Melvin v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion and, thereafter, to close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas N. Frazier on 3/9/2018. (CAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
HEATH ANDREW MELVIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:16-cv-2109-Orl-DNF

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Heath Andrew Melvin, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his claim for a period of
disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The Commissioner filed the Transcript of
the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by the appropriate page number), and
the parties filed a joint legal memoranda setting forth their respective positions. For the reasons
set out herein, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Social Security Act Eligibility, Standard of Review, Procedural History, and the
ALJ’s Decision

A. Social Security Act Eligibility
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. The

impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do his previous work, or any other
substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2),
1382(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511, 416.905-416.911.
B. Standard of Review
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate support to a conclusion. Even if the evidence
preponderated against the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Martin v. Sullivan, 894
F.2d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). However,
the District Court will reverse the Commissioner’s decision on plenary review if the decision
applied incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide sufficient reasoning to determine that the
Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064,
1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

The Court reviews de novo the conclusions of law made by the

Commissioner of Social Security in a disability benefits case. Social Security Act, § 205(g), 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920. At step one, the claimant must prove that he is not undertaking substantial gainful
employment.

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001), see 20 C.F.R. §

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404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in any substantial gainful activity, he will be found
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
At step two, the claimant must prove that he is suffering from a severe impairment or
combination of impairments. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278, 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(ii). If the
claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not significantly limit his physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities, the ALJ will find that the impairment is not severe, and
the claimant will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(c).
At step three, the claimant must prove that his impairment meets or equals one of
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1; Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. §
1520(a)(4)(iii). If he meets this burden, he will be considered disabled without consideration of
age, education and work experience. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
At step four, if the claimant cannot prove that his impairment meets or equals one of the
impairments listed in Appendix 1, he must prove that his impairment prevents him from
performing his past relevant work. Id. At this step, the ALJ will consider the claimant’s RFC and
compare it with the physical and mental demands of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §
1520(a)(4)(iv), 20 C.F.R. § 1520(f). If the claimant can still perform his past relevant work, then
he will not be found disabled. Id.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is capable of
performing other work available in the national economy, considering the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and past work experience. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(v). If
the claimant is capable of performing other work, he will be found not disabled. Id. In determining
whether the Commissioner has met this burden, the ALJ must develop a full and fair record
regarding the vocational opportunities available to the claimant. Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200,

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1201 (11th Cir. 1989). There are two ways in which the ALJ may make this determination. The
first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“the Grids”), and the second is by the use
of a vocational expert. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004). Only after the
Commissioner meets this burden does the burden shift back to the claimant to show that he is not
capable of performing the “other work” as set forth by the Commissioner. Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001).
C. Procedural History
On May 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB, alleging
disability since June 6, 2008. (Tr. 116-122). The claim was denied initially on August 28, 2009,
and upon reconsideration on February 25, 2010. (Tr. 63-65, 67-68). Plaintiff requested a hearing,
which was held on May 19, 2011, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joseph L. Brinkley.
(Tr. 18-54, 69, 386-417, 454-490). On July 26, 2011, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 817, 418-427). Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision. (Tr. 7, 452). On May 13, 2013,
the Commissioner’s Appeals Council denied the request for review. (Tr. 1-6, 428-433). Plaintiff
appealed that decision to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
Orlando Division. On January 21, 2014, the Commissioner filed an unopposed motion to remand
Plaintiff’s case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative
proceedings. (Tr. 435). On February 10, 2014, this Court entered an Order granting the motion to
remand. (Tr. 437-438). Judgment was entered on February 11, 2014. (Tr. 439-440). On April 8,
2014, the Appeals Council remanded the case back to an ALJ for further proceedings. (Tr. 441446).
A second hearing was held on August 20, 2014, before ALJ Janet Mahon. (Tr. 356-385,
829-858). On December 15, 2014, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 337-355, 794-812).

