McCullars v. Maloy
Filing
128
ORDER granting 124 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Grant Maloy and close this case. Signed by Judge Paul G. Byron on 3/25/2019. (JRJ)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
B. STANLEY MCCULLARS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 6:17-cv-1587-Orl-40GJK
GRANT MALOY,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50. The Court granted Defendant’s motion at
the end of the defense case, having deferred ruling following Plaintiff’s presentation of
evidence. The Court articulated on the record its reasoning for granting Defendant’s
motion, and this Order incorporates the Court’s earlier pronouncement.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff B. Stanley McCullars brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
Defendant Grant Maloy, individually and in his official capacity as Clerk of the Circuit
Court and Comptroller of Seminole County, Florida (the “Clerk”), for alleged First
Amendment violations. (Doc. 1). The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr.
Maloy in his individual capacity and the trial proceeded against Defendant in his official
capacity. (Doc. 72). This suit arises from Plaintiff’s controversial social media comments
that precipitated the end of his employment with Defendant.
A.
The Posts
On March 16, 2017, State Attorney Aramis Ayala declared publicly that her office
would not seek the death penalty in capital murder cases. Ms. Ayala made this statement
in the wake of a tragic double-murder wherein Mr. Markeith Loyd killed his pregnant
girlfriend and subsequently murdered Orlando Police Department officer LT Debra
Clayton as she attempted to apprehend him. 1 Another officer was fatally injured in a traffic
accident connected to this crime-spree.
On March 19, 2017, at approximately 10:30 p.m. while at home, Plaintiff posted
comments from his Facebook account criticizing the State Attorney’s decision. The
Plaintiff posted a comment to another individual’s Facebook page concerning Ms. Ayala’s
position on the death penalty. 2 Specifically, Mr. McCullars wrote that Ayala, the first
African-American State Attorney in Florida, “should get the death penalty,” and followed
this post by writing Ms. Ayala “should be tarred and feathered if not hung from a tree.”
(Def. Ex. 6). Later that same night, Plaintiff made another Facebook post that said: “Yep,
it was wrong for me to post that. I let my anger at her efforts to thwart justice get the better
of me. No excuses.” Plaintiff strenuously denies that the post was racially motivated,
claiming that he was unaware of Ayala’s race when he made the posts. 3 The posts were
deleted by a third party shortly after they were posted.
1
At trial State Attorney Ayala explained that her position was predicated, in part, upon
the fact that the United States Supreme Court and Florida Supreme Court had stuck
down the procedure employed in Florida in death-penalty cases.
2
The individual who received Plaintiff’s comments attended Florida A&M Law School,
a predominantly African-American institution.
3
For Defendant’s Rule 50 motion, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s position that he was
unaware of Ms. Ayala’s race, as patently implausible as that assertion may be in view
2
B.
The Impact of Plaintiff’s Facebook Comments
Plaintiff’s comments literally went viral. Almost immediately after the posts spread
across the internet, Plaintiff McCullars was identified as a Clerk’s Office employee. The
next morning, March 20, 2017, the Clerk’s Office’s phones were ringing off the hook with
complaints. Ms. Lia Denning, the head of human resources, testified that citizens calling
the Clerk’s Office were upset, with some people crying while others used profanity to
express their outrage. Mr. McCullars’ comments were largely characterized by concerned
citizens as racist. Some citizens requested that the Clerk of Court, Mr. Maloy, return their
call. The volume of telephone calls was so significant that two additional staff members
were pulled from their duties to answer phone calls. Ms. Denning characterized the
volume of telephone traffic as incredible, and the work environment was a nightmare with
media converging outside the building. Ms. Amy Midyette, one of Plaintiff’s co-workers,
corroborated Ms. Denning’s description of the volume of citizen complaints, adding that
calls were so numerous that the Office’s voicemail was overwhelmed. Additionally, the
Clerk’s Office received many emails related to the Facebook posts. Ms. Denning was,
therefore, tasked with reviewing Plaintiff’s social media posts as part of an on-going
investigation.
General counsel for the Clerk’s Office, Ms. Susan Dietrich, further corroborated
Ms. Denning’s testimony that on Monday morning the phones were constantly ringing
with citizens complaining about Plaintiff’s Facebook posts. Ms. Dietrich testified that
personnel were removed from their normal duties for 2-3 days following the posts.
of the public discourse surrounding her statements concerning the death penalty and
Plaintiff’s choice of words.
