Scantland et al v. Jeffry Knight, Inc. et al

Filing 103

ORDER denying 62 Motion to dismiss; denying 62 Motion to strike ; denying without prejudice 62 Motion to sever; denying 66 Motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 9/29/2010. (JM)

UNITED S T A T E S D I S T R I C T TAMPA DIVISION

COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MICHAEL SCANTLAND,

PETER CARTER,
LEON

DANIEL LAWRENCE, FREDERICK HAUSER, III, JOSHUA FARRELL, SPERRY, PHILLIP ZAPATA, AND

TERRENCE DOWNS,
situated,

individually and

on b e h a l f of all o t h e r s similarly-

Plaintiffs,

v.

CASE

NO.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

JEFFRY KNIGHT,

INC.

d/b/a

KNIGHT ENTERPRISES, INC., BRIGHT HOUSE NETWORKS, INC., a n d J E F F R Y D, K N I G H T ,
Defendants.

ORDER

This cause

is before the Court on:

Dkt.
Dkt. Dkt.
Dkt .

39
62 66
77

Second Amended Class Action

Complaint and Jury Demand
Motion to Dismiss,
Motion to Dismiss

to Strike and to Sever

Dkt. Dkt.
Dkt.

78
82 96

Response Response

Stipulation Stipulation

T h e S e c o n d A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t is i d e n t i f i e d as a c l a s s a c t i o n
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and a collective action under the Fair

Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C.

Sec.

216(b).

In the Second

Amended Class Action Complaint, Plaintiffs include the following
claims:

Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

Count I

F a i l u r e to P a y O v e r t i m e

(29 U . S . C .

Sec.

207);

C o u n t II

F a i l u r e to P a y M i n i m u m W a g e
206(a) ) ;

(29 U . S . C . Sec.

Count III
Count IV

Unjust Enrichment
Conversion

(Florida Common Law);

(Florida Common Law)

Count V

Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices - D a m a g e s (F.S.A. S e e s . 5 0 1 . 2 0 1 - 5 0 1 . 2 1 3 ) ; Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices - I n j u n c t i o n (F.S.A. S e e s . 5 0 1 . 2 0 1 - 5 0 1 . 2 1 3 ) ;
Retaliation
that

C o u n t VI

Count VII
The Court notes

(29 U . S . C .

Sec.

215(a)(3).

Plaintiffs Peter Carter and Daniel

Lawrence are no longer named Plaintiffs in the Second Amended

Complaint

(Dkts.

82, 96).

T h e C l e r k of C o u r t s h a l l a m e n d t h e

s t y l e of t h i s c a s e t o r e m o v e P l a i n t i f f s C a r t e r a n d L a w r e n c e .

I.

Standard of

Review

A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6)

if it d o e s n o t p l e a d e n o u g h f a c t s to s t a t e a c l a i m for
I n S i n a l t r a i n a l v. C o c a -

r e l i e f t h a t is p l a u s i b l e o n i t s face.

C o l a Co., 578 F . 3 d 1252,

1 2 6 0 - 6 1 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) ,

the Eleventh

C i r c u i t C o u r t of A p p e a l s e x p l a i n s :

Although it must accept well-pled facts as true, the court is not required to accept a plaintiffs legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. -- , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (noting "the tenet that a court must accept as true all o f the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). In evaluating the sufficiency o f a plaintiffs pleadings, we make
reasonable inferences in P l a i n t i f f s favor, "but we are not required to draw p l a i n t i f f s i n f e r e n c e . " A l d a n a v. D e l Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 4 1 6 F.3d 1242, 1248 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) . Similarly, " u n w a r r a n t e d d e d u c t i o n s o f fact" in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose o f testing the sufficiency o f

Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

plaintiffs allegations. Id.; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951 (stating conclusory
a l l e g a t i o n s are " n o t entitled to be a s s u m e d true").

A complaint may be dismissed i f the facts as pled do not state a claim for r e l i e f that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (explaining " o n l y a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss"); BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-62, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (retiring the prior "unless it appears beyond doubt that the p l a i n t i f f can prove no set o f facts" standard). In Twombly, * 1261 the S u p r e m e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e d a c o m p l a i n t " r e q u i r e s m o r e than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but " m u s t be enough to raise a right to r e l i e f above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even i f doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (internal citations and e m p h a s i s omitted). More recently, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although Rule 8 o f the Federal Rules o f Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, it does demand " m o r e than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A complaint must state a plausible claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible."
Twombly, 5 5 0 U.S. at 5 7 0 , 127 S . C t . at 1974.

II.

Defendants'

Motions

D e f e n d a n t s J e f f r y Knight,
Defendants") move to dismiss,

Inc. and J e f f r y D. K n i g h t ("Knight
strike and/or sever the Second & (2), 12(f) and

Amended Complaint,

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6)

21(b).

The Knight Defendants incorporate all p r i o r arguments
(Dkt. 12). Defendants

contained in the First Motion to Dismiss

a l s o m o v e to d i s m i s s P l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m s of u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t a n d
conversion. In the alternative, Defendants move to sever the

Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

retaliation claims brought by Plaintiffs.

