Lavine v. Goshen Mortgage LLC
Filing
31
ORDER discharging Order to Show Cause. Appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 5/23/2017. (VMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
In Re:
JODELL M. ALTIER,
Debtor.
Bankr. Case Nos. 6:15-bk-1838-KSJ
6:15-ap-0156-KSJ
6:16-ap-0013-KSJ
_________________________________
DARRIN C. LAVINE,
Appellant,
v.
Case No. 6:16-cv-1899-Orl-37
GOSHEN MORTGAGE LLC,
Appellee,
ORDER
In this appeal, Appellant Darrin Lavine (“Lavine”) challenges a bankruptcy court
order granting Justin Luna’s (“Mr. Luna”), counsel for Appellee Goshen Mortgage LLC
(“Goshen”), motion to substitute as counsel for Grand Legacy Group (“GLG”) in
Chambers v. Altier, Case No. 6:16-ap-00013-KSJ (“2016 Adversary Proceeding”). 1 (See
The 2016 Adversary Proceeding is one of two adversary proceedings stemming
from the underlying bankruptcy action. On April 15, 2016, the bankruptcy court
consolidated these adversary proceedings and directed that all papers be docketed in
Goshen Mortgage, LLC v. Altier, Case No. 6:15-ap-00156-KSJ (“2015 Adversary
Proceeding”). (See 2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 21.)
As explained more fully below, GLG was one of several defendants in the 2016
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Doc. 4-2 (“Substitution Order”).) Upon review of the parties’ briefing and the
bankruptcy record, the Court initially expressed concern that this appeal was moot. (See
Doc. 29.) The Court then determined that, even if not moot, the Court lacks appellate
jurisdiction over the Substitution Order, and the appeal is due to be dismissed.
I.
BACKGROUND
The serpentine nature of the underlying bankruptcy proceedings requires the
Court to recount the relevant events that led to the instant appeal. On March 4, 2015,
Debtor filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. (See In re Altier, 6:15-bk-1838-KSJ
(“Bankruptcy Action”), Doc. 1.) In connection with the Bankruptcy Action, Debtor
purportedly failed to disclose, inter alia, her interest in GLG, an incorporated entity that
held Debtor’s real property interests. 2 (See 2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 1.) Debtor’s
failure to disclose such interests led to the initiation of the 2015 and 2016 Adversary
Proceedings, in which Goshen and the acting bankruptcy trustee, Gene T. Chambers
(“Chambers”), alleged that Debtor had engaged in misrepresentation and fraud,
respectively. (See 2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 1; see also 2016 Adversary Proceeding,
Doc. 1.)
Following initiation of these Adversary Proceedings, on motion by Chambers, the
bankruptcy court ordered Debtor to turn over possession “of the original ‘bearer shares’
stock certificates for all 1,000 shares of [GLG]” (“GLG Shares”) to Chambers.
Adversary Proceeding. (See 2016 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 1.)
2 Lavine served as the original trustee of GLG. (See Bankruptcy Action, Doc. 88.)
As of August 15, 2016, Jonathan Bull (“Mr. Bull”) and the Liberty Law Team represented
Lavine and GLG. (See 2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 45.)
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(Bankruptcy Action, Doc. 100.) Ultimately, Goshen purchased all of the GLG Shares from
Chambers at an auction held by the bankruptcy court on July 14, 2016 (“Auction”). (See
Doc. 5-5, p. 5; see also Doc. 5-17, pp. 25–26.)
As a result of Goshen’s acquisition of the GLG Shares at the Auction, Mr. Luna
moved the bankruptcy court to substitute as GLG’s counsel, replacing Mr. Bull.
(2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 47 (“Substitution Motion”).) In his Substitution
Motion, Mr. Luna represented that GLG’s new sole shareholder, Bill Bymel (“Bymel”):
(1) removed any and all persons seeking to act on behalf of GLG, which included Lavine;
(2) appointed himself as sole director and officer of GLG; and (3) adopted bylaws for
GLG. (See id. at 4.) Over Lavine’s objection (2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 56), the
bankruptcy court entered the Substitution Order. (See Doc. 4-2.) In so doing, the
bankruptcy court noted that Goshen was “the 100% owner of GLG and [held] all the
powers of management, direction, and control related to GLG.” (Id.)
On October 31, 2016, Lavine initiated the instant appeal (“Appeal”). (Doc. 1.)
