Allen v. Commissioner of Social Security et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION: The Commissioner's final decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Claimant and to close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Kelly on 6/14/2018. (DWG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
VIRGINIA ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:17-cv-203-Orl-GJK
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Virginia Allen (the “Claimant”) appeals to the District Court a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her applications for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Doc. No. 1. Claimant
argues that the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) committed reversible error by: 1) finding
that Claimant’s past relevant work included being a hairdresser; 2) applying improper legal
standards to three medical opinions; 3) making a finding on Claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) that is not supported by substantial evidence; and 4) making a finding on Claimant’s
credibility that is not supported by substantial evidence. Doc. No. 26 at 21-23, 26-28, 31-34, 3740. Claimant requests that the Commissioner’s final decision be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. at 42-43. For the reasons stated below, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s
final decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2012, Claimant filed her SSI application. R. 15. On May 28, 2013,
Claimant filed her DIB application. Id. Claimant alleges an onset date of December 1, 2010 for
both applications, and she alleges disability due to rheumatoid arthritis and obesity. Id.; Doc. No.
26 at 1. Claimant’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she requested
a hearing before an ALJ on January 3, 2014. R. 70; Doc. No. 26 at 1. On October 5, 2015, Claimant
attended a hearing before the ALJ. R. 490-520. On January 15, 2016, the ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision finding Claimant not disabled. R. 15-25. On March 17, 2016, Claimant
requested review of the ALJ’s decision. R. 10. On December 6, 2016, the Appeals Council denied
Claimant’s request. R. 5-7. On February 6, 2017, Claimant filed this appeal. Doc. No. 1.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla – i.e., the evidence must do more
than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Where the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have
reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1991). The Court must take into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the
decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. The District Court “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the
evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted).
III.
WEIGHING MEDICAL OPINIONS
Weighing the opinions and findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians
is an integral part in determining whether a claimant is disabled. In cases involving an ALJ's
-2-
handling of medical opinions, “substantial-evidence review ... involves some intricacy.” Gaskin v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 533 F. App’x. 929, 931 (11th Cir. 2013).1 In Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit held that whenever a physician offers a
statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments, including
symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis, what the claimant can still do despite his or her impairments,
and the claimant's physical and mental restrictions, the statement is an opinion requiring the ALJ
to state with particularity the weight given to it and the reasons therefor. Id. at 1178-79 (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2); Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987)).
“In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether
the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence.”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted). See also MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050,
1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that a failure to state with particularity the weight given to medical
opinions and the reasons therefor constitutes reversible error). An ALJ may not “implicitly
discount” or ignore any medical opinion. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79; MacGregor, 786 F.2d at
1053; McClurkin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 625 F. App’x. 960, 962-63 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that it
is reversible error for the ALJ to fail to state weight given to a non-examining physician's opinion).
This Court has stated that “reversal is required where an ALJ fails to sufficiently articulate the
reasons supporting his decision to reject portions of a medical opinion while accepting others.”
Kahle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
“The ALJ must state the grounds for his decision with clarity to enable [the court] to
conduct meaningful review …. Absent such explanation, it is unclear whether substantial evidence
supported the ALJ's findings; and the decision does not provide a meaningful basis upon which
1
In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished decisions are not binding, but are persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
-3-
[the court] can review [a claimant’s] case.” Hanna v. Astrue, 395 F. App’x 634, 636 (11th Cir.
2010). With regard to a claimant’s RFC, this means that “the ALJ must link the RFC assessment
to specific evidence in the record bearing upon the claimant's ability to perform the physical,
mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” Salter v. Astrue, No. CA 11–00681–C, 2012
WL 3817791, at * 6 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2012). See also Ricks v. Astrue, No. 3:10–cv–975–TEM,
2012 WL 1020428, at * 9 (M.D. Fla. Mar, 27, 2012) (“An ALJ is required to build an accurate and
logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”). Thus, “the existence of substantial evidence
in the record favorable to the Commissioner may not insulate the ALJ's determination from remand
when he or she does not provide a sufficient rationale to link such evidence to the legal conclusions
reached.” Russ v. Barnhart, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Keeton v. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994)).2
IV.
ANALYSIS
On June 3, 2009, Claimant presented to Dr. James Ryan, a one-time examining
physician. R. 266. In a treatment note, Dr. Ryan stated the following:
Arthritis Knee – This arthritis is mild to moderate at the present
time. Based on her physical examination and findings, [Claimant]
has no restrictions of the upper extremities, but due to the arthritis
of the knees, would not be able to perform activities which would
require prolonged walking or standing.
R. 268 (emphasis added). On February 23, 2010, Claimant presented to Dr. Nitin Hate, another
one-time examining physician. R. 275. Dr. Hate completed a disability evaluation stating:
In Ricks, this Court stated that the “onus is on the ALJ to provide a clear opinion.” Ricks, 2012 WL 1020428 at * 9.
The Court also stated that “[w]here the district court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a
sentence-four remand may be appropriate to allow him to explain the basis for his decision.” Id. (citing Johnson v.