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Plaintiff appealed that decision to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division. On August 20, 2015, the Commissioner filed an unopposed motion to
remand Plaintiff’s case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative
proceedings. (Tr. 785-787). On August 21, 2015, this Court entered an Order granting the motion
to remand. (Tr. 782-784). Judgment was entered on August 24, 2015. (Tr. 780-781). On January
7, 2016, the Appeals Council remanded the case back to an ALJ for further proceedings (Tr. 788792).
A third administrative hearing was held on August 11, 2016, before ALJ Mahon (Tr. 766779). At the hearing, Plaintiff requested a closed period of disability from June 6, 2008 through
December 31, 2013. (Tr. 769). On October 5, 2016, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 744765). Plaintiff waited sixty-one days for the ALJ’s decision to become the final decision of the
Commissioner and this appeal followed (Doc. 1). The parties having filed a joint memorandum
setting forth their respective positions, this case is ripe for review.
D. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since June 6, 2008, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 749). At step two, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: loss of cervical lordosis/spine
disorder. (Tr. 750). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 750).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”), through the date last insured, to perform
within the range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a)
except could lift and carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10
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pounds frequently. The claimant could sit for six hours out of an eighthour workday and stand and/or walk for two hours out of an eight-hour
workday. The claimant could perform only occasional pushing/pulling
with lower extremity. The claimant could occasionally climb but never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant could occasionally
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant should have
avoided even moderate exposure to hazards including dangerous
machinery and unprotected heights.
(Tr. 750-51). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff, through his date last insured, was unable
to perform his past relevant work as an airplane flight attendant. (Tr. 756).
At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to find that, through
Plaintiff’s date last insured, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there are jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. (Tr. 757). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform such occupations as
order clerk, charge account clerk, and telephone solicitor. (Tr. 757). The ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff had not been under a disability from June 6, 2008 the alleged onset date, through June 30,
2011, the date last insured. (Tr. 758).
II.

Analysis
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ erred by failing to comply with

the Court’s Remand Order and the Appeals Council’s Remand Order with respect to Dr.
Karumanchi’s opinion; and (2) whether the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s
allegations of pain and limitations. The Court will address each issue in turn.
A) Whether the ALJ erred by failing to comply with the Court’s Remand Order and the
Appeals Council’s Remand Order with respect to Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion.
On August 21, 2015, the Court entered an Order reversing and remanding Plaintiff’s case
for further administrative proceedings. (Tr. 782-784). The Commissioner had requested a
voluntary remand for an ALJ to, in relevant part, “further evaluate the opinion from Plaintiff’s

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treating physician, Dr. Rama Karumanchi, M.D.” (Tr. 785). On January 7, 2016, the Appeals
Council issued a “Notice of Order of Appeals Council Remanding Case to Administrative Law
Judge” (Tr. 788-792). The Order noted that the ALJ’s decision:
did not adequately evaluate the opinion of treating physician, Rama
Karumanchi, M.D. . . . The decision indicated that certain aspects of Dr.
Karumanchi’s opinion are consistent with the residual functional capacity
and given some credit (Decision, page 5). The decision specifically
mentioned limitations on lifting and carrying, standing and walking,
pushing and pulling, and climbing (Decision, page 5). The decision
rejected the sitting limitation – less than two hours without interruption –
because there was “no evidence of vertebral fracture or nerve root
compression that could cause the degree of pain and restrictions that would
result in such restrictions that would result in such a restriction” (Decision,
page 5). Dr. Karumanchi explained that the sitting restriction is due to the
cervical spine and herniated nuclear pulposus causing pain and
inflammation of the spine, as evidenced on an MRI scan (Exhibit 12F,
page 2). The record contains an MRI scan of the cervical spine performed
on July 21, 2010 at the request of Dr. Karumanchi; this MRI revealed disc
herniations and bulges at C5-6 and C6-7 causing mild central canal
stenosis (Exhibit 10F, page 2). In addition, the MRI showed bilateral facet
hypertrophic changes causing mild to moderate bilateral neural bilateral
neural foraminal stenosis (Exhibit 10F/2). The decision did not address
Dr. Karumanchi’s rationale. . . . In addition, while the decision indicated
that Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion that the claimant is unable to climb is
consistnet [sic] with the residual functional capacity, the claimant was
found to be capable of occasional climbing, but never ladders, ropes or
scaffolds (Decision, page 4). However, the decision did not explain the
inconsistency or otherwise specify the evidence supporting this limitation.
Lastly, the decision did not address Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion regarding
the claimant’s ability to reach, handle or feel.
(Tr. 790-791). The Appeals Council’s remand order provided that upon remand the ALJ will
“[g]ive further consideration to the treating source opinions pursuant to the provisions of 20 CFR
404.1527 and Social Security Rulings 96-2p and 96-5p, and explain the weight given to such
opinion evidence” and “[g]ive further consideration to the claimant’s residual functional capacity
and provide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the
assessed limitations. . .” (Tr. 791).

