Haygood v. Orange County Public Schools et al
Filing
17
ORDER granting 15 motion to dismiss. On or before Wednesday, May 17, 2017, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 4/28/2017. (VMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
WILSONIA W. HAYGOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 6:16-cv-2105-Orl-37GJK
ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS; FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION PRACTICES
COMMISSION; and FLORIDA
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
ORDER
On December 8, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Wilsonia W. Haygood—a 69-year-old, black
female—initiated this action against Defendants for alleged violations of: (1) The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”): and (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (See Doc. 1.) In the Complaint, she alleges that after serving
almost nine years as a middle school teacher at Bridgewater Middle School (“School”),
she was forced to retire when false allegations surfaced concerning her failure to report
“child-on-child abuse” in the classroom (“Abuse Allegations”). (See id. ¶¶ 7, 8.) Plaintiff
claims that the Abuse Allegations were promulgated by Defendants and arose in October
of 2011, which was just a month after she filed a grievance with the School. (See id.)
According to Plaintiff, the Abuse Allegations are merely a pretext, as she believes she was
forced in to retirement due to her age and race. (Id. ¶ 12.)
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On March 14, 2017, Defendant Florida Education Association (“FEA”) moved for
dismissal on the ground that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action. 1 (Doc. 15
(“MTD”).) Plaintiff responded (Doc. 16), and the matter is ripe for the Court’s
consideration.
I.
A.
LEGAL STANDARDS
General Pleading Requirements
A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are
not required, but “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Rather, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows [a] court to draw the
reasonable inference that [the] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678;
see
also
Bailey
v.
Wheeler,
843
F.3d
473,
480
(11th
Cir.
2016).
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may request dismissal of a pleading that
falls short of these pleadings requirements. Dismissal is warranted if, assuming the truth
of the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s favor, there is a dispositive legal issue which
precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989).
1 Despite
each Defendant being served with a summons (Docs. 6, 7, 8), FEA is the
only Defendant that has appeared in this action thus far. (See Doc. 13.)
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Pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, a court may not
“serve as de facto counsel for a party” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order
to sustain an action.” GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369
(11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S at 662 (2009); see also Beckwith
v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (noting
that “pro se complaints also must comply with the procedural rules that govern
pleadings”).
B.
Shotgun Pleadings
Shotgun pleadings come in a variety of forms. See, e.g., Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing four categories of shotgun
pleadings). But “[t]he unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they
fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id.
at 1323.
Such pleadings impose on the Court the onerous task of sifting out irrelevancies
to determine which facts are relevant to which causes of action. See id. at 1323. Described
as “altogether unacceptable,” by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, when
a shotgun pleading is filed in this Court, repleader is required. Cramer v. Florida,
117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117,
1125–28 (11th Cir. 2014). If the Court does not require repleader, then “all is lost.” Johnson
Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998).
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II.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the Complaint is a shotgun pleading, as
it asserts Title VII and ADEA claims against Defendants collectively, without specifying
which Defendant is responsible for which acts or omissions, or which Defendant a
particular claim is brought against. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 7–12; see also Weiland. 792 F.3d at 1323;
see also, e.g., Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing a
complaint that sets forth allegations against “defendants” without making any
distinctions among them).) This is impermissible, hence the Complaint must be
dismissed. If Plaintiff chooses to replead, the amended complaint must clearly specify
which Defendants are responsible for which acts and which Defendants the claims are
brought against.
In its MTD, FEA also points out other pleading deficiencies. First, Plaintiff fails to
plead facts establishing that FEA—or any Defendant—is an “employer” under Title VII
or the ADEA. (Doc. 15, p. 3.) Under Title VII, an employer is defined as “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.” See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Similarly, the ADEA defines an employer as “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.”2
29 U.S.C. § 630(b); see also Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256,
The term “person” under both Title VII and the ADEA includes governmental
agencies and associations. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(a); 29 U.S.C. § 630(a).
2
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1264 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that the only appreciable difference between the definitions
of “employer” under Title VII and the ADEA is the number of employees required).
Because this employee-numerosity requirement is a necessary element to Plaintiff’s
claims under Title VII and the ADEA, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006),
without it her claims fail as a matter of law.
Finally, FEA’s MTD argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish that she is an
“employee” of FEA under Title VII or the ADEA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f);
29 U.S.C. § 630(f). 3 (Doc. 15, pp. 2–3.) The Court agrees. Thus, such a ground is also a
sufficient basis for dismissal.
Before submitting an amended pleading, Plaintiff is encouraged to consult the
resources available to pro se litigants on the Court’s website. 4 Plaintiff should also take
advantage of the in-person legal information program, which is provided free of charge
and administered every Tuesday from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. at the George C. Young
U.S. Courthouse, 401 W. Central Blvd. Orlando, Florida 32801. 5 Contact information is
located on the Court’s website, http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.
Defendant Florida Education Association’s Dispositive Motion to Dismiss
While Plaintiff alleges that she was formerly employed by “Respondent” (see
Doc. 1, ¶ 7), it is unclear to which Defendant Plaintiff ascribes such a label.
4 https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/pro_se/default.htm;
5 https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/pro_se/docs/Brochure_Orlando_Division.pdf
3
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Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum (Doc. 15) is GRANTED.
2.
The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3.
On or before Wednesday, May 17, 2017, Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint that remedies the deficiencies identified in this Order. Failure to
timely file will result in closure of this case without further notice.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on April 28, 2017.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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