Barnhart, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2002)).
2
-4-
[Claimant] will have difficulty in any activities that require
prolonged standing, walking, climbing stairs, repeated stooping,
and any squatting. She needs ongoing medical care and life style
change for serious weight reduction.
Id. (emphasis added).
On February 27, 2013, Francisco Gonzalez, a physician’s assistant, completed a
Medical Source Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities (Physical) Form.3 R.
357-59. Mr. Gonzalez found that Claimant could frequently and occasionally lift and/or carry
less than ten pounds and stand and/or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday.
R. 357. Mr. Gonzalez found that Claimant is limited in pushing and pulling in the upper and
lower extremities and found that Claimant could occasionally balance and crouch. R. 358. Mr.
Gonzalez also found that Claimant is limited in reaching in all directions, handling, fingering,
and feeling. Id.
The ALJ found that Claimant had the RFC to perform light work except that she can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, and crouch; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,
crawl, or kneel; can frequently reach with both arms; can frequently handle and finger with both
hands; and cannot work in environments of concentrated cold, humidity, wetness, or vibration. R.
18. When making his RFC finding, the ALJ summarized the above-referenced medical opinions
(the “Opinions”) and gave some weight to the same:
The undersigned assigns some weight to the opinions of Drs. Hate,
Ryan, and Gonzalez (sic). While the overall conclusion that
[Claimant] would have some limitations as a result of her
impairments is supported, the undersigned finds that work at the
light exertional level with the limitations in manipulative,
environmental, and postural activities is more appropriate after
considering the treatment records, imaging reports, and findings on
physical examinations ….
According to the ALJ, Mr. Gonzalez was a “treating provider at Florida Family Physicians.” R. 23. The record
contains a number of treatment notes from Mr. Gonzalez from February 2012 to April 2013. R. 342-354, 362-375.
3
-5-
[Claimant] has rheumatoid nodules at the elbows and there was
swelling and tenderness in her left knee, wrists, shoulders, hips,
elbows, ankles, and hands. Range of motion in her lumbar spine,
hips, shoulders, and knees was decreased. X-rays of the knees
revealed moderate to severe medial compartment narrowing. Yet,
her motor strength was full and her sensation was intact on physical
examinations. In addition, imaging of the hands, ankles, and right
hip were unremarkable. Further, x-rays of the feet and wrists
showed only mild degenerative changes. There is also no evidence
that [Claimant] has required repeated hospitalizations, surgery, or
prolonged physical therapy for pain in her ankles, knees, wrists,
neck, hands, shoulders, hips, elbows, and back since the alleged
onset date.
It is reasonable to conclude that [Claimant] should have some
limitations as a result of her impairments. However, considering
[Claimant’s] testimony, the medical treatment records, and the
findings and opinions of physicians, [Claimant] retains the ability
to perform work activities consistent with the [RFC] determined in
this decision.
R. 23-24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the ALJ collectively gave some
weight to the Opinions and stated his reasons for the same. Id. The ALJ did not state the weight
given to any specific portion of the Opinions or any functional limitations found therein. Id.
Instead, the ALJ found that “work at the light exertional level with the limitations in manipulative,
environmental, and postural activities is more appropriate …” Id.
Claimant argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to explicitly state the
portions of the Opinions that he accepted or rejected. Doc. No. 26 at 26-28. Specifically, Claimant
argues that “the actual weight accorded to each opinion, the reasons therefor, and how the ALJ
arrived at the ultimate [RFC] is unclear.” Id. at 26. Claimant notes that some limitations found in
the Opinions are more restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC finding. Id. at 26-28. The Commissioner
argues that the ALJ articulated specific reasons for giving some weight to the Opinions and
substantial evidence supports such reasons:
-6-
As the ALJ explained, to the extent [Mr.] Gonzalez or Drs. Ryan
and Hate assessed greater limitations than the ALJ accommodated
in his RFC finding, those opinions conflicted with the treatment
records, imaging reports, and physical exam findings. Even if the
ALJ inadequately explained his rationale for assigning some weight
to the opinions of [Mr.] Gonzalez or Drs. Ryan and Hate, the error
was harmless because the ALJ considered the opinions in detail, and
the substantial evidence discussed below supports his rejection of
the aspects of the opinion evidence that conflicted with his RFC
finding.
Id. at 31.
The ALJ collectively gave some weight to the Opinions. R. 23-24. The Opinions, however,
are conflicting and contain functional limitations that were not included in the RFC. R. 23-24. For
example, the ALJ found that Claimant has the RFC to perform light work, but Dr. Ryan found that
Claimant “would not be able to perform activities which would require prolonged walking or
standing.” R. 18, 268.4 Dr. Hate found that Claimant “will have difficulty in any activities that
require prolonged standing [and] walking.” R. 275. Mr. Gonzalez found that Claimant was able to
stand and/or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour work day and that Claimant was able to
occasionally and frequently lift and/or carry less than ten pounds. R. 357. The ALJ also found that
Claimant had the RFC to handle and finger frequently with both hands and to reach frequently
with both arms, but Mr. Gonzalez found Claimant to be limited in those areas.5 R. 358.
