GJC Interests of Florida Limited Partnership v. Geneva Foods, LLC et al

Filing 6

ORDER -- Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. On or before Friday, August, 11, 2017, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 8/1/2017. (VMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
GJC INTERESTS OF FLORIDA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:17-cv-1398-Orl-37TBS

GENEVA FOODS, LLC; PETER A.
CORTEVILLE; THOMAS BANDEMER;
and PACA FOODS LCC,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on its own motion. In what has become an all too
familiar exercise, the Court must again dismiss a complaint for failure to sufficiently
plead the citizenship of the parties. Such careless pleading is egregious enough on its own
but, here, Plaintiff’s Complaint also constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading. For
these reasons, the Complaint is due to be dismissed without prejudice. “Federal courts
exercise limited subject matter jurisdiction,” and, as such, are “empowered to hear only
those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the
Constitution or otherwise authorized by Congress.” Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367
(11th Cir. 1994). For that reason, a fundamental understanding of the nature of federal
jurisdiction is essential to practicing in United States District Court. Discovering the
proper jurisdictional pleading requirements for establishing diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires only rudimentary research skills and much less time than that
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consumed by the Court in ferreting out the deficiencies, directing correction and
reviewing the response for compliance. Counsel would be well advised to do some basic
research before submitting pleadings that miss the mark so woefully.
I.

Jurisdictional Allegations

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the Declaratory Judgment Act (“the Act”). (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 8.)
However, “the operation of the [Act] is procedural only.” Household Bank v. JFS Grp.,
320 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)). By its own terms, the Act requires plaintiffs to allege
“facts showing that the controversy is within the court’s original jurisdiction.” Id. (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). “If there is an underlying ground for federal court jurisdiction, the
[Act] allows parties to precipitate suits that otherwise might need to wait for the
declaratory relief defendant to bring a coercive action.” Id. (emphasis added). Evidently
then, Plaintiff cannot rely on the Act without an independent basis for jurisdiction. So the
Court turns to Plaintiff’s diversity jurisdiction allegations.
District courts have original jurisdiction over cases in which the parties are
completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
“To meet the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332(a), the citizenship of each plaintiff
must be different from that of each defendant.” Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics
Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070 (11th Cir. 2012). The Court is unable to determine whether
complete diversity exists in this action because Plaintiff has not properly alleged the
citizenship of the parties.
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First, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the citizenship of the individual parties to
this action. The citizenship of an individual is determined by domicile, which is
established by residence plus an intent to remain. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Peter A. Corteville and
Thomas Bandemer are residents of Georgia and Florida, respectively (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 5, 6), are
insufficient. See Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Citizenship, not
residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to establish diversity for a
natural person.”). While courts may consider a party’s residence as one consideration
indicating domicile, Plaintiff has wholly failed to supplement the foregoing residence
allegations. See Taylor v. Am. Heritage Church Fin., Inc., No. 6:10-cv-559-Orl-31GJK,
2010 WL 2991572, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 27, 2010). For example, other factors considered
when assessing the domicile of a party include payment of taxes, voter registration,
driver’s licenses, location of property, location of bank accounts, and membership in
clubs, churches, and other associations. Id.
Second, Plaintiff has also failed to sufficiently plead the citizenship of the business
entities in this action. Despite Plaintiff’s attempt to characterize these entities as
corporations (see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7), as indicated by their names, Plaintiff GJC Interests of
Florida Limited Partnership, Defendant Geneva Foods, LLC, and Defendant Paca Foods,
LLC (collectively, “Unincorporated Parties”) are unincorporated entities. See Americold
Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1015 (2016); Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v.
Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1021–22 (11th Cir. 2004). For purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of an “unincorporated entity generally depends on
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the citizenship of all the members composing the organization.” Rolling Greens, 374 F.3d
at 1021 (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990)). Thus, the
Unincorporated Parties are citizens of any state where one or more of their members are
citizens. See id. Because Plaintiff has mistakenly asserted the citizenship allegations for a
corporation, see 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1), it has failed to demonstrate complete diversity
between the parties. To assure itself of its jurisdiction, the Court will require Plaintiff to
identify each member of the Unincorporated Parties and allege the citizenship of each
member individually.
II.

Shotgun Pleadings

Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint is a shotgun pleading. Shotgun pleadings come in a
variety of forms. See, e.g., Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321
(11th Cir. 2015) (describing four categories of shotgun pleadings). The most common type
“is [one] containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last
count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at 1321. Such pleadings impose on
the Court the onerous task of sifting out irrelevancies to determine which facts are
relevant to which causes of action. See id. at 1323. Described as “altogether unacceptable,”
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, when a shotgun pleading is filed
in this Court, repleader is required. Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997);
see also Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1125–28 (11th Cir. 2014). If the Court
does not require repleader, then “all is lost.” Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp.,
Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Here, the Complaint evidences a modified version of the most common form of
shotgun pleading, as Counts V through VIII incorporate each of the preceding
allegations. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 50, 62, 73, 81.) Despite its deviation from the prototype, this
too is impermissible. As such, the Complaint must be dismissed. If Plaintiff chooses to
replead, the amended complaint must clearly delineate which factual allegations are
relevant to each claim.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2.

On or before Friday, August, 11, 2017, Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint that remedies the various deficiencies set forth in this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on August 1, 2017.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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