Mulfort v. State of Florida - Office of the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit et al

Filing 46

ORDER. In light of the parties' joint stipulation (Dkt. 45), Counts I through IV (Dkt. 9 at 7-12) are DISMISSED with prejudice, the Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Bain as a party to this case, and Defendants' motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 36) is DENIED as moot. See the order for details. Signed by Judge Julie S. Sneed on 3/11/2025. (AJL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
KEISHA MULFORT,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:24-cv-1118-JSS-UAM

STATE OF FLORIDA - OFFICE OF
THE STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT and
ANDREW A. BAIN,
Defendants.
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ORDER
The parties have filed a joint stipulation stating that Plaintiff, Keisha Mulfort,
dismisses with prejudice the claims she brings under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654, (Dkt. 45 at 1), which constitute Counts I
through IV of the twelve-count amended complaint, (see Dkt. 9 at 7–12). Relatedly,
the joint stipulation states: “The parties agree that there will be no further proceedings
on FMLA claims or the filing of them.” (Dkt. 45 at 1.) Counts III and IV are the only
claims asserted against Defendant Andrew A. Bain in the amended complaint, (see
Dkt. 9 at 7–25), but Plaintiff brings eight non-FMLA claims against Defendant State
of Florida - Office of the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit (the State
Attorney’s Office), (id. at 13–25).
Although the joint stipulation does not invoke a procedural rule or cite any legal
authority respecting the dismissal of the FMLA claims, (see Dkt. 45), Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(a) governs the voluntary dismissal of an “action,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A), (2), and “in a multi-defendant lawsuit,” such as this case, “an ‘action’ can
refer to all the claims against one party,” Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 n.2
(11th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, Rule 41(a) allows for dismissal of Counts III and IV as
all the claims against Bain but does not allow for dismissal of Counts I and II because
Plaintiff brings other claims against the State Attorney’s Office. (See Dkt. 9.) As to
Counts III and IV, “[P]laintiff may dismiss [the] action [against Bain] . . . by
filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) “requir[es] each and every party that
has thus far appeared in [the] lawsuit”—including “a party that appeared but has
already been removed from [the] action”—“to sign [the] stipulation of dismissal.” City
of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hosp. Holdings, L.P., 82 F.4th 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 2023).
Here, only Plaintiff and Defendants have appeared in this lawsuit, and all parties
signed the stipulation through their legal counsel. (Dkt. 45 at 1–2.) Because the Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) requirements for a stipulated dismissal of Counts III and IV with
prejudice are met, those counts are dismissed with prejudice.
As to Counts I and II, the “easiest and most obvious” way to dismiss fewer than
all claims in an action “is to seek and obtain leave to amend the complaint to
eliminate” the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Perry v. Schumacher
Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018). Rule 15 allows a plaintiff to amend a
complaint before trial “with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave”
and provides that the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Plaintiff has the written consent of the State Attorney’s Office to
amend her amended complaint to drop Counts I and II, (see Dkt. 45), and in any event,
the court freely gives her leave to amend. Therefore, Counts I and II are dismissed
with prejudice. See Breeding v. Integrated Behavioral Health Inc., No. 22-10374-GG, 2022
U.S. App. LEXIS 15731, at *3–4 (11th Cir. June 7, 2022) (determining that counts
“were properly eliminated from the proceedings with prejudice under Rule 15”).
In addressing the dismissal of the FMLA claims, the joint stipulation states that
Defendants withdraw their motion for partial summary judgment on those claims
(Dkt. 30). (Dkt. 45 at 1.) Although the court denied the motion for partial summary
judgment on January 15, 2025, (Dkt. 35 at 7–10), the next day Defendants filed a
motion for reconsideration of that denial (Dkt. 36), which remains pending. Given
Defendants’ withdrawal of the motion for partial summary judgment, the court denies
the motion for reconsideration as moot.
Accordingly:
1. Counts I through IV (Dkt. 9 at 7–12) are DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Bain as a party to this case.
3. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 36) is DENIED as moot.

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ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on March 11, 2025.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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