The above-referenced functional limitations are more restrictive than Claimant’s RFC, but
the ALJ did not: 1) explicitly state that such limitations were rejected; or 2) incorporate such
limitations in the RFC. R. 23-24. The ALJ only stated that his RFC finding was appropriate after
“Light work involves lifting no more than [twenty] pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to [ten] pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires
a good deal of walking or standing …. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, [the
claimant] must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
4
Mr. Gonzalez’s findings that Claimant is limited in her upper extremities and that she is limited in reaching, handling,
fingering, and feeling contradicts Dr. Ryan’s finding that Claimant has no restrictions in her upper extremities. R. 268,
358. The ALJ gave both opinions some weight without addressing this conflict. R. 23-24.
5
-7-
considering Claimant’s treatment records, imaging reports, and findings on physical examinations.
Id. The ALJ failed to explicitly state which of the Opinions’ limitations he rejected and failed to
correlate specific medical evidence to any rejected functional limitations. Id. While it appears that
the ALJ rejected the functional limitations mentioned above, he cannot implicitly reject a medical
opinion. See McClurkin, 625 F. App’x. at 962-63. Thus, without a clear statement from the ALJ
either: 1) incorporating Claimant’s limitations into the RFC finding; or 2) identifying the specific
functional limitations that were rejected and correlating specific medical evidence to those rejected
functional limitations, the ALJ failed to “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to
his conclusion.” Ricks, 2012 WL 1020428 at * 9.
The Commissioner argues that the Opinions are not entitled to any special weight or
deference because: 1) Drs. Ryan and Hate examined Claimant once; and 2) Mr. Gonzalez is a
physician’s assistant. Doc. No. 26 at 30. The Court agrees that the Opinions are not entitled to any
specific weight or deference. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting
that a one-time examiner’s opinion is not entitled to any specific weight or deference); Johnson v.
Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-424-J-TEM, 2008 WL 4456749, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2008) (“[A]
physician's assistant's opinion of disability is not entitled to great weight.”). Nevertheless, the ALJ
decided to collectively give some weight to the Opinions. R. 23-24. After doing so, the ALJ failed
to incorporate certain limitations found therein or to identify which portions of the Opinions were
rejected. Id. Thus, the ALJ’s error does not arise from the weight given to the Opinions, but rather
his failure to: 1) explicitly identify any functional limitations that were rejected; and 2) correlate
any medical evidence to those specific limitations. Such an error is not harmless because some of
the limitations found in the Opinions are more restrictive than Claimant’s RFC. See supra p. 7.
-8-
As noted above, the “onus is on the ALJ to provide a clear opinion.” Ricks, 2012 WL
1020428 at * 9. “Where the district court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision,
a sentence-four remand may be appropriate to allow him to explain the basis for his decision.” Id.
(citing Johnson v. Barnhart, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2002)). Here, because the: 1)
ALJ decided to collectively give some weight to the Opinions; 2) Opinions not only conflict with
each other but also contain functional limitations that are more restrictive than Claimant’s RFC;
and 3) ALJ never explicitly identified the portions of the Opinions that he rejected or incorporated
such portions in Claimant’s RFC, the Court is unable to determine whether the ALJ applied the
proper legal standards to the Opinions. See Hanna, 395 F. App’x at 636. Given the foregoing, the
Court finds remand necessary for the ALJ to provide a more specific discussion on the weight
given to the Opinions and the functional limitations found therein. See Ricks, 2012 WL 1020428
at * 9. On remand, should the ALJ decide to give any weight to any of the Opinions, he must state
the precise weight given to each opinion and the reasons therefor. See Winschel, 631 F.3d 117879. If the ALJ accepts or rejects any portion of a medical opinion, he must identify those specific
portions and explain why such portions were accepted or rejected.6
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that:
1) The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for
further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of Section 405(g); and
2) The Clerk is directed to award judgment in favor of Claimant and to close the case.
6
Because the above-referenced issue is dispositive, there is no need to address the other arguments presented in this
appeal. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (on remand the ALJ must reassess the entire record);
McClurkin, 625 F. App’x at 963 n. 3 (no need to analyze other issues when case must be reversed due to other
dispositive errors). On remand, however, the ALJ should consider Claimant’s other arguments.
-9-
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on June 14, 2018.
The Court Requests that the Clerk
Mail or Deliver Copies of this order to:
Sarah Harriet Bohr
2337 Seminole Rd
Atlantic Beach, FL 32233
John F. Rudy, III
Suite 3200
400 N Tampa St
Tampa, FL 33602-4798
Office of the General Counsel, Region IV
Social Security Administration
61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 20T45
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8920
The Honorable Michael Calabro
Administrative Law Judge
c/o Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
Desoto Building #400
8880 Freedom Crossing
Jacksonville, FL 32256-1224
- 10 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?