McDaniel v. Trend Aviation LLC et al

Filing 15

ORDER granting 12 motion to dismiss. On or before May 5, 2017, Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 4/24/2017. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
KEVIN McDANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:17-cv-00193-Orl-37KRS

TREND AVIATION LLC; and
JONATHAN HOUDYSCHELL,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Trend Aviation, LLC and Jonathan
P. Houdyschell’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12), filed March 9, 2017. For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is due to be granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Houdyschell (“Houdyschell”) owns and operates Trend Aviation LLC
(“Trend Aviation”), a company that “provid[es] pilots to, and management aircraft for,
owners of private aircraft.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6–7).) In November of 2015, Defendants 1 offered
to pay Kevin McDaniel (“McDaniel”) $550.00 per day in exchange for his services as an
airplane pilot. (Id. ¶ 34.) Defendants also offered to pay McDaniel $13,000 for his training,
if successfully completed. (Id. ¶ 41.)

For purposes of this motion, the Court refers to Trend Aviation and Houdyschell
collectively as “Defendants”.
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McDaniel accepted Defendants’ offer, “fully performed under the contract,” and
“successfully completed the training.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 36 42.) Defendants, however, failed to
pay McDaniel for twenty-four hours that he worked, and failed to fully reimburse him
for completing the training. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 43). McDaniel alleges that Defendants still owe
him $13,200.00 in unpaid wages and $6,500.00 for training expenses. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 43.)
McDaniel further alleges that Defendants owe him $414.00 for “employment-related
expenses” that they agreed to pay. (Id. ¶¶ 44–46.)
Consequently, McDaniel brought suit against Defendants invoking the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction, and alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“Count I”). (Id. ¶¶ 4, 20–31.) McDaniel also alleges
claims for breach of contract (“Counts II & III”), quantum meruit (“Count IV”), and
promissory estoppel (“Count V”). (Id ¶¶ 32–65.) Defendants move to dismiss the
Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 34.) McDaniel has not
responded, and his time to do so has elapsed. As such, the matter is now ripe for
adjudication.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a claimant must plead “a
short and plain statement of the claim.” On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court limits its consideration to the “well-pleaded factual allegations.” See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The factual allegations in the complaint must “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In
making this plausibility determination, the Court must accept the factual allegations as
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true; however, this “tenet . . . is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(2009). A pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” is therefore insufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint because McDaniel
has failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements with respect to each of his claims.
To determine the merit of Defendants’ argument, the Court begins its analysis with
McDaniel’s FLSA claim, as it provides the only basis for the Court’s exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction over this action.
The FLSA requires an employer to pay its employees a minimum wage. See
29 U.S.C. § 206(a). If no exemption applies, employers must also pay their employees at
least one and a half times their regular wage for every hour worked in excess of forty per
week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA’s civil remedies provision gives a private right of
action to workers affected by employers’ violation of the FLSA's minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Here, it is unclear whether McDaniel is
bringing a FLSA claim for unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, or both. Regardless,
McDaniel’s FLSA claim is inadequately pled.
To the extent McDaniel intends to state a FLSA claim for unpaid wages, his claim
fails. The FLSA does not provide a plaintiff with a remedy for unpaid contractual wages
which exceed the statutory mandated minimum wage. See Bolick v. Brevard County
Sheriff’s Dept., 937 F. Supp. 1560, 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (explaining that “an employee
cannot succeed on a claim under the FLSA if his average wage for a period in which he
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works no overtime exceeds minimum wage”) (collecting cases). The express private right
of action found in § 216(b) of the FLSA is limited in an important respect: It is available
only when an employee is owed unpaid minimum wages, or unpaid overtime
compensation as a result of a minimum-wage or overtime violation. Here, McDaniel
alleges that Defendants did not compensate him at his alleged contract rate of pay,
however, he fails entirely to allege that he was paid less than the statutory mandated
minimum wage. Accordingly, McDaniel fails to state a plausible FLSA claim for unpaid
minimum wages.
Similarly, McDaniel fails to state a claim for overtime compensation. “[T]o survive
a motion to dismiss, [a plaintiff] must allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible
claim that [he] worked compensable overtime in a workweek longer than 40 hours.” See
Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013); Davis
v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241–42 (3d Cir. 2014) (same); Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC,
846 F.3d 757, 777 (4th Cir. 2017) (same); Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638,
644–45 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2012)
(same). 2
McDaniel does not allege that he ever worked in excess of forty hours in a
workweek while employed by Defendants. As such, the Court finds that McDaniel
simply has not stated a plausible FLSA claim for unpaid overtime wages or unpaid

Although these circuit court cases are not controlling, the Court finds them
persuasive, particularly here, where McDaniel fails to even generally allege that he
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek while employed by Defendant.
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minimum wages. Accordingly, Count I is due to be dismissed. See Gigena v. Tapas &
Tintos, Inc., No. 10-23422-CIV, 2010 WL 11451387, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2010) (finding
that a plaintiff failed to adequately state a FLSA claim for similar reasons).
Having found that McDaniel fails to state the only claim that independently
anchored federal jurisdiction, the Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over
McDaniel’s state law claims. Thus, McDaniel will be afforded an opportunity to file an
amended complaint. In the absence of a timely amendment, the matter will be dismissed
and this case will be closed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendants Trend Aviation, LLC and Jonathan P. Houdyschell’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
2. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. On or before May 5, 2017, Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint to
correct the deficiencies in the Complaint.
4. If Plaintiff fails to timely file an Amended Complaint, then this case will be
closed without further notice.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on April 24, 2017.

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Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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