Gadd v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 28

ORDER denying 22 Plaintiff's Social Security Brief. The Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the Commissioner and against Allison Danielle Gadd and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kyle C. Dudek on 5/19/2023. (CGW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
ALLISON DANIELLE GADD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 6:22-cv-932-KCD

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
Plaintiff Allison Danielle Gadd sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)1 for
judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her
application for supplemental security income. (Doc. 1.) The procedural history,
administrative record, and law are summarized in the parties’ briefs (Docs. 22,
25, 26, 27) and not fully repeated here.
Gadd raises one issues on appeal—whether the ALJ properly considered
a medical opinion from consultative examiner Blanca Lopez, Psy. D. (Doc. 22
at 10-18.) The Commissioner contends there is no error. For the reasons below,
the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have
been omitted in this and later citations.
1

Review of the Commissioner’s (and, by extension, the ALJ’s) decision
denying disability benefits is limited to whether substantial evidence supports
the factual findings and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,
139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a
preponderance. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). The
Supreme Court recently explained, “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in
other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.”
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
When determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the court must view the record as a whole, considering
evidence favorable and unfavorable to the Commissioner. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The court may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. And even
if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the
reviewing court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
The ALJ found Gadd had severe impairments of psoriasis, obesity,
ADHD, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety
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disorder. (Tr. 27.) He further found Gadd has the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform light work, subject to additional mental limitations:
The claimant is able to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks, or jobs
that can be learned in 30 days or less consistent with a reasoning level
of 1-3 per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). She is able to
understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and is limited
to work that requires no interaction with crowds but she could
occasionally interact with the public and frequently interact with coworkers and supervisors.

(Tr. 32.) Considering the RFC and the other evidence, the ALJ concluded Gadd
can perform three jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy and thus is not disabled. (Tr. 40-41.)
As mentioned, Gadd argues the ALJ erred in assessing the medical
opinions from Blanca Lopez, Psy. D. (Tr. 1019-24.)2
A medical opinion is “a statement from a medical source about what [the
claimant] can still do despite [her] impairment(s) and whether [she has] one or
more

impairment-related

limitations

or

restrictions[.]”

20

C.F.R.

§

416.913(a)(2). When dealing with a medical opinion, the ALJ must consider its
persuasiveness using several factors: “(1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3)

Gadd’s brief also claims the ALJ’s “RFC determination was unsupported by substantial
evidence it failed to incorporate Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations.” (Doc. 22 at 10.) Despite
this broad statement, Gadd offers no substantive argument about any physical impairments.
Her brief instead focuses on the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Lopez’s opinion, who performed a
psychological consultation. Gadd has thus abandoned any arguments related to her physical
impairments, let alone any specific manipulative limitations. See, e.g., Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting the Eleventh Circuit has “long
held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it
or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority”).
2

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relationship with the claimant, which includes (i) length of the treatment
relationship, (ii) frequency of examinations, (iii) purpose of the treatment
relationship, (iv) extent of the treatment relationship, and (v) examining
relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors.” Id. § 416.920c(a).
Supportability and consistency “are the most important factors” in
determining persuasiveness. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2). And because of their
importance, the ALJ must explain “how [he] considered the supportability and
consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions.” Id. Put simply, the
ALJ must assess the factors of supportability and consistency for each medical
opinion.
Lopez evaluated Gadd in 2021 and completed a check-box questionnaire
titled “Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities
(Mental).” (Tr. 1019-20.) Lopez opined that Gadd had moderate limitations in
three areas: understanding and remembering complex instructions; carrying
out complex instructions; and interacting appropriately with the public,
supervisors, and coworkers. (Tr. 1019-20.) She also concluded that Gadd had
marked limitations in her ability to make judgments on complex work-related
decisions and respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in
the routine work setting. (Tr. 1019-20.) Lopez further stated that Gadd could
carry out and understand simple instructions, had difficulty understanding

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complex instructions and might need clarification, and struggled with face-toface interaction, but would do well with online interaction. (Tr. 1019-20.)
Lopez assessed Gadd for severe recurrent major depressive disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 1024.) She noted Gadd’s mental health
symptoms appeared to moderately to severely affect her activities of daily
living, vocational performance, and interpersonal interactions. (Tr. 1024.)
In assessing Lopez’s opinions, the ALJ found them partially persuasive:
There is nothing in the medical evidence revealing the
claimant experiences issues this serious with adapting.
The claimant was taking a full course load in September
2020 and working as a graduate research assistant with
her current stressors being a friend dying from cancer and
the recent loss of her uncle and cousin (Exhibit C10F/2). In
October 2020, she reported the sudden death of her brother
(Exhibit C11F/2). In November 2020, she reported stress
because of upcoming final projects and was managing her
moods (Exhibit C13F/2). While the claimant noted concerns
about finishing projects while classes switched to online
(Exhibit C4F/3), she was able to graduate (Exhibit C13F/2)
which shows adaptability, as she was able to complete her
degree with multiple stressors. Additionally, she has a
history [of] medication non-compliance (Exhibits C4F/21,
37; C14F). The undersigned finds the mental residual
functional capacity found herein is consistent with the
medical evidence of [the] record as a whole.

(Tr. 38.) Gadd argues the ALJ failed to conduct a supportability analysis, and
his consistency analysis is flawed.
Contrary to Gadd’s claim, the ALJ shared how he evaluated
supportability and consistency and properly determined that Lopez’s opinions
were partially persuasive. (Tr. 38.)