During the pendency of the Appeal, however, Goshen, Bymel, on behalf of GLG, and
Debtor filed a joint stipulation dismissing the 2016 Adversary Proceeding. (See Doc. 27;
see also 2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 176.) The bankruptcy court dismissed the
2016 Adversary Proceeding on May 9, 2017. (See 2015 Adversary Proceeding, Doc. 181
(“Dismissal Order”).) In light of the Dismissal Order, the Court directed Lavine to show
cause why the Appeal should not be dismissed as moot. (Doc. 29 (“Show Cause Order”).)
Lavine timely responded to the Show Cause Order. (Doc. 30.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
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Federal courts operate under “a continuing obligation to inquire into the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction whenever it may be lacking.” RES-GA Cobblestone, LLC v.
Blake Constr. & Dev., LLC, 718 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013). In reviewing decisions of a
bankruptcy court, a district court functions as an appellate court. In re Colortex Indus., Inc.,
19 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, a district court has appellate jurisdiction over
“final judgments, orders and decrees” from the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
Unless leave to appeal is first granted, a district court lacks appellate jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders from the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), (3).
III.
ANALYSIS
An order is final if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). In
the bankruptcy context, “finality is given a more flexible interpretation . . . because
bankruptcy is an aggregation of controversies and suits,” which involves multiple parties
and is protracted in nature. In re Donovan, 532 F.3d 1134, 1136–37 (11th Cir. 2008). Hence
a bankruptcy court’s order is final if it “completely resolves all the issues pertaining to a
discrete claim, including issues as to the proper relief.” Id. at 1136–37 (quoting In re Atlas,
210 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2000)). The Substitution Order does not completely resolve
issues related to a discrete claim. Moreover, courts that have addressed the character of
substitution orders have concluded that such orders are interlocutory. See In re M.T.G.,
403 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Generally a bankruptcy court’s order approving or
substituting counsel in a bankruptcy proceeding is not appealable.”) (quoting
In re Cottrell, 876 F.2d 540, 542 (6th Cir. 1989)); In re Sylvania Elec. Prods., 220 F.2d 423, 424
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(1st Cir. 1955) (noting that an order granting party substitution “was obviously
interlocutory in character”). 3
Because the Substitution Order is an interlocutory order, Lavine was required to
seek leave of court. 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Though Lavine failed to specifically do so,
the Court elects to exercise its discretion to treat Lavine’s notice of appeal as a motion for
leave to appeal the Substitution Order. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(b). However, doing so
is to no avail.
An interlocutory order is appealable under § 1292(b) where it is not otherwise
explicitly appealable under the other sections of the Interlocutory Decisions Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1292. Under § 1292(b), an interlocutory order may become appealable if the
district court finds that: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (2) immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Mamani v.
Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016). An order involves a controlling question of
See also Bauer v. Commerce Union Bank, Clarksville, Tenn., 859 F.2d 438, 440
(6th Cir. 1988) (finding that a district court’s order substituting a bankruptcy trustee as
the proper plaintiff did not satisfy the collateral order doctrine, an exception to the final
order rule).
4 While the Bankruptcy Code permits a district court to review interlocutory
orders, it does not provide criteria for determining when a court should exercise its
discretionary authority to grant a party leave to appeal such orders. See
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Nonetheless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
affirmed the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to assess the propriety of interlocutory
appeals from the bankruptcy court. See In re Charter Co., 778 F.2d 617, 620 n.5
(11th Cir. 1985); see also McCallan v. Hamm, 502 B.R. 245, 247–48 (M.D. Ala. 2013)
(collecting opinions from district courts within the Eleventh Circuit applying § 1292(b) to
interlocutory bankruptcy orders).
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law if it involves a matter that can be resolved without examining the record. See McFarlin
v. Conseco Servs., L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004).
Here, the issue of whether the bankruptcy court properly substituted counsel for
GLG is not explicitly appealable under the other sections of the Interlocutory Decisions
Statute. Applying § 1292(b), the Court finds that this issue does not present a “pure” legal
question. Rather, to determine whether the bankruptcy court properly substituted
Mr. Luna as GLG’s counsel requires the Court to examine the series of transactions that
led to Goshen’s acquisition of the GLG Shares—an inquiry that necessarily involves
review of the facts. See, e.g., Amos v. Glynn Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1254
(11th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005) (denying interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) because review would
have been “too fact-intensive an inquiry”). Therefore, the Substitution Order does not
satisfy the standard under § 1292(b), and, consequently, the Court declines to grant
Appellants leave to appeal. Hence the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, and it is
due to be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.
Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED.
2.
The Court’s Show Cause Order (Doc. 29) is DISCHARGED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on May 23, 2017.
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Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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