Williams v. Allen et al

Filing 26

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 24 motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 9/7/2017. (ED)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
REGINA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:17-cv-242-Orl-31DCI

TIMOTHY ALLEN and MICHELLE
TILLMAN,
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court without a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24)
filed by the Defendants and the response in opposition (Doc. 25) filed by the Plaintiff, Regina
Williams.
I.

Background

According to the allegations of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), which are accepted in
pertinent part as true for purposes of resolving the instant motion, Williams is an Orange County
resident, and the Defendants – Timothy Allen (“Allen”) and Michelle Tillman (“Tillman”) – are
officers with the Ocoee Police Department. Williams was involved in a traffic accident on March
6, 2008 in which the other driver was killed and Williams was determined by the police to be at
fault. (Doc. 21 at 4). On April 25, 2008, her license was suspended for an (unrelated) failure to
pay a traffic fine. (Doc. 21 at 4).
In August 2008, Tillman conducted a search on DAVID – Florida’s Driver and Vehicle
Information Database – regarding Williams. (Doc. 21 at 4). Tillman found “that Williams had a
suspended license but her license was not suspended at the time of the accident.” (Doc. 21 at 4).

Despite knowing that Williams’ license was not suspended on the day of the accident, the
Defendants informed the state attorney and the state court to the contrary. (Doc. 21 at 5). More
specifically, Tillman submitted a report containing the false information, and Williams submitted
it to the court and to the state attorney. (Doc. 21 at 5). Relying on this information, the state
attorney filed charges against Williams for violating Florida Statute § 322.34(6), driving without a
valid driver’s license causing serious injury or death, a third degree felony. Williams was
arrested on September 12, 2009. 1 (Doc. 21 at 3).
On December 11, 2012, a state court judge, Bob Leblanc, dismissed the charges against
Williams. (Doc. 21-5 at 1). In that order (henceforth, the “Dismissal Order”), Judge LeBlanc
noted that the prosecution had asserted that Williams’ license had been suspended as of March 6,
2008 but had had not presented any evidence to prove this point. (Doc. 21-5 at 1). Judge
LeBlanc then stated that
In fact, the infraction … for which her license was allegedly
suspended shows via Clerk’s Office “events” to have a notice of
suspension issued on May 1, 2008 – almost two months after the
crash.
(Doc. 21-5 at 1).
On December 12, 2016, Williams filed the instant suit. In her Amended Complaint,
Williams asserts two claims for malicious prosecution – one against each defendant – pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. By way of the instant motion, the Defendants seek dismissal of both claims.

1

In her response to the instant motion, Williams asserts that she was arrested on December
28, 2010 rather than September 12, 2009, the date indicated in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 25
at 1). In any event, the Defendants do not dispute that Williams was arrested at some point as a
consequence of the accident.

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II.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” so as to give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103,
2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint; it does not decide the merits of the case.
Milbum v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11th Cir.1984). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
Court must accept the factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. SEC v. ESM Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir.1988). The
Court must also limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993).
The plaintiff must provide enough factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1966, and to indicate the presence of the
required elements, Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2007). Conclusory
allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not
prevent dismissal. Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme
Court explained that a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “but it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Id. at 1949 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not

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permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged –
but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III.

Analysis

To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
prove two things: the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution and a violation of
her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Kingsland v. City of Miami,
383 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). Under Florida law, a plaintiff must establish each of six
elements to support a claim of malicious prosecution: (1) an original judicial proceeding against
the present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present defendant was the legal cause of
the original proceeding; (3) the termination of the original proceeding constituted a bona fide
termination of that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) there was an absence of
probable cause for the original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part of the present
defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the original proceeding. Id. As
for the second prong, it is well established that an arrest without probable cause is an unreasonable
seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256
(11th Cir. 2010) (citing cases). 2
In this case, the Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Williams, and
therefore she cannot satisfy the “unreasonable seizure” prong of her Section 1983 malicious
prosecution claim. Specifically, the Defendants point to a document attached to the Dismissal

2

Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge,
of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to
believe under the circumstances shown that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F. 3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).