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Plaintiff argues that although the ALJ summarized Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion and included
a lengthy evaluation of the opinion, the ALJ again failed to properly evaluate the opinion in
accordance with the remand order. (Doc. 15 p. 12). In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
improperly found that Plaintiff’s medical record did “not show repeated hospitalizations or
aggressive forms of therapy (such as surgery) that would be expected if he experienced severe,
persistent, and unremitting pain.” (Doc. 15 p. 12) (citing Tr. 752). Plaintiff contends that Dr.
Karumanchi’s treatment notes revealed treatment modalities that are offered by pain clinics. (Doc.
15 p. 12). Further, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ cherry picked the evidence in order to reject Dr.
Karumanchi’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s limitations in his ability to reach, feel, handle, push
and pull. (Doc. 15 p. 13). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly substituted her opinion
for that of Plaintiff’s treating physician when she found that there was “no evidence of vertebral
fracture or nerve root compression that could cause the degree of pain and restrictions that would
result in such a restriction of not being able to sit up to 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday” and
that Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion that Plaintiff should never climb “should be given little weight
based upon the comments mentioned above and finds a more reasonable interpretation of the
claimant’s ability should be limited to only occasional climbing.” (Doc. 15 p. 15) (citing Tr. 752).
In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ adequately complied with the Appeals
Council’s remand order by properly considering Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion. (Doc. 15 p. 16).
In her decision, the ALJ addressed the opinion of Dr. Karumanchi as follows:
On March 28, 2011, Dr. Karumanchi completed a questionnaire regarding
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (Ex. 12F). He opined the
claimant could lift and carry ten pounds occasionally and seven pounds
frequently. Dr. Karumanchi also opined the claimant could stand/walk for
two hours without interruption in an eight-hour workday and sit for less
than two hours in an eight-hour workday. Additionally, he opined the
claimant could never climb, stoop, kneel, balance, crawl, and crouch.

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Further, he noted the claimant had limitations with reaching, feeling,
handling, reach, and pushing/pulling (Ex. 12F).
As subject to the current pending appeal, the Appeals Council noted the
undersigned did not address Dr. Karumanchi’s rationale for his opinion as
it relates to the pain and inflammation of the spine from the claimant’s
cervical spine and herniated nuclear pulposus (see Ex. 9A, p.3). Dr.
Karumanchi referred to an MRI taken in July of 2010, which is
approximately two years after his work related job injury. Although the
claimant’s spinal condition may be expected to produce mild chronic pain
or discomfort, the medical record does not show repeated hospitalizations
or aggressive forms of therapy (such as surgery) that would be expected if
he experience severe, persistent, and unremitting pain. Instead, in review
of Dr. Karumanchi’s treatment notes, it appears the claimant routinely
underwent conservative treatment such as electric stimulation, therapy
massage, therapy exercise, and hot pack. Further, as noted elsewhere in
this decision, the claimant was not cooperative in submitting additional
evidence regarding his functional reports or pain questionnaires despite
multiple attempts (see Ex. 7F). Thus lacking this additional evidence in
comparison to Dr. Karumanchi’s records, the undersigned has not been
able to consider fully whether the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the claimant’s ability
to perform work-related activities and limit him to the function-byfunction analysis submitted by Dr. Karumanchi. Additionally, the
undersigned refers to Dr. Philippe Mazure’s records that showed in 2008,
that the cervical foraminal compression test was negative; George’s test
was negative; manual muscle testing of the upper extremities did not
suggest any obvious motor impairment; upper extremity deep tendon
reflexes were brisk and symmetrical; and upper extremity sensory
appeared intact (Ex. 11F, p.2). A consultative examiner performed this
examination of the claimant in 2008, subsequent to the work-related
injury. Based upon this additional objective evidence, the undersigned
assigns very little weight to the portion of Dr. Kar umanchi’s opinion
related to the claimant’s ability to reach, handle, or feel. As noted
previously in the prior decision, certain aspects of Dr. Karumanchi’s
opinion are consistent with the residual functional capacity contained
herein and is given some credit, e.g. lifting and carrying restrictions,
pushing and pulling, and standing and walking restriction. However, the
physician found the claimant would not be able to sit for less than two
hours in an eight-hour workday. The undersigned found there is no
evidence of vertebral fracture or nerve root compression that could cause
the degree of pain and restrictions that would result in such a restriction of
not being able to sit up to 2 hours total in an 8-hour workday. The
undersigned also finds the portion of the opinion that precludes the
claimant from never climbing should be given little weight based upon the
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comments mentioned above and finds a more reasonable interpretation of
the claimant’s ability should be limited to only occasional climbing.
(Tr. 751-52).
The regulations provide that an ALJ shall take any action that is ordered by the Appeals
Council and may take any additional action that is not inconsistent with the Appeals Council’s
remand order. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.977(b). In this case, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately
complied with the Appeals Council’s remand order by thoroughly reviewing and evaluating Dr.
Karumanchi’s opinion and the ALJ’s evaluation is supported by substantial evidence. While
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion that Plaintiff was
limited due to pain and inflammation of Plaintiff’s cervical spine and herniated nuclear pulposus,
the ALJ’s decision shows that she properly discussed and considered this aspect of Dr.
Karumanchi’s opinion. (Tr. 752). The ALJ acknowledged the July 2010 MRI cited by Dr.
Karumanchi and found while the record supported a mild chronic pain or discomfort, it did not
support the level of limitations as indicated by Dr. Karumanchi. (Tr. 752). For example, the ALJ
pointed out that the record showed Plaintiff was treated with routine and conservative treatment,
which is not what would be expected for the level of limitations indicated by Dr. Karumanchi. (Tr.
752). The ALJ noted Plaintiff did not have any repeated hospitalizations or aggressive forms of
therapy. (Tr. 752). In addition, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Karumanchi’s own notes indicate
Plaintiff underwent conservative treatment such as electric stimulation, massage, exercise and use
of hot packs. (Tr. 291-95, 752).
Further, the Court finds no error in the ALJ noting that Plaintiff failed to cooperate in
submitting any additional functional reports or pain questionnaires. (Tr. 752). As Defendant notes,
despite Plaintiff’s claim that the SSA was using Plaintiff’s “old address,” the record shows the

