Lamberth v. Fountains of Millenia IV, LLP

Filing 8

ORDER denying 5 Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. See Order for further details. Signed by Judge Paul G. Byron on 4/8/2024. (REG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
In Re: In Re: Tiffany Lamberth
TIFFANY LAMBERTH,
Appellant,
v.

Case No: 6:24-cv-490-PGB

FOUNTAINS OF MILLENIA IV,
LLP,
Appellee.

/
ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on pro se Appellant Tiffany Lamberth’s
(the “Appellant”) document entitled “Stay Pending Appeal,” which this Court
construes as a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (Doc. 5 (the “Motion”)). 1 Therein,
Appellant seeks a stay of various bankruptcy court Orders pending the resolution
of the instant appeal. (See id.). Appellee Fountains of Millenia IV, LLP (the
“Appellee”) has not responded in opposition to the Motion and the time to do so
has passed. As such, the matter is ripe for review. Upon due consideration, the
Motion will be denied.

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The Court notes that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed” and courts “look beyond the
label of the pleadings to determine whether they are properly characterized.” United States v.
Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1068 n.11 (11th Cir. 2021); see, e.g., United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d
1320, 1322 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Court construes the document entitled “Stay
Pending Appeal” as a motion requesting such relief. (See Doc. 5).

I.

LEGAL STANDARD
“A stay pending appeal is an ‘extraordinary remedy’[.]” In re Woide, 730 F.

App’x 731, 737 (11th Cir. 2018). 2 The decision regarding whether to grant a stay
pending appeal under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 is discretionary
with the court. See, e.g., In re White-Lett, No. 23-10732, 2024 WL 578122, at *2
(11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2024) (reviewing such an order for an abuse of discretion).
“Ordinarily, a party must move first in the bankruptcy court” to obtain a stay
pending appeal. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007(a)(1)(A). A motion for such a stay may be
made in the district court where the appeal is pending only if the motion “[s]hows
that moving first in the bankruptcy court would be impracticable[.]” FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8007(b)(1)–(2). A movant’s failure to establish that moving for a stay in
the bankruptcy court was “impracticable” is a standalone ground for the district
court to deny the motion. In re White-Lett, 2024 WL 578122, at *3 (affirming the
denial of such a motion on this basis alone); see also In re Carrington, No. 23-CV6430, 2023 WL 6813064, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2023) (“[D]istrict courts
routinely dismiss motions for a stay pending appeal when, as here, relief is not first
requested from the bankruptcy judge and the failure to do so is not adequately
explained.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Further, a motion for stay pending appeal “must . . . include: (A) the reasons
for granting the relief requested and the facts relied upon; (B) affidavits or other

2

“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their
legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th
Cir. 2007).

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sworn statements supporting facts subject to dispute; and (C) relevant parts of the
record.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007(b)(3).
Finally, the motion must establish “(1) a substantial likelihood that [the
movant] will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) a substantial risk of irreparable
injury to [the movant] unless the [stay] is granted; (3) no substantial harm to other
interested persons; and (4) no harm to the public interest.” Id. (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted); In re Woide, 730 F. App’x at 737.
II.

DISCUSSION
The Court finds that, in the instant case, Appellant has not established

entitlement to the “extraordinary relief” of a stay pending appeal. See In re Woide,
730 F. App’x at 737. Notably, Appellant failed to move for such a stay in the
bankruptcy court. (See Doc. 5, p. 1). Instead, Appellant argues that so moving
would have been impracticable, alluding to a belief that the bankruptcy court
would not have rendered a favorable decision or that it would not have ruled fairly.
(See, e.g., id. at pp. 1–2 (stating that the bankruptcy court had denied Appellant’s
Motions for Reconsideration, asserting that “the [bankruptcy j]udge stated in open
court she did not look at my evidence or motions[,]” and suggesting that “[the]
judge is acting in collusion with [the] trustee to avoid penalty to [sic] fraud”)).
This Court finds that Appellant has not established that it was impracticable
to seek such a stay in the bankruptcy court. (See id.); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007(b)(1)–
(2). It is not readily apparent how Appellant’s stated grounds rendered filing such
a motion “impracticable.” Further, Appellant cites no legal authority to support the

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notion that these are adequate grounds to establish that this requirement has been
met. (See Doc. 5, pp. 1–2).
Additionally, Appellant has failed to include with the Motion either
“affidavits or other sworn statements supporting facts subject to dispute” or the
“relevant parts of the record.” (See Doc. 5); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007(b)(3).
Consequently, this Court does not have sworn testimony upon which it could base
a ruling for Appellant on the issue of impracticability. (See Doc. 5); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 8007(b)(3). The Court also lacks sworn testimony upon which it could base a
ruling for Appellant regarding the other elements Appellant must establish to show
entitlement to a stay pending appeal. (See Doc. 5); In re Woide, 730 F. App’x at
737. Moreover, Appellant’s failure to attach relevant portions of the record makes
it difficult for the Court to readily ascertain whether Appellant can establish her
entitlement to the requested relief. 3 (See Doc. 5); In re Woide, 730 F. App’x at 737.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Appellant’s Motion for Stay Pending

Appeal (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on April 8, 2024.

3

The Court also notes that at the time the instant Motion was filed, the bankruptcy record on
appeal had not yet been transmitted to this Court. (See Docs. 5, 6). Moreover, when this record
was transmitted seven (7) days after the Motion was filed, it contained the entire bankruptcy
court record. (Docs. 6, 6-2). Consequently, the Court could not easily sift through the record
on appeal to attempt to ascertain whether the requested relief was warranted, even if the Court
was so inclined.

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Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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