Woide et al v. Federal National Mortgage Association

Filing 26

ORDER denying 25 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 2/9/2017. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

In Re:
CHARLES EDWARD WOIDE; and
SUSANNAH CLARE WOIDE,
Debtors.
Bankr. Case No. 6:10-bk-22841-KSJ
_________________________________
CHARLES EDWARD WOIDE; and
SUSANNAH CLARE WOIDE,
Appellants,
v.

Case No. 6:16-cv-1484-Orl-37

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION,
Appellee.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing and
Reconsideration of Order (Doc. 25), filed January 23, 2017.
Appellants initiated this appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order reopening the
bankruptcy case to compel surrender of Appellants’ home (Doc. 5-2 (“Surrender
Order”).) On January 9, 2017, finding that Appellants had failed to demonstrate that the
bankruptcy court abused its discretion, the Court affirmed the Surrender Order. (Doc. 24
(“Dismissal Order).) Appellants now urge the Court to reconsider its decision on the
ground that the Court failed to consider material facts presented to the Court. (Doc. 25

(“Motion to Reconsider”).) 1 Appellee did not respond to the Motion to Reconsider, and
the time for doing so has now passed.
Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is appropriate on the
basis of: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) newly discovered evidence; or
(3) clear error or manifest injustice. See Beepot v. JP Morgan Chase Nat’l Corp. Servs.,
626 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2015); Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A.,
153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (noting that courts have generally granted such
relief in those three circumstances). 2 Rule 59, however, cannot be used to “relitigate old
matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry
of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763
(11th Cir. 2005). “The Court’s reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary
remedy, to be employed sparingly.” Mannings v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., 149 F.R.D.
235, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1993). “[T]he decision to grant such relief is committed to the sound
discretion of the district judge . . . .” Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v.
Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993).
Appellants do not contend that there has been an intervening change in controlling
law or that there is newly discovered evidence. Rather, they contend that the Court failed
to consider material facts presented to the Court at the time of the Dismissal Order.
1

Appellants represent that they seek reconsideration of the Court’s Order affirming
the bankruptcy court’s order vacating its prior rulings (Bankr. Doc. 63). (See Doc. 25,
p. 2.) But the Dismissal Order only affirmed the Surrender Order. (See Doc. 24.) Thus,
the Court will assume that Appellants meant to seek reconsideration of the order
addressed in the Dismissal Order.
2 Because Appellants filed their Motion to Reconsider within twenty-eight days of
the Dismissal Order Rule 59(e) controls. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); see also United States
v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 1560, 1562 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that the prior version of
Rule 59(e) applies when a motion is filed within ten days of judgment).

2

(Doc. 25, p. 4.) The Court will presume that such arguments relate to the clear error or
manifest injustice standards for reconsideration. Even under this presumption, Appellants
have reiterated, nearly verbatim, the standing and fraud arguments made in their initial
brief. (Compare Id. at 4–7, with Doc. 21, pp. 12–16.) Contrary to Appellants’ contention,
the Court did consider these arguments in the Dismissal Order but found them to be
unavailing. (See Doc. 24, pp. 4–6, 9 n.9.)
Far too often, litigants operate under the assumption, as Appellants do here, that
any adverse ruling confers on them a license to move for reconsideration, and utilize such
motion as a platform to relitigate issues that have already been decided or otherwise seek
a “do over.” Such use of Rule 59 is improper. See Michael Linet, Inc., 408 F.3d at 763.
Indeed, a court’s order is not intended as a mere first draft, subject to revision at the
litigant’s

whim.

See

Plummer

v.

PJCF,

LLC,

No.

2:15-cv-37-FtM-38CM,

2015 WL 2359996, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2015) (citing Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v.
Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill 1988)). As Appellants have failed to
explain why Rule 59 is satisfied here, the Court finds that the Motion to Reconsider is due
be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Appellants’ Motion for
Rehearing and Reconsideration of Order (Doc. 25) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on February 9, 2017.

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Copies:
Counsel of Record
Pro Se Parties
Trustee

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