Mohamad v. Lawgical Insight et al

Filing 6

ORDER. Plaintiff's emergency motion (Dkt. 2) is DENIED. (See the order for details.) As immediately as practicable, Plaintiff shall comply with Local Rule 6.01(c) and shall also serve Defendants with this order. Signed by Judge Julie S. Sneed on 1/6/2025. (AJL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
ANSARI MOHAMAD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:24-cv-2354-JSS-LHP

CENTRAL FLORIDA TAX AND
ACCOUNTING SERVICES, INC.,
ANEES AHMAD TANOLI,
LAWGICAL INSIGHT, LLC,
ANDREW BAUTA, MICHAEL
RUSSO, ROTTENSTREICH FARLEY
BRONSTEIN FISHER POTTER
HODAS LLP, MELIZA MILLER, and
RICHARD I. SEGAL,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff has filed a verified class action complaint (Dkt. 1) and an emergency
motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction (Dkt. 2).
For the reasons outlined below, the court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Central Florida Tax and Accounting Services, Inc. (CFTAS) has
sued non-party Akbar A. Ali, who does business as A.A. Ali C.P.A., and other nonparties in state court alleging the breach of a non-competition agreement and other
business-related misconduct. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1, 72–74; accord id. at 2 n.1.) Defendant Anees
Ahmad Tanoli is “a licensed C.P.A. doing business as CFTAS.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant

Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP (RFB LLP) is a law firm
representing CFTAS in state court. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 72–74; accord id. at 2 n.1.) Defendants
Meliza Miller and Richard I. Segal work as attorneys for RFB LLP. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.)
Defendant Lawgical Insight, LLC is an electronic discovery company that has acted
as a forensic examiner in state court. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 75; Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 1.) Defendants Michael
Russo and Andrew Bauta are Lawgical’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating
Officer, respectively. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 12–13.) Plaintiff, Ansari Mohamad, is one of Ali’s
former clients. (Id. ¶ 10.) He sues on behalf of himself and “others similarly situated
who are present and former clients” of Ali. (Id. ¶ 1.)
As part of the discovery in the state court proceeding, the state court required a
third party to conduct a forensic examination of Ali’s computer files. (Dkt. 1-1 at 1.)
The parties in the proceeding agreed that Lawgical would conduct the examination.
(Id. ¶ 1.)

They also agreed on the “parameters and search protocols” for the

examination.

(Id. at 1–2.)

Pursuant to an Agreed Order Regarding Forensic

Examination, Ali would provide Lawgical with “all computers and other electronic
storage devices” used by the defendants in the state court proceeding “since April 1,
2019[,] through the present,” and Lawgical would create a “forensic mirror[ ]image of
the[] devices” and search the mirror image for, among other things, “all tax filings,
including returns and extensions, prepared and/or submitted by [Ali], and any
documents, records, and data relating to such filings created on or after April 8, 2019,”
in order to “create [a] forensic production to be provided to the [p]arties.” (Id. at 1–6
& n.1.)

According to the complaint, Lawgical has already “harvested and/or
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inspected” tax return information including “over 17,000 files and 100,000 pages.”
(Dkt. 1 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 26 U.S.C. § 6103 by inspecting
and disclosing his and others’ tax return information without authorization and that
Defendants are thus liable under 26 U.S.C. § 7431. (Dkt. 1 at 9–19.) Plaintiff seeks
monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 19–20.)
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
A TRO or preliminary injunction “is appropriate only if the movant
demonstrates . . . ‘(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits[,] (2) that the
preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury[,] (3) that the
threatened injury outweighs the harm the preliminary injunction would cause the
other litigant[s,] and (4) that the preliminary injunction would not be averse to the
public interest.’” Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir.
2014) (quoting Chavez v. Fla. SP Warden, 742 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014)). A
TRO or preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be
granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to each of
the four prerequisites.” Wall v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 543 F. Supp. 3d
1290, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (alteration adopted and quotations omitted); accord Cheng
Ke Chen v. Holder, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (“The issuance of a
[TRO] or preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only
under exceptional circumstances.”).

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants “from inspecting, disseminating, [or]
transmitting any return or return information with respect to the unlawful disclosure
of Plaintiff’s private tax return(s).” (Dkt. 2 at 14.) Having carefully considered the
record in this case, the court concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to a TRO or
preliminary injunction because he has not carried his burden of persuasion as to the
third requirement. See Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1263; Wall, 543 F. Supp. 3d at 1292.
Plaintiff contends that the harm to him if a TRO or preliminary injunction does not
issue outweighs the harm to Defendants if they are enjoined because “Defendants will
simply be precluded from enforcing a patently unlawful discovery order entered by the
[state] court.” (Dkt. 2 at 13.) Plaintiff asserts that issuance of injunctive relief “will
not harm Defendants” and that Defendants “will suffer no hardships.” (Id.) This
argument is not persuasive.
CFTAS and Tanoli, through RFB LLP, Miller, and Segal, are conducting
discovery in the state court proceeding with the help of Lawgical, Russo, and Bauta
pursuant to orders issued by the state court. (E.g., Dkt. 1-1.) This discovery is
presumably calculated to allow CFTAS to prosecute its claims against Ali and the
other defendants in the state court proceeding. See Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011) (“Part of the purpose of discovery is to
‘provide each party with all available sources of proof as early as possible to facilitate
trial preparation.’” (quoting Dodson v. Persell, 390 So. 2d 704, 706 (Fla. 1980))).
Although issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction will likely impede the efforts to
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obtain discovery and thus to prosecute the claims, Plaintiff does not address this
potential harm at all. (See Dkt. 2 at 13.) Therefore, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion
seeking entry of a TRO or preliminary injunction. See Golden Rule Fasteners, Inc. v. Deks
N. Am., Inc., No. 2:16-CV-289-WKW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54547, at *3–4 (M.D.
Ala. Apr. 25, 2016) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO when the plaintiff
“fail[ed] to address the magnitude of th[e] potential harm to [the defendant] and the
way [the potential harm] factor[ed] into th[e] equitable calculus”); cf. Guice v. Postmaster
Gen., No. 8:15-cv-2846-T-36MAP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197416, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla.
June 10, 2016) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO when the plaintiff “wholly
failed to address . . . the potential harm that might be caused to [the d]efendant if the
[TRO] were issued”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly:
1. Plaintiff’s emergency motion (Dkt. 2) is DENIED.
2. As immediately as practicable, Plaintiff shall comply with Local Rule 6.01(c)
and shall also serve Defendants with this order.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on January 6, 2025.

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Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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