Bryant v. Orange County, Florida et al

Filing 56

ORDER granting 54 motion to dismiss. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Orange County's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54) is GRANTED. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Gregory A. Presnell on 5/14/2018. (MAF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
WILLINE BRYANT and MAX GRACIA,
SR. ,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 6:17-cv-1423-Orl-31KRS

ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
ROBERT J. BUCK, III , MARYANNE
EVANS, KAREN CLAIRMONT, ELSA
GALLOZA-GONZALEZ and LYNN
MARIE HARTER,
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Orange County’s Motion to Dismiss
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 54) and the Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 55).
I.

Background
The Plaintiffs brought the instant case following the death of the Decedent, which occurred

during his incarceration with Orange County Corrections. An Autopsy Report concluded that the
manner of his death was homicide, due to his incarceration, and that the cause of death was “septic
shock complicating infected dog bite wounds” with HIV as a contributory factor. 1 Doc. 47 ¶ 41.
The Decedent suffered multiple dog bites during his arrest on August 6, 2015. Id. ¶ 21.
On September 18, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint. Doc. 29. Count I
alleged a § 1983 claim against Orange County, Count II alleged a § 1983 claim against Buck, Count

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For a more detailed factual background, see Bryant v. Orange Cty., Fla., No. 6:17-cv1423-ORL-31-KRS, 2018 WL 326310, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2018).

III alleged a § 1983 claim against Evans, Count IV alleged a § 1983 claim against Clairmont, Count
V alleged a § 1983 claim against Gonzalez, Count VI alleged a § 1983 claim against Harter, and
Count VII alleged a medical malpractice claim against Orange County.
Defendants Clairmont and Evans each filed individual motions to dismiss on October 2,
2017. Docs. 31, 32. That same day, Defendants Orange County, Buck, Gonzalez, and Harter filed a
collective motion to dismiss. Doc. 33. The Court granted Orange County’s Motion to Dismiss, but
denied the other Motions to Dismiss. Doc. 44. On January 18, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the Second
Amended Complaint. Doc. 47. Orange County filed the Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Second
Amended Complaint on February 8, 2018. Doc. 54. The Plaintiffs filed the Response in Opposition
on February 20, 2018. Doc. 55.
II.

Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, see, e.g., Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir.
1994), and must limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993).
The Court will liberally construe the complaint's allegations in the Plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual
deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
In reviewing a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), “courts must be mindful that the Federal Rules require only that the complaint contain ‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” U.S. v. Baxter
Intern., Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). This is a liberal

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pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with particularity every element
of a cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001).
However, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–555 (2007). The complaint's factual
allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555, and
cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
III.

Analysis
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint seeks relief against Orange County for violation

of § 1983.

In Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of New York, the Supreme Court rejected the

proposition that municipalities can be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a plaintiff is required to show that the Constitutional injury alleged
was the result of a custom or policy. Id. Where no stated policy exists, a plaintiff must show that
there was a pattern of deliberate indifference 2 that is “so widespread as to have the force of law.”
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); see also Craig v. Floyd
Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2011). Municipal liability may be based on a claim of
inadequate training where “a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect
evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants such that the failure to train can be
properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983.” Albra v. City of Ft.
Lauderdale, 232 Fed. App'x 885, 890 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

2

Deliberate indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence. See Townsend v.
Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010) (“claim of deliberate indifference requires
proof of more than gross negligence”).

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The Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent’s death was the result of “an unwritten policy of
allowing documentation to be minimized to twice a week unless there was a change in the patient’s
medical condition.” Doc. 47 ¶ 69. Additionally, the Plaintiffs aver that the “facility was medically
understaffed, presumably due to budgetary concerns.” See id. However, because there is no stated
policy, the Plaintiffs would need to plausibly allege that there was a widespread pattern of deliberate
indifference in order for Count I to survive the Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiffs allege that Orange
County knew of prior similar incidents that resulted in the death of OCC detainees, and that Orange
County consciously failed to properly train its medical staff to avoid repeated incidents. Doc. 47 ¶
59. Instead of training its staff properly, the Plaintiffs aver, Orange County “routinely acquiesced to
its medical staff not properly doing rounds, not properly documenting a detainee’s medical
conditions, [and] not properly supervising and administering medical orders.” Id. ¶ 60.
As factual support for their claims, the Plaintiffs cite three different deaths and one serious
injury during the past thirty years that involved a failure to provide medical treatment to detainees
with declining medical conditions. The most recent of these incidents occurred in October of 2000.
Doc. 47 ¶ 61. The Plaintiffs claim that these deaths “put Orange County on notice of the need for
more adequate training of its medical staff when dealing with inmates or detainees in medical or
mental decline.” Id. ¶ 60. Individually, these incidents are troubling, but they are insufficient to
plausibly allege a widespread pattern of deliberate indifference that was ongoing at the time of the
Decedent’s death. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a claim for municipal liability
under § 1983.

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IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Orange County’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54) is GRANTED. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on May 14, 2018.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

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