Rangel v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 36 Defendants' Motion for summary judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Defendants Herman and Lucas and to close this case. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 6/24/2010. (SM)
United States District Court Middle District of Florida Tampa Division
FRANCISCO RANGEL, Plaintiff, v.
CAPTAIN HERMAN,
CASE NO.:
8:09-cv-1594-T-17AEP
MAJOR LUCAS.
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS cause is before the Court on Defendants Herman and Lucas' dispositive motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36)1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion will be
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Rangel, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, originally filed a pro se 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights complaint on August 13, 2009. (Doc. 1). He is proceeding on his amended
complaint filed November 16, 2009. (Doc. 25).
Plaintiff's Allegations
1 The court granted the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office's motion to dismiss (Doc. 27) on February 25, 2010
(Doc. 34).
On December 5,2008, Rangel was booked into the Orient Road Jail, Hillsborough
County, Florida, on one count of first degree murder; five counts of attempted murder in the first
degree of a law enforcement officer; three counts of shooting at, within, or into a vehicle; one
count of murder in the second degree with a firearm; one count of murder in the second degree with a firearm; one count of fleeing and attempting to elude a law enforcement officer; and two
counts of felon in possession of a firearm. (See Doc. 36). Rangel contends that from his original
detention on December 5, 2008, until July 6, 2009, Defendants wrongfully denied him outside exercise privileges and the opportunity to file grievances in accord with jail procedure for doing so. (Doc. 25) Rangel alleges that the restrictions placed on him in the Hillsborough County Jail
violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and caused him physical and mental injury. Rangel contends that he suffers from migraines, heartburn, stomach cramps, neck pains, back pains, constipation, lethargy, depression, a bump on his right hand, and a fungus in
one of his toe nails. Rangel states that he received medical treatment for these problems. (Doc.
25). Rangel argues that Defendants Herman and Lucas were aware that denying outside exercise posed a substantial risk of harm. He claims that he was not allowed outside exercise until he
wrote a letter to Captain Herman contending that the denial of outside exercise violated his
Eighth Amendment rights (Doc. 25).
Inmate Support for Plaintiff's Allegations
On October 19, 2009, Rangel filed declarations from Raymond Marston and Edward
Covington. Marston stated that Defendants denied Rangel outside exercise for seven months. He
claims that he heard Rangel be denied a grievance form a few times by supervisors and that
Defendants rarely answered Rangel's requests. (Doc. 19). Covington stated that Defendants denied Rangel outside recreation for five or six months and consistently denied his grievances.
He claims that Defendants did not treat Rangel equal to similar inmates in the unit and it was
only when Rangel informed Major Lucas that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated that
Defendants allowed him outside recreation. (Doc. 20).
Defendant's Allegations
Defendants contend that there is no evidence that they violated Rangel's constitutional
rights; Rangel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity. Thus, Defendants argue that based on the pleadings and the record of evidence, they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Although instructed in the requirements of Rule 56, and given an opportunity to respond to Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, Rangel has not done so.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (c) states that summary judgment should be rendered "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating
the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The moving party may discharge this initial responsibility by "showing that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or by showing that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." Hickson v. Northern Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1 lth
Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 (11th
Cir. 1991)). When the moving party has discharged this responsibility, the nonmoving party must
then designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, All
U.S. at 324.
Issues of fact are genuine "only if a reasonable jury considering the evidence presented could find for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Material facts are those which will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Id. The
Court must consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing the motion, and all reasonable doubts about the facts are resolved in favor of the
nonmoving party. Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 1265,
1268 (1 lth Cir. 2007) If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then the moving party is
"entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex, All U.S. at 323.
