Sphar et al v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 34

ORDER denying 23 Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment without prejudice as premature. Signed by Judge Paul G. Byron on 12/15/2017. (JRJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER
A.
HEATHER N. SPHAR,

SPHAR

and

Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 6:16-cv-2221-Orl-40TBS

AMICA
MUTUAL
COMPANY,

INSURANCE

Defendant.
/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 23), filed August 31, 2017, and Defendant’s Response in Opposition
(Doc. 28), filed September 12, 2017. The parties have completed their briefing and the
Court is otherwise fully advised on the premises. Upon consideration, the Court denies
without prejudice Plaintiffs’ motion as premature.
I.

BACKGROUND
This case stems from an October 27, 2014, automobile accident involving

Christopher Sphar, Plaintiff, and an allegedly uninsured motorist, Royslan HernandezMacias. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 4, 6, 12). At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was covered by an
insurance policy issued by Defendant, Amica Mutual Insurance Company (“Amica”). (Id.
¶ 7). Plaintiff and his wife thereafter brought this suit in state court on November 11, 2016,
against Amica pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage allegedly supplied by the Amica
policy. (Id.). On December 27, 2016, Amica removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1).

On December 28, 2016, Amica filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, which
contained affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence and failure to wear a
seatbelt, and alleging entitlement to set-offs for amounts recoverable against the
tortfeasor. (Doc. 23-1, pp. 3–5). Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on these
affirmative defenses, citing Christopher Sphar’s testimony, which is purportedly “the only
record evidence concerning” these defenses. (Doc. 23). Amica urges the Court to deny
Plaintiffs’ motion, or defer ruling on it, until Ms. Hernandez-Macias can be deposed and
Amica’s expert reports are disclosed. (Doc. 28). In support, Amica notes that Ms.
Hernandez-Macias has twice failed to attend depositions, flaunting both a deposition
notice and subpoena. (Doc. 28, pp. 2–3). On September 13, 2017, this Court ordered Ms.
Hernandez-Macias to attend her deposition under threat of sanctions for failure to attend
a third time. (Doc. 29). With respect to the expert reports, Amica notes that expert reports
were not due to be disclosed until December 1, 2017, and that it could use its expert
report to opine whether Plaintiff was wearing a seatbelt. (Doc. 28).
II.

DISCUSSION
Before granting summary judgment, the party opposing summary judgment must

be afforded an “adequate opportunity” to conduct discovery. Carter v. HSBC Mortg.
Servs., Inc., 680 F. App’x 890, 892 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Snook v. Tr. Co. of Ga. Bank
of Savannah, 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 1988)). Rule 56(d) authorizes district courts to
deny, defer, or otherwise delay ruling on summary judgment motions where the
“nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). However, the
“nonmovant may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will

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produce needed, but unspecified, facts, but rather he must specifically demonstrate how
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to
rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Wallace v. Brownell
Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Generally summary judgment is inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has
been unable to obtain responses to his discovery requests.” Snook, 859 F.2d at 870.
Here, Amica argues that the Court should allow it to depose Ms. HernandezMacias, the nonparty tortfeasor in this case, who Amica anticipates will provide testimony
concerning the disputed affirmative defenses. The record discloses Amica’s fruitless
attempts to depose a critical fact witness, culminating with an Order by this Court requiring
Ms. Hernandez-Macias to submit to a deposition. According to the Case Management
and Scheduling Order (“CMSO”), the discovery deadline in this case is January 2, 2018,
meaning time remains for the parties to discover facts that may bear on Plaintiffs’ motion.
Finally, Amica has explained how its expert’s report would provide another potential
source of facts to rebut Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.
The Court therefore finds that Amica has adequately demonstrated how deferring
a ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment might enable Amica to prove
genuine disputes of material fact.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is denied without prejudice as premature. As provided in
the CMSO, the parties have until February 1, 2017, to file motions for summary judgment.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on December 15, 2017.

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Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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