3
Plaintiff’s actions caused Ms. Dietrich to spend time researching First Amendment issues
and reviewing the Clerk’s options. Ms. Jenny Spencer, the Plaintiff’s supervisor, called a
meeting of 22 staff members to discuss the situation and to provide guidance on dealing
with citizens and the media. Ms. Dietrich also related that protests were being threatened
in response to the Facebook posts. And Ms. Dietrich had meetings with Mr. Maloy to
discuss the situation.
Ms. Dietrich testified that Plaintiff’s posts violated the Clerk’s Code of Ethics
(contained in the deputy clerk handbook), which provides: “We shall avoid any activities
that would impugn the dignity of the clerk’s office.” (Def. Ex. 55, p. 3). Ms. Dietrich
explained that Florida Rules of Court identify the Office of the Clerk of Court as an arm of
the judiciary. Accordingly, Ms. Dietrich was concerned that Mr. McCullars’ comments
reflected poorly upon the integrity and impartiality of the Clerk’s Office, thereby
undermining the public’s confidence in the administration of justice. 4 This concern was
echoed by Mr. Maloy, the Clerk of Court, who explained that citizens access the court
through the Clerk’s Office, and Plaintiff’s comments negatively impact upon public
confidence in the administration of justice. Moreover, Plaintiff’s comments had a negative
impact on office morale and, if left unchecked, would have impacted the Clerk’s ability to
recruit and retain a diverse workforce. For example, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Ms. Spencer is
a highly educated Finance Director with vast experience in governmental accounting. Ms.
Spencer testified that she could not continue to work with Mr. McCullars in light of his
comments which she perceived as racist and impugning the dignity of the office. Mr.
4
The Code of Ethics provides that deputy clerks “shall conduct [their] work without bias
or prejudice based on any factor to include race, skin color, religion, age, [or] national
origin . . . .” (Doc. 55, p. 4).
4
Maloy testified that the loss of Ms. Spencer, via her potential resignation, would have a
detrimental impact on the operation of his office.
Plaintiff McCullars was not a line employee; he was a supervisor occupying the
number two position in the finance department of the Clerk’s Office. Plaintiff testified at
trial and acknowledged that impartiality is important to the work of the Clerk’s Office.
Plaintiff McCullars admitted the importance of discharging his duties in an impartial
manner and avoiding the appearance if bias. Mr. McCullars also acknowledged that the
Clerk’s Office is racially and ethnically diverse. He conceded that his comments on
Facebook were made in anger, and he agreed that his comments did not address the
merits of the death penalty or State Attorney Ayala’s position on that subject. Plaintiff
knew his comments generated public outcry, but he claims his suggestion that Ms. Ayala
receive the death penalty or that she be tarred and feathered and hung from a tree was
misconstrued by a handful of people who engaged in a crusade to have him fired. In
contrast, Mr. McCullars’ letter of resignation, submitted on March 22, 2017, stated:
Please consider this letter as my official resignation with an
effective separation date of April 3, 2017.
My social media posts of last weekend resulted in the Clerk
and Clerk staff spending resources answering questions from
some members of the public. I believe my resignation will help
the Clerk’s Office to more quickly return to the people’s
business.
....
(Def. Ex. 50).
C.
Community Leaders Respond
State Attorney Ayala testified that on March 19, 2017, she began receiving calls
by people who had seen Plaintiff’s Facebook posts. Ms. Ayala took the threat literally,
5
and she was offended and concerned for her safety and for the safety of her children. 5
Ms. Ayala went to Plaintiff’s Facebook page, clicked on his profile, and saw that he was
employed by the Clerk of Court. 6 On Monday morning, Ms. Ayala directed her staff to call
Mr. Maloy to express her displeasure. Mr. Maloy testified to the importance of maintaining
a positive working relationship with the community and its leaders, including Ms. Ayala,
and how Plaintiff’s posts caused him to apologize to the State Attorney.
Other community leaders beyond State Attorney Ayala voiced their concern to the
Clerk of Court. By March 20, 2017, the day after Plaintiff’s Facebook comments, the
Orange County Democratic Party passed a resolution condemning Mr. McCullars’
comments, resolving that “the Orange County Democratic Party expresses its outrage
over the terroristic threat made by Stan McCullars towards State Attorney Aramis Ayala,
and calls upon Clerk Grant Maloy to terminate Stan McCullars immediately.” (Def. Ex.