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Order. 3 (Doc. 21-5 at 3-4). The document is the record of the docket in a civil traffic case
against Williams. As Judge LeBlanc pointed out (Doc. 21-5 at 1) in the Dismissal Order, that
document (henceforth, the “Traffic Docket”) reflects that a driver’s license suspension issued to
Williams on May 1, 2008. (Doc. 21-5 at 3). However, the Traffic Docket also shows a
suspension issued to Williams on December 20, 2007 – and nothing indicating that this earlier
suspension was lifted prior to the March 6, 2008 accident. 4 (Doc. 21-5 at 3). As such, the
Defendants argue, “it is reasonable to conclude” that in August 2008, when Defendant Tillman
checked Williams’ status, her license was actually suspended, and therefore Williams’ September
2009 arrest for causing a serious accident while driving on a suspended license was supported by
probable cause. (Doc. 24 at 5).
In response, Williams reiterates that her license was not suspended on the day of the
accident and again asserts that the suspension relied upon by the Defendants as a basis for the
criminal charge did not take effect “until April 25, 2008, which was over a month after the
accident.” 5 (Doc. 25 at 2). She argues that the Traffic Docket shows that she completed a 4hour defensive driving course on February 8, 2008 and that the officers would have known that
this “reinstate[d] her license.” (Doc. 25 at 4). However, the docket entry on that date reads as
follows, in its entirety: “Complete 4hr DDC with Proof to the Clerk by”. (Doc. 25-1 at 3). If

3

Williams attached the dismissal order – and the accompanying document – to her
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 21-5). Exhibits attached to a pleading are properly considered a
part of the pleading for all purposes. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
4

In contrast, the document does show a “Notice of D6 Satisfaction” on September 4,
2008. (Doc. 21-5 at 3).
5

The Court notes that the date Williams cites here for the suspension (April 25, 2008)
does not match the dates shown for suspensions in the Traffic Docket (December 20, 2007 and
May 1, 2008). Neither party has addressed this discrepancy.

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anything, this suggests that Williams was being required to complete such a course, not recording
that she had already done so. (Even assuming arguendo that she did complete such a course on
(or by) that date, Williams has not presented any support for her contention that doing so would
have resulted in an immediate reinstatement of her license.) Williams also fails to address the
Defendants’ point regarding the lack of a “Notice of D6 Satisfaction” – or some other indicator
that she had completed all the necessary steps and had her driving privilege restored – between the
December 2007 suspension and the March 2008 accident. 6
Thus it appears that, as the Defendants argue, a reasonable police officer looking at the
Traffic Docket in August 2008 could have concluded that Williams was driving on a suspended
license when the accident occurred. It is not clear how much this matters, however. Williams
has not alleged in her Amended Complaint that Tillman reviewed the Traffic Docket before
assessing whether her license had been suspended, and so far as the Court can determine, Tillman
does not assert that she did so. Instead, Williams alleges that Tillman searched through DAVID
to determine the status of Williams’ license. (Doc. 21 at 4). As such, the probable cause
determination would appear to turn on the contents of that database, rather than the Traffic
Docket.
The relevant portions of that database are not described in the Amended Complain. There
is no explanation as to how the data that would have been found in that database in August 2008,
when Tillman searched it, would have informed her that Williams’ license was not suspended on
March 6, 2008. Williams simply asserts that, after searching DAVID, the Defendants “knew that

6

Williams raises one additional argument: that the Defendants lacked probable cause
because the Traffic Docket does not contain any indication that she was ever provided notice of
the suspension of her license. However, Williams has not shown that such information is
normally included in the Traffic Docket, so that its absence would be noteworthy.

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the Plaintiff’s license was not suspended at the time [the accident occurred] and knew that they
should not have filed charges against the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 21 at 4). This unsupported assertion is
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Twombly.
It may be that Williams believes that the information in DAVID is identical [in pertinent
part] to the information in the Traffic Docket (which is why the Court has attempted to address the
arguments raised by the parties in relation to the Traffic Docket). Or perhaps Williams believes
that DAVID contained additional information showing that the December 2007 suspension was
cured before March 2008. Or perhaps Williams has a different theory entirely. In any event, the
Court will give Williams another chance to allege the facts behind her contention that the
Defendants knew before filing the report with the court and the state attorney that Williams had
not been driving on a suspended license when the accident occurred.
IV.

Conclusion

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED IN PART, and the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Plaintiff may
file an amended pleading on or before September 18, 2017.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on September 7, 2017.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

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