DISCUSSION
A. Defendants Did Not Violate Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights
The Eighth Amendment states that punishment inflicted in the United States shall not be
"cruel and unusual." U.S. Const, amend. VIII.2 It is only by "the unnecessary and wanton
2 Because Rangel has not yet been convicted of a crime, he is a prctrial detainee and his claim invokes the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. However, the applicable standard is the same. Gross v. White, 340 Fed. Appx. 527, 530
infliction of pain" that the Eighth Amendment is implicated in prisoner civil rights cases. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). The deprivation of rights alleged by prisoners must be "sufficiently serious" and "result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" to receive consideration under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prisoner must show that his prison conditions pose a "substantial risk of serious harm." Id. A punishment is deemed
"unnecessary" if it is "totally without penological justification." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). It is wanton if the prison official acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of
mind" such as "deliberate indifference to the inmates' health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
A prisoner's civil rights claim will not stand absent these factors.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that restriction from outside recreation does result in the "infliction of pain." Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (1 lth Cir. 1999). However, such a restriction
is constitutional if it is based on proper "penological justification," such as the necessity for the
protection of the prison population. See Rhodes, 425 U.S. at 346. Defendants booked Rangel in
the Orient Road Jail due to his alleged involvement in a series of violent crimes. (Doc. 36). Rangel was known to be a member of the violent gang, "Sur 13". (Doc. 13). Rangel also displayed violent and disruptive behavior that included possessing nuisance contraband, becoming hostile and threatening a deputy, concealing dangerous instruments that could be
fashioned into a weapon, banging on his cell door, screaming in his cell, and refusing to take medicine. (Exhibit "F"). Defendants allowed Rangel to participate in indoor recreation, yet he
(11th Cir. 2009).
refused. Given Rangel's charges and his violent and disruptive behavior while imprisoned, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Rangel's claim that his outside recreation
restriction was not justified.
Each week the Confinement Review Committee evaluated Rangel to determine his threat
level and each week the committee determined Rangel to be a threat to himself and to the prison
population. The Eighth Amendment protections "afford plenty of operating space for the control
of dangerously violent detainees and convicted criminals." Weems v. Lawrence, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68708, *6 (S.D. Ga., June 29,2009). Defendants worked within that operating space while attempting to control Rangel's violent and disruptive behavior.
As for the second prong of the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard,
there is no evidence that Defendants showed deliberate indifference to Rangel's health or safety.
Major Lucas stated that Defendants closely monitored and evaluated Rangel's conditions and
behavior to ensure that he was placed in the correct classification and allowed appropriate
privileges. (Exhibit "C"). After Rangel was placed in Administrative Confinement upon entry into jail, a doctor evaluated him on a one-on-one basis for several days. For several months after the one-on-one evaluations, a Confinement Review Committee evaluated Rangel's inmate
classification on a weekly basis to ensure that his level of confinement "coincided" with his
behavior. Id. The committee's findings were the basis for Captain Herman's decision to remove
Rangel's telephone and visitation restrictions on January 15, 2009, and Rangel's outside
recreation restrictions on July 6, 2009. (Exhibit "D"). Defendants displayed great interest in
Rangel's confinement by regularly evaluating him and finally removing his restrictions once
Rangel's violent and disruptive behavior improved.
Defendants also treated Rangel for all of the physical problems that he claims resulted
from his lack of outside recreation. (Doc. 25). It is "the government's obligation to provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). The deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. Not only do Rangel's injuries not constitute "serious harm," as Defendants correctly pointed out in their motion for summary judgment, but
Defendants fulfilled their obligation to provide the necessary care to treat Rangel's ailments. Rangel's sixty-three page medical file shows that Defendants treated Rangel for his medical
issues, none of which he has shown to be directly related to the outside recreation restriction.
(Exhibit "I").
Even in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to the alleged violation of Rangel's Eighth Amendment rights. Rangel's outside exercise restriction was based on a penological justification and Defendants showed great interest in
Rangel by carefully evaluating his confinement conditions and ensuring that he was provided
proper medical attention.
