Morrison v. City of Holly Hill et al
Filing
16
ORDER granting 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 1/18/2017. (CHT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MICHAEL MORRISON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:16-cv-1809-Orl-31TBS
CITY OF HOLLY HILL and MATT
ARMSTRONG,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) filed by the Defendant,
the City of Holly Hill, and the Response in Opposition (Doc. 15) filed by the Plaintiff, Michael
Morrison.
I.
Background
Michael Morrison brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Holly
Hill (the “City”), and Officer Matt Armstrong, a police officer employed by the City. The City has
moved to dismiss only the claims made against it; 1 therefore, the claims against Officer
Armstrong will not be addressed here.
According to the facts alleged in the Complaint (Doc. 1) which are taken as true for
purposes of this Order, Officer Armstrong entered Michael Morrison’s home in Holly Hill,
Florida, without a warrant on October 21, 2012, and shot Morrison several times. Morrison alleges
that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it had an established policy, custom, or
1
Officer Armstrong has not been served as of the writing of this Order.
practice of encouraging “officers to aggressively stop individuals without regard to their
Constitutional [sic] rights . . . .” (Doc. 1 ¶ 20). The City has moved to dismiss Morrison’s claim
arguing that Morrison has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish municipal liability under §
1983.
II.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” so as to give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled
on other grounds, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint; it does not decide
the merits of the case. Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 1984). In ruling on a
motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations as true and construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. SEC v. ESM Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir.
1988). The Court must also limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached
thereto. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th
Cir. 1993).
The plaintiff must provide enough factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and to indicate the presence of the required elements,
Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2007). Conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual deductions, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal. Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court explained that a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, “but it demands more than an unadorned,
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the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678 (internal
citations and quotations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When it comes to municipal liability under § 1983, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations
will not support a claim.” Hall v. Smith, 170 F. App’x 105, 107–08 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming
dismissal of a § 1983 claim against a municipality where the plaintiff alleged no factual support
for his conclusory statement that the municipality had a policy or custom of grossly inadequate
supervision and training of its employees); Cannon v. Macon Cty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1567 (11th Cir.
1993) (affirming dismissal of a § 1983 claim against a county when the plaintiff failed to “to
allege any facts whatsoever to indicate that the alleged violation was a result of a [municipal]
policy or practice that would give rise to [municipal] liability”). Simply alleging the elements of a
municipal liability claim, without any factual support, is insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. See Gray v. City of Roswell, 486 Fed. App’x 798, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
plaintiff failed to state a claim after failing to “recite any facts or policies that would support a
claim against” a municipality, and only making “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Discussion
“[I]t is well established that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 on a
theory of respondeat superior.” Davis v. Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1375 (11th Cir.
2000). But a government entity is subject to § 1983 liability “when execution of a government’s
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policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy,” violates an individual’s constitutional rights. Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, to establish municipal liability a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that his constitutional rights were violated, and (2) identify a
municipal custom or policy that (3) caused the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283,
1289–90 (11th Cir. 2004).
As this Court has previously stated:
The second element—that a municipal custom or policy exists—can be
established in a number of ways: (1) through the explicit setting of an
unconstitutional policy by the government, Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95; (2) when a
final policymaker within the government commits the unconstitutional act, City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123–30 (1988); (3) when a final policymaker
is aware of, and approves of, both the unconstitutional action and the basis for it,
before it occurs, Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015); Matthews
v. Columbia Cty., 294 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); or (4)
where the municipality knew of a specific training need and made a deliberate choice
not to take action, amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights of those injured.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–90 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 151
F.3d 1346, 1349–51 (11th Cir. 1998).
Irons v. City of Holly Hill, No. 616CV479ORL31GJK, 2016 WL 4810721, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
14, 2016).
Here, assuming arguendo that the first element is satisfied, Morrison’s generalized
allegations fail to establish the second and third. Morrison generally concludes that the City had a
policy that encouraged police officers “to aggressively stop individuals without regard to their
Constitutional [sic] rights;” that the City “displayed deliberate indifference” to Officer
Armstrong’s unconstitutional acts; and that the City knew of constitutional violations committed
by its officers. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 20–22) But Morrison provides no factual support for these conclusions.
Indeed, even assuming such a policy existed, Morrison fails to provide facts demonstrating a
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causal link between said policy and Officer Armstrong’s alleged use of excessive force on
Morrison. As such, Count II will be dismissed. 2
It is therefore ORDERED that the City’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED and
Count II of the Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to re-plead
this Count, he may file an Amended Complaint by February 3, 2017.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on January 18, 2017.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party
2
To avoid any misunderstanding, Count II here is erroneously identified as Count III in
the Complaint. (Doc 1).
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