28). This resolution was sent to Mr. Maloy on March 22, 2017 at 8:44 a.m., three days
after the Facebook post. (Def. Ex. 47). The negative impact from Plaintiff’s comments did
not subside quickly. Plaintiff’s friend and former co-worker, Ms. Danalee Ellner testified
that the atmosphere in the office after Mr. McCullars’ posts was like a “grenade” went off,
with the buzz about it lasting for weeks.
Pastor Roman Oliver, a community leader in Sanford, Florida, also testified at trial.
Pastor Oliver spent a career as an educator and administrator before taking a leadership
5
Ms. Ayala explained that it has become common for people to post their intentions to
commit acts of violence on Facebook prior to carrying out an attack. Accordingly, she
took Mr. McCullars’ comments to be threatening.
6
The Plaintiff denies that his Facebook page reflects that he worked for the Clerk of
Court.
6
role at Saint Paul Baptist church in Sanford. 7 Pastor Oliver is active in the AfricanAmerican community on issues of economic, social, and political justice. He was involved
in organizing peaceful protests over the killing of Trayvon Martin, an African-Americ an
teenager shot by George Zimmerman as he walked home from a convenience store
where he had purchased candy. Pastor Oliver quickly learned of Mr. McCullar’s posts and
his affiliation with the Clerk’s office. Plaintiff’s position in the judicial system concerned
Pastor Oliver and other community leaders, and they met with Mr. Maloy. Because the
Clerk of Court had placed Mr. McCullars on administrative leave, no protests took place.
However, Pastor Oliver testified that had the Clerk’s office declined to act, peaceful
protests would have ensued.
Florida Representative Geraldine Thompson testified as an expert witness for the
Defendant on African-American history and culture, including the prevalence of lynching
in Florida and more particularly in Central Florida. After providing a comprehensive history
of this dark chapter in American history, Representative Thompson opined that it is
reasonable to foresee that the African-American community would interpret Plaintiff’s
statement that Ms. Ayala should be tarred and feathered and hung from a tree to be a
reference to lynching. 8 Representative Thompson also provided a scholarly history of
racial tension and segregation in Sanford, where the Seminole County Courthouse is
located. She concluded her expert testimony by explaining how the Sanford community
reacted to the killing of Trayvon Martin and how Plaintiff’s comments, coming a year later,
7
Saint Paul is the oldest African-American church in Florida.
8
Lynching was a form of mob violence typically involving hanging a person from a tree
without due process. It was extrajudicial killing typically perpetrated against an AfricanAmerican.
7
would elicit public outcry in the community. Representative Thompson explained how the
African-American community has mistrust for the judicial system, making Plaintiff’s
comments capable of undermining confidence in the Courts.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judgment as a matter of law should only be granted if no objectively reasonable
jury, based on the evidence and inferences adduced at trial and through the exercise of
impartial judgment, could reach the verdict reached. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597
F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir. 2010); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526
(11th Cir. 1997). Stated differently, the party moving for judgment as a matter of law must
show that the trial evidence “is so overwhelmingly [in its favor] that a reasonable jury could
not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241,
1246 (11th Cir. 2001). However, where there is substantial evidence in the trial record
which would allow reasonable minds to reach different conclusions, judgment as a matter
of law is inappropriate. Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co., 608 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir.
2010). In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court must
review the record and draw all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Brown, 597 F.3d at 1173. Importantly, the district court
must not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence, as these are functions
reserved for the jury. Id. Rule 50 is clear in its procedure. Before a case is submitted to
the jury for consideration, a party may move for judgment as a matter of law on any issue
which is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
8
A.
First Amendment Analysis
1.
Comments Made as Employee or Private Citizen
The Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s comments were made within the
scope of his employment or in his capacity as a private citizen. When government
employees speak “as citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those
speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and
effectively.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). On the other hand, “when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421. The Garcetti Court
based this distinction on the long-recognized need for public employers to have discretion
in controlling their operations:
Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an
employee in his or her professional capacity. Official communications have
official consequences, creating a need for substantive consistency and
clarity. Supervisors must ensure that their employees' official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer's mission.
Id. at 422–23. Public employee speech “ordinarily within the scope of [the] employee’s
duties” is therefore not afforded First Amendment protection. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct.
2369, 2379 (2014).
The speech at issue in this case occurred when Plaintiff was home, using his
personal computer. The Facebook comments do not reflect Plaintiff is speaking as an
employee of the Clerk of Court. Moreover, the posts concerned Plaintiff’s opinion
regarding, and response to, a Florida prosecutor’s public statement and had nothing to
9
do with Plaintiff’s professional duties. Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s speech
was not made in his official capacity.
