Pantle v. Crawford et al

Filing 19

ORDER denying #15 Request to Enter Default Against Defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leslie Hoffman Price on 10/21/2024. (MKH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

SHAD DOUGLAS PANTLE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:24-cv-1591-CEM-LHP

CHARLES G. CRAWFORD and
MELANIE FREEMAN CHASE,
Defendants

ORDER
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following
motion filed herein:
MOTION: REQUEST TO ENTER DEFAULT AGAINST
DEFENDANT (Doc. No. 15)
FILED:

October 4, 2024

THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, instituted this action against
Defendants Charles G. Crawford and Melanie Freeman Chase.

Doc. No. 1.

Plaintiff filed returns of service demonstrating that Defendant Crawford was served
with a copy of the summons and complaint on September 10, 2024, and Defendant

Freeman Chase was served on September 13, 2024.

Doc. Nos. 11, 12.

Thus,

Defendant Crawford’s deadline for responding to the complaint was October 1,
2024, and Defendant Freeman Chase’s response deadline was October 4, 2024.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(i).
On October 4, 2024, Defendants both appeared in this case through the same
counsel, and they have filed a joint motion to dismiss. Doc. Nos. 13–14. The same
day, Plaintiff filed a motion for Clerk’s default against Defendant Crawford for
failure to timely plead or otherwise defend. Doc. No. 15. The Court directed
Defendant Crawford to respond to Plaintiff’s motion, Doc. No. 16, and Defendant
Crawford timely complied, Doc. No. 18.
Upon review, given the brief delay, and the explanation provided by counsel
for Defendant Crawford, Doc. No. 18, the Court does not find default warranted.
Cf. White v. Hiers, No. 1:13-CV-2404-SCJ, 2014 WL 12638087, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 22,
2014) (“Defendant’s four-day delay in filing its Answer does not qualify as the type
of ‘extreme situation’ that justifies a default judgment.”). Notably, the Eleventh
Circuit has repeatedly held that there is a strong policy in favor of resolving cases
on the merits and that defaults are viewed with disfavor. See In re Worldwide Web
Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Fla. Physician's Ins. Co. v. Ehlers,
8 F.3d 780, 783 (11th Cir. 1993) (“We note that defaults are seen with disfavor
because of the strong policy of determining cases on their merits.” (citing Gulf Coast
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Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1510 (11th Cir. 1984))).
“[W]hen doubt exists as to whether a default should be granted or vacated, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party.” Kilbride v. Vrondran,
No. 07-0389-WS-M, 2007 WL 2775185, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 2007) (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, considering these standards, the representations by defense
counsel, Doc. No. 18, and that Defendants have both now appeared in this case,
Doc. Nos. 13–14, Plaintiff’s request for Clerk’s default (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED at
this time. The remaining pending matters, Doc. Nos. 14, 17, will be addressed
separately.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 21, 2024.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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