Field v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 37

ORDER adopting 33 Report and Recommendations; overruling 34 Objection. See PDF for details and directions to Clerk. Signed by Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. on 2/25/2019. (PKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
ANASTASIA M. FIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 6:18-cv-119-Orl-37KRS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________
ORDER
In the instant social security appeal, Plaintiff Anastasia Field seeks review of the
Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying the claim for social security
benefits filed by her deceased son Christopher Field. (Doc. 1.) On referral, U.S. Magistrate
Judge Karla R. Spaulding recommends affirming the Commissioner’s final decision.
(Doc. 33 (“R&R”).) Plaintiff then objected to the R&R (Doc. 34 (“Objection”)), now before
the Court. On de novo review, the Court finds that the Objection is due to be overruled,
the R&R adopted, and the Commissioner’s final decision affirmed.
I.

BACKGROUND

In May 2013, Christopher Field applied for disabled adult child benefits and
supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits due to a congenital valve defect, bulging
discs, seizure disorder, strokes, arthritis, bipolar disorder, and attention deficit

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hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). (R. 502.) 1 He alleged a disability onset date of October
1, 2011 when he was 19 years old. (R. 429, 431.)
After his claims were denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 259–61) An initial hearing was
held on September 15, 2015 where Christopher appeared with counsel present, but the
hearing was continued based on his counsel’s untimely submission of evidence. (R. 157–
68.) The hearing was scheduled for December 1, 2015 (R. 311), but Christopher died on
November 30, 2015 (R. 461). Anastasia Field, his mother, applied to be substituted as the
party upon Christopher’s death (R. 418), and the ALJ held additional hearings on April
12, August 31, and November 10, 2016. (R. 54–154.)
On February 2, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that
Christopher was not disabled for his SSI and child insurance benefits claims. (R. 16–42.)
Following the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) five-step sequential process, the
ALJ found that Christopher had these severe impairments: a history of recurrent
endocarditis secondary to IV drug abuse and polysubstance drug abuse; a history of
mitral valve replacement secondary to endocarditis; a history of seizure disorder likely
secondary to opiate withdrawal or IV drug abuse; and a history of polysubstance abuse.
(R. 20.) The ALJ found that Christopher’s medically determinable mental impairments
were non-severe, and he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in SSA regulations.

The Court cites the administrative record as “R.” in reference to the Social
Security Transcript located at Doc. 9.
1

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(R. 20–22.) Thus, the ALJ assessed Christopher’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

(R. 23.) The ALJ found that Christopher had no past relevant work and considered
whether any jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform, finding:

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(R. 36.) From there, the ALJ considered what limitations were attributable to
Christopher’s substance abuse, finding that if Christopher stopped the substance abuse,
he would have non-severe medically determinable mental limitations. (R. 37–38.)
Ultimately, if Christopher stopped the substance abuse, the ALJ found that he would not
have had any impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
any of the listed impairments in the SSA regulations. (R. 38.) Therefore, the ALJ found
this RFC:

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(R. 38.) The ALJ then re-assessed whether jobs existed in the national economy based on
this RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), who testified that an individual
would be able to perform the requirements of representative unskilled occupations such
as Blade Balancer, Egg Candler, and Maker II. (R. 40–41.) Thus, the ALJ found:

(R. 41.) With this, the ALJ concluded:

(R. 41.)
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Following the ALJ’s decision of no disability, Anastasia requested review by the
Appeals Council. (R. 419.) She submitted her own medical records and medical records
from Christopher’s sister to support her belief that Christopher potentially suffered from
Ehler Danlos Syndrome (“EDS”) and thus was disabled. (R. 419–28, 1408–31.) She also
sought review on the grounds that the ALJ exhibited bias against Christopher. (R. 419–
28.) The Appeals Council denied her request for review, finding the medical records not
material to Christopher’s claim and that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion. (R. 1–2.) As
such, the ALJ’s finding of no disability became the Commissioner’s final decision.
Anastasia then initiated this action requesting review of the Commissioner’s
decision and reversal for an award of benefits or remand. (Doc. 1.) As grounds, Anastasia
cited three assignments of error: (1) the ALJ failed to allow her to conduct a complete
cross-examination regarding EDS and submit supporting evidence; (2) the Appeals
Council’s determination that Anastasia and Christopher’s sister’s medical records were
not material; and (3) the ALJ’s determination that Christopher’s substance abuse was a
contributing factor material to the determination of disability and finding of no disability.
(Doc. 23, pp. 13–24.) Magistrate Judge Spaulding then ordered the parties to submit
supplemental briefing on the issue of Anastasia’s standing to pursue both claims for SSI
and child insurance benefits. (Doc. 25.) The parties complied (Doc. 28, 29.),
Magistrate Judge Spaulding then issued a comprehensive R&R that: (1)
Anastasia’s appeal of the SSI claim should be dismissed because she lacked standing to
pursue this claim; and (2) the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed as to the finding of
no disability for the child insurance benefits claim. (Doc. 33, pp. 6–7, 14–19.) Anastasia
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objected, claiming: (1) Anastasia has standing because she was substituted as the party to
Christopher’s claims; (2) the R&R used the wrong standard of review for her claim that
the Appeals Council erred by not considering the additional medical records; (3) the R&R
erred in determining that no evidence existed in the record regarding EDS and finding
Plaintiff’s cross examination argument unavailing; and (4) Plaintiff should have been
afforded an opportunity to amend her complaint. (Doc. 34.) Thus, the matter is ripe.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s findings, the district court must
“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. The
district court must consider the record and factual issues based on the record
independent of the magistrate judge’s report. Ernest S. ex rel. Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ.,
896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990).
III.

DISCUSSION

The Objection raises four issues, three of which are relevant to the R&R. (Doc. 34.)
In the fourth, however, Plaintiff mounts an “objection to refusal of the MJ to allow leave
of court for plaintiff to amend Complaint to include a Lucia claim.” (Id. at 6.) As Plaintiff
never sought to appeal Magistrate Judge Spaulding’s Order denying leave to amend her
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the Court will not entertain that

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argument now. Celestine v. Capital One, 741 F. App’x 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2018) 2 (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(a); then citing Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 n.21 (11th Cir. 2003))
(“However, where the party appealing the denial of a non-dispositive motion failed to
object to or appeal the magistrate judge’s decision to the district court, that party waives
his argument that the magistrate judge erred in denying the order.”). As to Plaintiff’s
other arguments, the Court addresses each in turn below.
A.

Standing Argument for SSI Benefits Claim

First, Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s finding that Anastasia lacks standing to pursue
Christopher’s SSI claim. (Doc. 33, pp. 1–4.) Plaintiff claims standing based on 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1323(c)(3). (Id.) Yet as Magistrate Judge Spaulding noted, simply being a
named party to a case is not enough to confer standing. (Doc. 33, p. 5.) In social security
cases, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is an individual that the SSA recognizes as
entitled to receive any benefits due to the claimant. (Id. (citing Brown o/b/o Brown v.
Berryhill, No. 17-CV-11577, 2017 WL 5898459, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2017)).) And for
Anastasia’s pursuit of Christopher’s SSI claim, “[i]t is clear that a parent of a deceased
adult disabled child is not entitled to collect past due SSI benefits owed to the child.”
Knight v. Colvin, No. 3:14-cv-1438-J-JBT, 2015 WL 12852312, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2015)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(1)(A); then citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.542(b); then citing Fowler v.
Astrue, No. 8:09-cv-1368-27MAP, 2010 WL 454765, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9,

While unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, they may be considered
as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2; see also United States v. Almedina,
686 F.3d 1312, 1316 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
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2010) (“[Claimant's] claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) extinguished upon his
death, and [his parents are] limited to seeking review of their son's denial for disability
insurance benefits.”) (collecting cases)). Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect that Anastasia’s status
as a substituted party enables her to pursue all of Christopher’s claims. (Doc. 34, pp. 1–
4.)
As Magistrate Judge Spaulding parsed out, Anastasia may only pursue
Christopher’s disabled adult child claim on appeal. (Doc. 33, pp. 6–7.) This is because the
SSA allows for these types of benefits, on death of the claimant, to be distributed to
survivors or heirs according to a statutorily-established order of priority. 42 U.S.C. §
404(d). As it stands, Anastasia has the highest level of priority and may pursue
Christopher’s claim seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny his
application for disabled adult child benefits. (See Doc. 33, pp. 6–7.) But as the R&R found,
Anastasia cannot pursue Christopher’s SSI claim. (Id. at 5–6.) Thus, the Court overrules
the Objection on this ground.
B.