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agency made several attempts to contact Plaintiff by phone and mail and tried to contact his
representative directly, who should have had his contact information. (Tr. 27, 287).

Finally, as to Plaintiff’s arguments regarding Dr. Karumanchi’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s
ability to climb, even if substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding concerning
Plaintiff’s ability to climb, remand is not appropriate. None of the jobs identified by the VE, i.e.
order clerk, charge account clerk, or telephone solicitor, require any climbing. Plaintiff failed to
meet his burden in showing that he could not perform the jobs identified by the VE.
B) Whether the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s allegations of pain
and limitations.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s allegations of pain and
limitations by only considering the objective medical evidence contrary to Social Security
Regulation (SSR) 96-7p. (Doc. 15 p. 21). Defendant argues that the ALJ properly considered
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disabling symptoms, together with the other evidence, in
assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 15 p. 22).
The Eleventh Circuit three-part pain standard that applies whenever a claimant asserts
disability through testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms requires (1) evidence of an
underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of
the alleged pain arising from that condition, or (3) that the objectively determined medical
condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably be expected to cause the alleged pain. Foote
v. Charter, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Kelly v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir.
1999). After considering claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ may reject them as not
credible, and that determination may be reviewed for substantial evidence. Marbury v. Sullivan,
957 F.2d 837 (11th Cir. 1992). If the objective medical evidence does not confirm the severity of
the alleged symptoms, but indicates that the claimant’s impairment could reasonably be expected
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to produce some degree of pain and other symptoms, the ALJ evaluates the intensity and
persistence of the claimant’s symptoms and their effect on his ability to work by considering the
objective medical evidence, the claimant’s daily activates, treatment and medications received,
and other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to pain. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529.
In this case, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not solely rely on the objective
medical evidence in determining Plaintiff’s condition was not as limiting as he alleged. (Tr. 75356). The ALJ discussed the medical evidence, in addition to the objective medical evidence, that
did not support Plaintiff’s allegations. (Tr. 753-56). For example, the ALJ correctly found
Plaintiff’s routine and conservative treatment provides evidence that his condition was not as
limiting as he alleged. (Tr. 753-56). Further, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s activities in
evaluating his claim. (Tr. 754). Although not dispositive, a claimant's activities may show that the
claimant's symptoms are not as limiting as she alleged. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). The
ALJ correctly noted that Plaintiff reported very little activities of daily living, however, his
assertions could not be objectively verified. (Tr. 754). The ALJ also noted that while Plaintiff
testified at the most recent hearing in August 2016 that nothing had changed since the period at
issue in case June 6, 2008 through January 31, 2013, the evidence shows Plaintiff was able to do
some work in 2013 and return to work as a flight attendant at the SGA level from 2014 through
the hearing. (Tr. 754, 774-75). The fact that Plaintiff was able to work at a medium level job when
he alleged no changes in his condition and that he could still only stand and/or walk ten to fifteen
minutes, he could not stand for very long, and he must lay down, does not support his allegations
he was disabled prior to January 31, 2013. (Tr. 774-75). Given the record as a whole, substantial

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evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disabling
limitations were not entirely credible.
As Defendant notes, SSR 96-7p had been superseded by SSR 16-3p at the time of the ALJ’s
decision. See SSR 16-3p. SSR16-3p provides that while “we will not disregard an individual’s
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the
objective medical evidence does no substantiate the degree of impairment-related symptoms
alleged by the individual,” objective medical evidence is still a useful indicator to help make
reasonable conclusions about how Plaintiff’s allegations may affect their ability to work. See SSR
16-3p. Thus, “a report of minimal or negative findings or inconsistencies in the objective medical
evidence is one of the many factors we must consider in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms.” See SSR 16-3p.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that the ALJ erred by violating SSR 16-3p. The Court
will not disturb the ALJ’s findings on appeal and finds it appropriate.
III.

Conclusion

The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
enter judgment consistent with this opinion and, thereafter, to close the file.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 9, 2018.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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