Ellis v. U.S. Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 34

ORDER granting 17 motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 2/6/2017. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
ERNEST MICHAEL ELLIS, III,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:16-cv-1750-Orl-37KRS

U.S. BANK, N.A.; CALIBER HOME
LOANS, INC.; WASHINGTON MUTUAL
BANK, F.A.; JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A.; and LASALLE BANK, N.A.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court the following:
1.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 17), filed November
8, 2016; and

2.

Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint and
Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 22), filed December 12, 2016.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff—proceeding pro se—initiated this action for violation of the Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”) against Defendants. (See Doc. 1.) On August 16, 2016, Plaintiff
mailed a notice of rescission (Doc. 1-1 (“Notice”)) with respect to the loan (“Loan”) and
mortgage (“Mortgage”), which secures Plaintiff’s residence (“Property”) to U.S. Bank,
N.A. (“U.S. Bank”), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”), and Washington Mutual
Bank, F.A. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). According to Plaintiff, upon mailing the Notice, the Loan was
cancelled by operation of law and the Mortgage was void. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14, 16.) Thus,

Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to: (1) return of the cancelled Loan; (2) recording of an
instrument that would release all encumbrances or liens; and (3) reimbursement of all
funds paid in connection with the origination of the Loan. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Defendants, as
creditors, have allegedly failed to comply with these obligations and are “continuing to
process an alleged foreclosure” based on a now-voided Mortgage. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 33.)
Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from taking any affirmative action
or seeking any relief with respect to the Loan and prohibit any potential judicial sale of the
Property. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.)
On November 8, 2016, JPMorgan moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground
that

the

Court

lacked

subject-matter

jurisdiction

based

on

the

well-settled

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 17 (“MTD”).) Attached to its MTD are copies of: (1) a
June 26, 2013 final foreclosure judgment from the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit
in and for Orange County, Florida (“State Court”) in favor of U.S. Bank entitling it to
foreclose on the Property (Doc. 17-1 (“State Foreclosure Judgment”); and (2) Plaintiff’s
appeal of the State Foreclosure Judgment to the District Court of Appeal for the Fifth
District of Florida (Doc. 17-2). Plaintiff responded (Doc. 22), and the matter is ripe for
adjudication.
STANDARD
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
challenges a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and may take two forms—a facial attack

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and a factual attack. Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys. Inc., 524 F.3d
1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). Facial attacks on the complaint “require[ ] the court merely
to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction, and the allegations in the complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the
motion.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, a factual attack raises the jurisdictional challenge “irrespective
of the pleadings.” Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). In
resolving a 12(b)(1) factual attack, a court is “free to independently weigh facts” and
consider evidence outside of the pleadings, so long as its conclusions do not implicate
the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 925. Courts are to presume that they lack
subject-matter jurisdiction, and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the
party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. A challenge to a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a factual attack. See,
e.g., O’Neal v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 8:11-cv-107-T-17-TGW, 2012 WL 629817, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2012).
DISCUSSION
JPMorgan contends that, under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit. 1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes
lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009). In general, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies if: (1) the federal action is brought by a state-court loser;
1

The doctrine has its origins in two U.S. Supreme Court cases. Dist. of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923).

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(2) complaining of an injury caused by a state-court judgment; (3) rendered before the
federal district court proceedings commenced; and (4) inviting the district court to review
and reject the state-court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To that end, the doctrine encompasses claims that were
actually raised in the state court and those “inextricably intertwined” with that state court
judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A federal claim is
inextricably interviewed with a state-court judgment where: (1) the success of the federal
claim would “effectively nullify” the state-court judgment; and (2) the federal claim
“succeeds only to the extent that the state wrongly decided the issues.” Springer v.
Perryman, 401 F. App’x 457, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Casale, 558 F.3d
at 1260).
These four requirements for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are
met as to Plaintiff’s TILA claim. Plaintiff, the losing party to the State Foreclosure
Judgment, brought this federal action. (See Doc. 1.) The State Court issued its State
Foreclosure Judgment more than three years before Plaintiff initiated this action. (See
Doc. 17-1.) And, Plaintiff’s TILA claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the State
Foreclosure Judgment because a decision on the TILA claim would effectively nullify the
State Foreclosure Judgment. See Parker v. Potter, 368 F. App’x 945, 947–48
(11th Cir. 2010) (reversing the grant of summary judgment on a TILA claim because such
action “unquestionably invalidated the state court’s final judgment granting foreclosure
and therefore offended the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”); see also Harper v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 138 F. App’x 130, 133 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of a claim
under TILA and noting that the TILA claim was inextricably intertwined where the plaintiff

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sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of final state foreclosure judgment). Hence
Plaintiff is asking that the Court do what Rooker-Feldman plainly prohibits, that is,
“overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292.
To be sure, while Plaintiff was a party to the state-court proceeding, not all
defendants in the instant federal case were parties. Apart from U.S. Bank none of the
other defendants were part of the State Foreclosure Judgment. (See Doc. 17-1.) But the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires only that the party against whom the doctrine is being
asserted in federal court—Plaintiff—to have been a party in the prior state-court
proceeding. See Auburn Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cobb, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338
(M.D. Ala. 2008) (citing Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006)); see also Christophe
v. Morris, 198 F. App’x 818, 824–25 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (disregarding the fact
that other defendants to the federal action were not parties to the state-court action
because the “party that matters is the plaintiff”). 2 This requirement is clearly met here.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies
to Plaintiff’s TILA claim, and Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
Therefore, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and JPMorgan’s MTD is due to be
granted. 3
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

2

Limiting the requirement to only the party against whom the doctrine is being
asserted prevents a state-court loser from doing an end-run around the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine by merely suing additional, or even different, parties in federal court. Auburn
Med. Ctr., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
3 Because the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it does not
address JPMorgan’s dismissal arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).

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1.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 17) is GRANTED.

2.

Plaintiff Ernest Michael Ellis, III’s claims (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 22–28, 31–34) are
DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on February 6, 2017.

Copies:
Counsel of Record

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