Standard of Review Argument

Next, Plaintiff asserts that the R&R used the wrong standard of review as to her
claim that the Appeals Council legally erred in not allowing the admission of Anastasia
and Christopher’s medical records. (Doc. 34, pp. 4–5.) Generally speaking, “[w]hen the
Appeals Council refuses to consider new evidence submitted to it and denies review, the
decision is subject to judicial review.” Ring v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 728 F. App’x 966,
967 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 806 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir.
2015)). The Court reviews “de novo whether evidence meets the new, material, and
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chronologically relevant standard.” Id. (citing Washington, 806 F.3d at 1321). “When the
Appeals Council erroneously refuses to consider evidence, it commits legal error and
remand is appropriate.” Id. (citing Washington, 806 F.3d at 1321).
Here, the Appeals Council found that Anastasia’s submission of additional
medical records was not material because it was not relevant to Christopher’s claim. (R.
2.) Thus, it did not consider that additional evidence. (Id.) After Plaintiff cited this refusal
as an assignment of error, Magistrate Judge Spaulding reviewed “the evidence presented
to the Appeals Council as part of the record as a whole” (Doc. 33, p. 17 n.9)—in other
words, de novo. See, e.g., Washington, 806 F.3d at 1321 (conducting de novo review of
whether evidence claimant submitted to appeals council was material in light of other
evidence in record); Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987) (same). And in
looking at the whole record, Magistrate Judge Spaulding found “no opinion from a
medical professional that these records support a finding that Christopher had EDS.” (Id.
at 17.) Thus, she concluded the Appeals Council was correct in not finding the evidence
material because it did not raise a “reasonable possibility that consideration of those
records would have changed the ALJ’s Decision.” (Id. at 17 (citing Robinson v. Astrue, 365
F. App’x 993, 996 (11th Cir. 2010))); see also Hyde, 823 F.3d at 459. As this is the correct
legal standard applicable to Plaintiff’s assignment of error, the Court overrules the
Objection on these grounds.
C.

Cross-Examination Argument

Last, Plaintiff claims that the R&R “does not address certain facts in the record that
show that the Plaintiff attempted to cross examine the Medical Expert and Vocational
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expert to [sic] regarding the genetic disorder, EDS.” (Doc. 34, p. 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel then
cites to his cross-examination of the medical expert concerning the symptoms of EDS in
an apparent attempt to show that the R&R overlooked this testimony. (Id. at 5–6.) Yet
Magistrate Judge Spaulding’s R&R quotes the entire exchange—it takes up one and a half
pages in the R&R. (Doc. 33, pp. 14–16.) She then found unavailing Plaintiff’s argument
that the ALJ erred in limiting his cross examination because no prejudice resulted. (Id. at
16.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel could not point to any medical evidence supporting
this potential EDS diagnosis for Christopher, as the medical expert testified that she did
not “find any evidence of a genetic disorder that was defined in this record or discussed
or otherwise felt to be a consideration in [Christopher’s] medical history or problems”
and no other record evidence supported this claim. (Id. (citing R. 96–98).)
On review, the Court reaches the same conclusion: There is no support for
counsel’s assertion that Christopher suffered from EDS, and that his sister and mother
had this diagnosis does not change the calculus. The ALJ thoroughly considered this issue
but found the evidence lacking—however unfortunate that may be. (See R. 97–100 (ALJ
discussion with counsel at hearing); R. 34–35 (ALJ Decision discussing lack of evidence
to support EDS diagnosis).) Frankly, nothing has changed since the ALJ’s consideration
of this issue, and based on the objective medical evidence before him, the ALJ found
Christopher’s symptoms attributable to drug use, not EDS. (R. 33–36.) This finding is
amply supported by the record and like Magistrate Judge Spaulding, the Court finds no
error in the limitation of cross-examination. (Doc. 33, pp. 14–18.) Thus, the Objection is
overruled on this ground.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Karla R. Spaulding’s Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 33) is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED, and made a part of this Order.

2.

Plaintiff’s Objections to Findings, Orders, Report and Recommendations of
Magistrate Judge (Doc. 34) is OVERRULED.

3.

Plaintiff’s appeal from the denial of SSI benefits is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.

4.

The Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disabled
adult child benefits is AFFIRMED.

5.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to:
a.

Enter judgment in favor of Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security and against Plaintiff Anastasia Field; and

b.

Close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on February 25, 2019.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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