2.
Pickering Balancing Test
Next, the Court addresses the framework set forth in Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). It is well-settled that a public employer may not fire an
employee “on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in
freedom of speech.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987). To prevail on a
wrongful termination claim based on protected speech, an employee must show, in part,
that he or she (1) suffered an adverse employment action (2) because the employee
engaged in protected speech. Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir.
2000).
Courts employ the so-called Pickering balancing test to discern whether a
government employee’s speech qualifies for First Amendment protection. Before any
balancing, though, the Court must decide whether Plaintiff’s speech may be “fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,” triggering First
Amendment protection. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). This
determination is made in view of “the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 384–85 (same). The Court holds that Plaintiff’s
speech concerning the State Attorney’s stance on the death penalty, no matter how
misunderstood Plaintiff’s understanding of Ms. Ayala’s position may have been, is speech
on a matter of public concern. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 (“The inappropriate or
controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a
matter of public concern.”). Plaintiff’s statements criticized a public official for a publicly-
10
announced decision that generated significant media attention and spawned a clash
between a Florida prosecutor and Florida’s Governor that went up to the Florida Supreme
Court. 9 The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s speech addressed a matter of public
concern, and next turns to the Pickering balancing test.
To prevail on his wrongful termination claim, Plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that his “first amendment interest in engaging in the
speech outweighs the employer's interest in prohibiting the speech in order to promote
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Stanley, 219 F.3d
at 1288. “In striking this balance, [the Court] consider[s] these factors: ‘(1) whether the
speech at issue impedes the government’s ability to perform its duties efficiently, (2) the
manner, time, and place of the speech, and (3) the context within which the speech was
made.’” Id. at 1289 (quoting Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir.
1989)). This balancing act requires a fact-intensive inquiry guided by few, if any, hard and
fast rules. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
Other Courts have suggested factors to consider in applying the Pickering
balancing test. The Second Circuit in Melzer v. Board of Education, 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir.
9
The Court pauses to note that, although unpleasant, Plaintiff’s posts do not constitute
an unprotected “true threat”—especially after giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt
as required at this stage. The First Amendment does not protect all speech touching
on matters of public concern. For instance, “true threats”—“statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”—are not entitled to
First Amendment protection. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). But while
“true threats” are not protected, “political hyperbole” is. Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot find that the posts constituted a “true
threat.” See Specialty Malls of Tampa v. City of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. 1222, 1227
(M.D. Fla. 1996).
11
2003), directs the district court to consider whether the speech “impairs discipline by
superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working
relationships . . . or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with
the regular operation of the enterprise.” Id. at 197; see also, Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch.
Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015) (the inquiry involves a “sliding scale” in which the
amount of disruption a public employer must tolerate is proportionate to the importance
of the speech to the public). The district court in Buker v. Howard County, Nos. MJG–13–
3046, MJG–13–3747, 2015 WL 3456750 (D. Md. May 27, 2015), aff’d Grutzmacher, et
al. v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2017), held:
Factors relevant to this inquiry include whether a public
employee’s speech (1) impaired the maintenance of discipline
by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony among coworkers; (3)
damaged close personal relationships; (4) impeded the
performance of the public employee’s duties; (5) interfered
with the operation of the institution; (6) undermined the
mission of the institution; (7) was communicated to the public
or to coworkers in private; (8) conflicted with the
responsibilities of the employee within the institution; and (9)
abused the authority and public accountability that the
employee’s role entailed.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
The Court begins by assessing Plaintiff’s interest in making the posts. Plaintiff
undoubtedly had a legitimate interest in speaking on a matter of public concern. Plaintiff’s
posts, as an “expression on public issues ‘. . . rest[] on the highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values.” See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
(1982); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”). On the
other hand, the “vulgar” and caustic nature of the posts somewhat weakens Plaintiff’s
interest in making them. See Hansen v. Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 577 (11th Cir. 1994)
12
(“[T]he manner of a public employee’s speech is an important element in the Pickering
balance. Here, the outcome of a Pickering balance is especially uncertain because the
manner of [the plaintiff’s] speech was vulgar, insulting, and defiant.” (citation omitted));
see also Snipes v. Volusia Cty., 704 F. App’x 848, 854 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here are many
ways to communicate ones’ thoughts, and the vulgar, derogatory phrases used by
[appellant] weigh against him.”). And while the Supreme Court has recognized “the
importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of
government employees engaging in civic discussion,” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, Plaintiff’s
posts do not implicate this consideration as there is little evidence that the views Plaintiff
expressed were particularly “well[ ]informed.” In fact, Plaintiff admitted at trial that he did
not attempt to engage in a thoughtful discourse on the merits of the death penalty or Ms.
