Doe v. Wantong International, Inc. et al

Filing 21

ORDER granting 10 Motion for Leave to Proceed Pseudonymously. Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 10) is GRANTED, such that Plaintiff is permitted to proceed pseudonymously at the pretrial proceedings subject to reconsideration upon a Defendant' s motion or if the Court otherwise determines that revisitation is necessary. If a Defendant objects to Plaintiff proceeding by pseudonym, the Defendant shall file a request for reconsideration of this Order within 30 days of the Defendant's first appearance in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick on 3/5/2025. (TNP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 6:25-cv-179-PGB-DCI

WANTONG INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
INTERNATIONAL STUDENT
SERVICES, LLC, PRO-NAILS &
BEAUTY SCHOOL, IN., ZONGYING
YUAN, and WENXIN LIU,
Defendants.

ORDER
This cause comes before the Court for consideration without oral argument on the
following motion:
MOTION:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Pseudonymously
(Doc. 10)

FILED:

February 19, 2025

THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
Jane Doe (Plaintiff) initiated this case against Defendants under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act. Doc. 1. Plaintiff has recently filed returns of service. Docs. 8, 17,
18, 19. No Defendant has made an appearance in this case. Plaintiff now moves to proceed
pseudonymously because the disclosure of Plaintiff’s identity will allegedly violate Plaintiff’s right
to privacy.

Doc. 10 (the Motion).

Plaintiff specifies that she requests leave to proceed

anonymously in only the pretrial proceedings at this stage of the litigation. Id. at 9.

The Court finds that the Motion is due to be granted but the Court may revisit the matter if
Defendants appear or if the Court otherwise determines that revisitation is necessary. See John
Doe I, et. al. v. Sabeti, Case. No. 6:25-cv-219-GAP-DCI (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2025) (granting a
motion for leave to proceed by pseudonym “subject to reconsideration upon appearance by the
[d]efendant.”) (citing Plaintiff b. v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1314, 1315-19 (11th Cir. 2011)
(reversing and remanding a district court’s denial of a motion to proceed anonymously but finding
no error in the court’s procedure of preliminarily granting the motion before revisiting the issue
prior to trial)).
The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the relevant legal standard as follows:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that “every pleading” in federal
court “must name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Although this creates a
“strong presumption in favor of parties proceeding in their own names . . . the rule
is not absolute.” [Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011)]. A
party may proceed anonymously by establishing “a substantial privacy right which
outweighs the ‘customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness
in judicial proceedings.’” Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Whether a party’s right to privacy outweighs the presumption of openness is a
“totality-of-the-circumstances question.” In re Chiquita Brands Int'l Inc., 965 F.3d
1238, 1247 n.5 (11th Cir. July 16, 2020). We have said that the “first step” is to
consider whether the party seeking anonymity “(1) is challenging government
activity; (2) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to disclose information of the
utmost intimacy; or (3) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to admit an intent
to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution.” Id. at 1247. Along
with these factors, a court “should carefully review all the circumstances of a given
case and then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff's
identity should yield to the plaintiff's privacy concerns.” Id. (quoting Francis, 631
F.3d at 1316). For example, we have also considered “whether the plaintiffs were
minors, whether they were threatened with violence or physical harm by proceeding
in their own names, and whether their anonymity posed a unique threat of
fundamental unfairness to the defendant.” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316 (citations
omitted).
Doe v. Neverson, 820 F. App’x 984, 986–987 (11th Cir. 2020).

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Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated that anonymity is appropriate based on the alleged
circumstances of this case. While Plaintiff is not challenging government activity,1 it is clear from
the Complaint that Plaintiff will be required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy.
Plaintiff alleges that she is a Chinese citizen and came to the United States for an education and to
work. Doc. 1 at 2, 4. Plaintiff claims, however, that the events surrounding her immigration
involved fraud in China and the United States. Id. at 3 to 7. After she arrived in the United States,
Plaintiff alleges that she was eventually coerced into obtaining a massage license and was required
to perform sexual acts on paying customers. Doc. 1 at 9. Plaintiff claims that the individual
Defendants “sex trafficked” her and she was raped and sexually assaulted by customers. Id. at 2,
9. Plaintiff asserts that the individual Defendants threatened her with deportation if she did not
“comply and do what she was told[.]” Id. at 8. Plaintiff states that she “fears retaliation from both
her former traffickers, as well as her former ‘clients’ that contributed to her victimization in the
Central Florida community.” Id. at 2.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff will clearly need to disclose her experience as an alleged
sex trafficking victim which includes extremely personal and sensitive details of forced sexual
service, rape, and intimidation and threats. As such, the Court finds that to deny the requested
relief would require Plaintiff to reveal sensitive and personal information of the utmost intimacy.
See A.D. Cavalier Mergersub LP, 2022 WL, at *4354842, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2022) (finding
that the second factor weighed in favor of anonymity where a plaintiff contended that she sustained
injuries from rape, sexual assault, physical violence, and torture and disclose private information
about the events that transpired when she was trafficked.).

1

It is not clear whether Plaintiff would be compelled to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct
and thus risk criminal prosecution. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff makes no such claim in the Motion. See
Doc. 10.

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Further, as to the threat of unfairness to Defendants, Plaintiff contends that she will reveal
her identity to Defendants. Doc. 10 at 10. While the public would be barred from access, Plaintiff
states that she will give Defendants her full name and identifying information subject to a
protective order. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s concession weighs against a finding that her
anonymity is fundamentally unfair to Defendants.
Finally, the Court finds that the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings does not
outweigh Plaintiff’s right to privacy under the circumstance of this case. Plaintiff has a reasonable
fear of retaliation if her identity is disclosed to the public. Any hearings in this case will remain
open to the public and other information will remain accessible on the public docket absent a court
order.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to relief
at this juncture.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 10) is GRANTED, such that Plaintiff is permitted to proceed
pseudonymously at the pretrial proceedings subject to reconsideration upon a
Defendant’s motion or if the Court otherwise determines that revisitation is necessary;
and
2. if a Defendant objects to Plaintiff proceeding by pseudonym, the Defendant shall file a
request for reconsideration of this Order within 30 days of the Defendant’s first
appearance in this case.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on March 5, 2025.

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