B. Plaintiff Did Not Exhaust His Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act "("PLRA"), as amended, requires that prisoners who
bring an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions must first exhaust all
administrative remedies available. Porter v. Nnssle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002). This provision of the PLRA is mandatory. Id. at 524. The requirement "applies to all suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes." Id. at 532. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that administrative remedies "are not available to an inmate if prison officials
do not respond to grievances or if they prevent the filing of grievances." Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d
1368 (1 lth Cir. 2008). Because the "exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in
abatement and not generally an adjudication on the merits...it is not ordinarily the proper subject
for summary judgment." Id. at 1374-75. Nonetheless, "a district court may properly consider
facts outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute regarding exhaustion where the factual dispute does not decide the merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop the record." W. at 1376.
It is required that for complaints about conditions at county jail, prisoners must complete a grievance process. Rangel was aware of the grievance process, yet failed to file any grievances in regard to his restriction from outside recreation. Rangel completed three Inmate Requests for
outside recreation privilege, the last of which Defendants approved on July 6,2009. (Doc. 1,
Exhibit 1). Rangel filed Inmate Request #389828 on June 26, 2009, asking for a "grievance." Defendants directed Rangel to state what the grievance was in reference to. Id. In response, Rangel filed Inmate Request #389823 on June 29, 2009, specifying that the requested grievance
was in reference to his outdoor recreation restriction. Id. Nonetheless, Rangel failed to file a
proper grievance for his outside recreation restriction and exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him.
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Rangel claims that the officers and supervisors on duty denied him "proper grievance procedure." (Doc. 25). He supports this allegation with the declarations of inmates Edward
Covington and Raymond Marston who stated that they saw or overheard Defendants deny Rangel
grievance forms. (Doc. 19 and 20). However, Rangel filed four different grievance requests during this period. (Exhibit "J"). Rangel's filings demonstrate that he had access to grievance forms and the grievance procedure, but failed to file a grievance in regard to his outside
recreation restriction. Instead, Rangel made his requests for outside recreation with the Inmate Request Forms to which Defendants responded. There is no evidence that Defendants failed to
respond to Rangel's requests or prevented him from filing grievances.
C. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity requires courts to enter judgment in favor of a government employee
unless the employee's conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The goal of qualified immunity is to "avoid excess disruption of government and permit the resolution of insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Id. This defense protects "public
officials acting within the scope of their discretionary authority and under clearly established
law." Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1165 (1 lth Cir. 1992). The government employee must establish that "he was acting within discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful act occurred." Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 Fed. Appx. 523, 525 (1 lth Cir. 2009). The Court must grant
qualified immunity unless the Plaintiff "can show: first, that the facts viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation by the officer; and, second, that the
unlawfulness of the defendant's actions was "clearly established" at the time of the incident." Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)). Qualified immunity almost always
protects the defendants unless "case law, in factual terms" has staked out a bright line of unlawfulness or the language of the statute or constitutional provision specifically prohibits certain behavior. Poulakis, 341 Fed. Appx.at 528.
The Defendants in this case acted within their discretionary authority as Captain and
Major of the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office. Major Lucas stated that he placed the outside
restriction on Rangel and let it remain for seven months because he deemed Rangel to be a danger to himself and to others. (Exhibit "C"). Captain Herman used her discretion to follow the
advice of Major Lucas and the Confinement Review Committee to continue to restrict Rangel until July 6, 2009. (Exhibit "D"). As supervisors in the jail system, it is well within Defendants' discretion to place restrictions on inmates whom they perceive to be dangerous.
As for Plaintiffs burden of proof to discredit qualified immunity, it is already established
that Defendants did not violate Rangel's constitutional rights. Also, there is no evidence that the
alleged unlawfulness of Defendants' actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.
Under the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard, Defendants did not violate
Rangel's constitutional rights by restricting his outside exercise. There is no relevant case law or
a specific constitutional provision that "clearly establishes" Defendants' conduct as unlawful.
Based on the defense of qualified immunity and the arguments set forth above, summary
judgment for Defendants is appropriate. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants' motion
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for summary judgment (Doc. 36) is hereby GRANTED as set out herein. The clerk is directed to
enter judgment for the Defendants and to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, thi^^day of June, 2010.
A. KOVACHE^ICH
UNITED STATES~DtSTRICT J
Copies to: All parties and counsel of record.
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