Ayala’s position in that regard. Rather, he lashed out in anger with violent rhetoric that
quickly went viral.
One aspect of Plaintiff’s position weighs slightly in his favor. Plaintiff had some—
albeit not the greatest—contact with the public. Plaintiff met with bankers and attended
committee meetings open to the public. But Plaintiff’s job required little direct public
contact, which means that his “burden of caution” with respect to his public speech was
less than an official with significant public contact. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–91; see
also, Sims v. Metro. Dade Cty., 972 F.2d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen the
employee serves in a sensitive capacity that requires extensive public contact, the
employee's private speech may pose a substantial danger to the agency's successful
functioning.”).
13
Next, the Court considers Defendant’s interests in censuring Plaintiff for the posts.
The Clerk’s Office requires “a significant degree of control over [its] employees' words
and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public
services.” See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. Another weight on the scales is the prospect of
disharmony among co-workers, manifested here by Ms. Spencer, Plaintiff’s supervisor,
testifying that she could no longer work with Plaintiff in light of his “racist” posts. See
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. The evidence is overwhelming that the posts “interfere[d] with
the regular operation of the [Clerk’s Office]” because the barrage of angry phone call and
email complaints disrupted several employees’ work, See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
Furthermore, Defendant saw the posts as damaging the integrity of the Clerk’s Office,
which is corroborated by several witnesses, including Defendant’s expert witness, and
which Plaintiff acknowledged at trial. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389 (suggesting that speech
“discredit[ing]” a public employer would tend to justify remedial measures).
It is well-settled that a “government’s legitimate interest in avoiding disruption does
not require proof of actual disruption.” Smopes, 704 F. App’x at 852. “Rather, a
‘[r]easonable possibility of adverse harm is all that is required.” Id. In Snipes, the County
did not receive complaints or demands that the appellant be fired, nor were any rallies or
protests held. Id. However, Reverend Durham, President of the Daytona Beach Black
Clergy Alliance, testified that had Snipes not been fired, “I certainly think that we would
have probably moved forward with some sort of either demonstration or action . . . in the
form of a protest rally.” Id. The potential for disruption in Snipes was sufficient to justify
the government’s action in response to Mr. Snipes hateful comments concerning the
death of Trevon Martin. Id. Conversely, when actual disruption to the government
14
employer’s operations occurs, this constitutes persuasive evidence that the government
has met its burden under the Pickering balancing test. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 197.
Here, Plaintiff employed Facebook, a public forum, by commenting on another
Facebook user’s page and advocating that the State Attorney receive the death penalty
for her views and that she be tarred and feathered and hung from a tree. The public outcry
in response to these vulgar comments was immediate and overwhelming. By the following
morning the Office of the Clerk of Court was inundated with telephone calls, emails, and
voice messages by upset citizens demanding action. The State Attorney had complained
to the Clerk of Court, community leaders had insisted upon meeting with the Clerk, the
Democratic Party of Orange County passed a resolution condemning the comments and
calling for Plaintiff’s termination, the threat of protests loomed, and the media was
aggressively covering the story. In the midst of this turmoil, the Finance Department, lead
by Ms. Spencer, was preparing a comprehensive financial report which demanded the
full attention of three senior members of the Finance Department, including Mr.
McCullars. None of these senior employees could attend to that business. Mr. McCullars
was placed on administrative leave and Ms. Spencer was busy dealing with the crisis
created by Mr. McCullars ill-conceived internet rant.
Perhaps the most damaging by-product of Mr. McCullars’ comments was to call
into question whether the Seminole County Clerk of Court—the right arm to the judiciary
in that county—was capable of discharging its important duties in an impartial manner.
Mr. Maloy and his staff responded to this turmoil with composure and consummate
professionalism and ultimately regained the public’s trust and confidence. However, “it is
not necessary ‘for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption
15
of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.”
Buker, 2015 WL 3456750, at *10.
Plaintiff McCullars was presented with a letter containing what the Clerk of Court
described as incentives for resignation. (Plf. Ex. 13). Plaintiff contends that he was
terminated via this letter. The Court need not resolve this dispute, because the Court finds
that in applying the Pickering balancing test to the specific facts of this case, Plaintiff’s
speech is not entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant
Grant Maloy and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on March 25, 2019.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?