 WL 3911561, at *8–9 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 7, 2017); Mallory v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:14-CV-1669-ORL-GJK 2015
WL 8321898, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2015); Salamina v. Colvin, No. 8:12-cv-1986-T23TGW, 2013 WL 2352204, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2013); Ray v. Astrue, No. 8:08-cv335-DAB, 2009 WL 799448, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2009).
1

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dismissing the rating in her final calculus: “The undersigned notes that the VA is a
distinct agency that utilizes its own standards in evaluation [sic] veterans’ claims. Their
findings are not binding on Social Security determinations.” (Id. at 18.) Although true,
these statements hardly demonstrate that the ALJ placed the requisite “great weight” on
Plaintiff’s 80% VA disability rating. Nor do they demonstrate the application of “serious
consideration” and “close scrutiny” required for such a departure from a fellow
government agency’s ratings. The Eleventh Circuit’s requirement of “great weight,”
“close scrutiny,” and “serious consideration” is not met by a gratuitous passing reference.
Thus, without meaningful discussion of the VA rating’s impact on the ALJ’s
analysis of Plaintiff’s disability rating, the Court cannot conclude that her decision was
supported by substantial evidence. It is incumbent upon the adjudicator to explain the
consideration given to the agency decision. So says Magistrate Judge Irick in his wellreasoned, comprehensive R&R (Doc. 32, p. 7), and the Commissioner’s objection does not
persuade the Court otherwise. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Irick’s R&R is due to be
adopted, the Commissioner’s decision is due to be reversed, and the case is due to be
remanded to the Commissioner.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick’s Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 2) is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED, and made a part of this Order.

2.

Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s Objections to the United
States Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 33) are
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OVERRULED.
3.

The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this case is
REMANDED for further proceedings.

4.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant and to close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on September 21, 2017.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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