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As to supportability, while the ALJ may not have parroted the word
“supportability,” the decision addressed this factor through its discussion of
the record evidence. See Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[I]t is proper to read the ALJ’s decision a whole, and . . . it would be a needless
formality to have the ALJ repeat substantially similar factual analyses[.]”).
The ALJ explained how Lopez’s opinion conflicted with her exam findings.
Specifically, the ALJ noted that during the examination Gadd had good basic
grooming and hygiene; adequate eye contact; displayed a positive attitude;
cooperated; had unremarkable behavior; speech was unremarkable; alert and
oriented x 4; good attention and concentration; displayed no significant
difficulties in processing speed and she recalled 3/3 words immediately and
after a short delay; thought processes appeared coherent, logical, and goaldirected;

she

appeared

somatically

focused;

denied

a

history

of

suicidal/homicidal attempts; denied current ideations and denied psychotic
features. (Tr. 36, 1022-24.) Given this evidence, Lopez’s own exam of Gadd
provides the necessary framework for the ALJ to doubt the proffered medical
opinion that her mental health symptoms severely impacted her ability to
work.
As to consistency, the ALJ noted that Gadd’s activities and work-history
were inconsistent with her allegations of disabling conditions that prevent her
from adapting. (Tr. 38); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Contrary to Lopez’s
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opinion that Gadd had marked limitations in her ability to respond
appropriately to usual work situations and changes in the routine work setting,
the ALJ noted Gadd was taking a full course load in September 2020 and
working as a graduate research assistant with her current stressors. (Tr. 38,
958.) While Gadd noted concerns about finishing projects while classes
switched to online (Tr. 38, 644), she was able to graduate with multiple life
stressors, which shows adaptability to change. (Tr. 38, 968.)
As the ALJ said, Lopez’s opinions were also inconsistent with the
findings from other sources in the record, including state agency psychologists.
(Tr. 38-39, 99-101, 120-22.) State agency consultants are highly qualified and
experts in Social Security disability evaluation, although an ALJ need not
adopt prior administrative medical findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1).
Here, the ALJ noted the state agency consultants found Gadd could adjust to
routine changes in the work setting and she was moderately limited with
public interaction. (Tr. 38-39, 99-101, 120-22.) The ALJ found these opinions
partially persuasive because, again, while the ALJ agreed Gadd should be
limited to unskilled work, the record fails to confirm she experienced even
moderate limitations in adapting. (Tr. 38-39.)
Gadd separately argues the ALJ failed to consider the impact that
accommodations would have on her ability to work full-time as she testified
that she could not keep a research assistant job because she could not focus
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long enough, that a professor allowed her to work from home, and that she
received extra time in a quiet room. (Doc. 22 at 15-16.)
An ALJ must clearly articulate explicit and adequate reasons for
rejecting a claimant’s testimony. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th
Cir. 1995). A court will not disturb a clearly articulated finding supported by
substantial evidence. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782
(11th Cir. 2014).
The ALJ found, “[a]fter careful consideration of the evidence, . . . that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. 35.) The ALJ continued, “[h]owever, the
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.”
(Tr. 35.)
Besides the medical evidence discussed above, the ALJ articulated
explicit and adequate reasons for rejecting Gadd’s testimony about symptoms
and limitations. The ALJ considered Gadd’s activities and that she received
accommodations. (Tr. 31, 34-35.) The ALJ summarized the medical evidence
related to mental impairments to outline the improvements shown in the
medical records and that otherwise show conservative treatment to support

8

that Gadd can perform light work with additional limitations. (Tr. 31-32, 36.)
For example, the ALJ stated:
The claimant has received conservative treatment for her psychiatric
issues with prescribed medication. Since the alleged onset date, she has
not engaged in therapy despite testifying that mental health symptoms
prevent all work activity. She has not presented to an office visit or
emergency department with uncontrollable mental health symptoms
and has not required any inpatient treatment. There is no medical
evidence of any physician finding that the claimant has had persistent
and adverse side effects due to any prescribed medication, resulting in
significant limitations of her functional capacity, or which were
incapable of control by medication adjustments or changes. Moreover,
the claimant earned a Master’s degree in a complex area after her
application date.
...
Given the claimant’s allegations of totally disabling symptoms, one
might expect to see some indication in the treatment records of
restrictions placed on the claimant by her treating physicians. Yet a
review of the record in this case reveals no restrictions recommended by
the treating physicians or counselors.

(Tr. 36-37.)
Substantial evidence supports those reasons. The medical records, as
discussed by the ALJ, show that Gadd was not as limited as he alleged. (See
Tr. 959, 963, 969, 985 (unremarkable mental status exams)).
While a different factfinder may well have credited Lopez’s opinions, that
is not the test. The dispositive question here is whether there is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support the ALJ’s
conclusion. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. “The substantial evidence threshold is
not high and defers to the presiding ALJ, who heard testimony and reviewed

9

the medical evidence.” Rodriguez v. Berryhill, 836 F. App’x 797, 803 (11th Cir.
2020). Given this low bar, the Court will affirm.
That leaves one final issue. Gadd argues the ALJ’s errors were not
harmless. (Doc. 22 at 17-18.) But harmlessness only comes to bear if there were
errors. Gadd has demonstrated none, and thus this argument is moot.
The Court thus AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision and directs the
Clerk to enter judgment for the Commissioner and against Allison Danielle
Gadd and close the file.
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 19, 2023.

Copies: All Parties of Record

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