Naughton v. InfoCheckUSA, LLC et al

Filing 59

ORDER denying 56 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Request for Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Embry J. Kidd on 9/24/2024. (TJR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
RILEY DANIEL NAUGHTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:24-cv-620-JSS-EJK

INFOCHECKUSA, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s
Request for Attorneys’ Fees (the “Motion”) (Doc. 56), filed August 26, 2024.
Defendant has responded in opposition. (Doc. 58.) Upon consideration, the Motion is
due to be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff instituted this action against Defendant for alleged violations of the

Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (Docs. 1, 17, 52.) On
August 6, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 54.) Therein, Defendant requested attorney fees and costs. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff
then filed the present Motion. (Doc. 56.)
II.

STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f). A motion to strike should only be granted if “the matter sought to be
omitted has no possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or
otherwise prejudice a party.” Reyher v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 574,
576 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s Answer seeks “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the
FCRA pursuant to 15 USC 1681n and/or 1681o.” (Doc. 54 at 6.) Plaintiff asserts that
this request should be stricken from Defendant’s Answer because it is not an
affirmative defense and that such a request is procedurally improper. (Doc. 56 at 4, 9.)
Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant’s request is premised on facts contradicted by
the record. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has failed to meet its
burden of proof under the FCRA to establish that Defendant is entitled to attorney
fees. (Id. at 10.)
Defendant makes several arguments in response. First, Defendant claims that
because Plaintiff initiated this action under the FCRA, Defendant has a statutory or
contractual basis to justify the request for attorney fees. (Doc. 58 at 2, 5.) Second,
Defendant argues that the Court cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion to strike.
(Id. at 3.) Third, Defendant asserts that Defendant’s request for attorney fees is not
procedurally improper since Defendant’s request is not a motion and it puts Plaintiff
on notice of Defendant’s intent to seek attorney fees. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s argument is premature since, at this stage of litigation,
Defendant does not have to prove entitlement to attorney fees under the FCRA.

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(Id. at 5–6.)
The undersigned has reviewed each of Defendant’s arguments and finds the first
and last persuasive. Defendant has a statutory basis for its request for attorney fees. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(c). Further, a determination as to whether Defendant is entitled to
fees has not yet been made in this action, so the request to strike it is premature. Denova
v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 8:17-CV-02204-23AAS, 2018 WL 1832901, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2018) (citing Merrill v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-232-FTM38MRM, 2015 WL 4496101, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2015)) (denying the motion to
strike because it was premature to determine if there was sufficient evidence to support
the defendant’s claim for attorney’s fees in the answer), report and recommendation
adopted, 2018 WL 1832902 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018). Regardless, as Defendant notes,
the Answer puts Plaintiff on notice of Defendant’s intent to seek attorney fees and is
ultimately harmless.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Motion (Doc. 56) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 24, 2024.

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