Defendant Bright House Networks,

LLC joins in Defendants'

M o t i o n s to D i s m i s s a n d / o r S t r i k e P l a i n t i f f ' s S e c o n d A m e n d e d

C o m p l a i n t , a n d i n c o r p o r a t e s all f a c t u a l a n d l e g a l a r g u m e n t s c o n t a i n e d in t h e K n i g h t D e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n s . Defendant Bright

House Networks also raises additional arguments to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint and to strike the FDUPTA claims for damages.

III.

Discussion

In t h e S e c o n d A m e n d e d C l a s s A c t i o n C o m p l a i n t ,
seek certification of several classes of

Plaintiffs

individuals:

1) a s t o c l a i m f o r o v e r t i m e ,

those who have

p e r f o r m e d i n s t a l l a t i o n , repair, c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
quality control, and similar duties for Defendant Knight Enterprises on behalf of Defendant Bright House's customers, and who h a v e b e e n c l a s s i f i e d as i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r s i n s t e a d of as e m p l o y e e s , p u r s u a n t
to 2 9 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b);

2) as to c l a i m s for f a i l u r e to p a y the m i n i m u m w age, those w h o h a v e p e r f o r m e d installation, repair, construction, q u a l i t y
control, and similar duties for Defendant

Knight Enterprises on behalf of Defendant Bright house's customers, and who have been c l a s s i f i e d as i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r s i n s t e a d of as e m p l o y e e s , p u r s u a n t to 2 9 U . S . C . Sec.

216(b) and have not been paid for hours spent
in t r a i n i n g d u r i n g the last t h r e e years;

3) A s to t h e c o m m o n l a w a n d F D U P T A c l a i m s , those who have performed installation, repair, c o n s t r u c t i o n , q u a l i t y c o n t r o l a n d

Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

supervisory services for Defendant Knight E n t e r p r i s e s o n b e h a l f of D e f e n d a n t B r i g h t
House's customers, and who have been

c l a s s i f i e d as i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r s i n s t e a d of as e m p l o y e e s , p u r s u a n t to F e d . R . C i v . P . 23.

In C o u n t I ( o v e r t i m e c l a i m s ) ,
a collective action under 29 U.S.C.

P l a i n t i f f s s e e k to p r o c e e d as
Sec. 216(b). I n C o u n t II

( f a i l u r e to p a y m i n i m u m wage), P l a i n t i f f s s e e k to p r o c e e d as a

c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n for the failure to p a y for r e q u i r e d t r a i n i n g
sessions, under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(a).

In Counts III

(unjust enrichment)

and IV (conversion),

P l a i n t i f f s s e e k to p r o c e e d as a class a c t i o n for f a i l u r e to p a y
Plaintiffs wages due them for time spent performing repair work

on p r i o r j o b assignments, as well as i m p r o p e r d e d u c t i o n s f r o m p a y
a n d f r o m the r e t a i n e r p r o v i d e d to K n i g h t E n t e r p r i s e s .

In Count V (FDUPTA-Damages)

a n d C o u n t VI

(FDUPTA-

Injunction), P l a i n t i f f s s e e k to p r o c e e d as a c l a s s a c t i o n for
m i s c l a s s i f y i n g P l a i n t i f f s as i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r s r a t h e r t h a n employees, r e q u i r i n g P l a i n t i f f s to s u f f e r d e d u c t i o n s a n d i n c u r

e x p e n s e s t h a t P l a i n t i f f s w o u l d n o t h a v e i n c u r r e d if P l a i n t i f f s

h a d b e e n p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d as employees.

Plaintiffs allege

that the services Plaintiffs provide constitute "trade or
commerce" under FDUPTA, that the actions of Defendants in

misclassifying Plaintiffs as independent contractors even though
D e f e n d a n t s k n o w that P l a i n t i f f s have no real p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t
and are entirely dependent upon Defendants for their income, are

u n l a w f u l , a n d t h e n a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as
m a s t e r - s e r v a n t r a t h e r t h a n as c o m p a n y - s u b c o n t r a c t o r . Plaintiffs

allege that this constitutes an unconscionable act or practice

Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

a n d / o r d e c e p t i v e act or p r a c t i c e in the c o n d u c t of t r a d e or
commerce, in violation of the FDUPTA.

P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e t h a t t h i s a c t i o n is b r o u g h t o n b e h a l f of
all class plaintiffs who performed contractor work for Defendants K n i g h t E n t e r p r i s e s a n d B r i g h t H o u s e in F l o r i d a . further allege that: j o i n d e r of 1) Plaintiffs

t h e c l a s s is so n u m e r o u s as to m a k e i m p r a c t i c a l ; 2) t h e c l a i m s of t h e n a m e d

(all m e m b e r s )

P l a i n t i f f s a r e c o m m o n a n d t y p i c a l of t h e c l a i m s o f t h e c l a s s as a w h o l e ; 3) C o u n s e l f o r t h e n a m e d P l a i n t i f f s c a n f a i r l y a n d
adequately represent the interest of the class; a n d 4)

m a i n t a i n i n g t h i s a c t i o n as a c l a s s a c t i o n is t h e m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e

a n d f e a s i b l e w a y f o r t h i s a c t i o n to p r o c e e d .

I n C o u n t VII,

Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiffs'

termination

a n d p r o m u l g a t i n g a l i s t i d e n t i f y i n g P l a i n t i f f s as p a r t i c i p a n t s in
t h i s l a w s u i t to o t h e r t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c o m p a n i e s c o n s t i t u t e s
unlawful retaliation in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 215(a)(3).

T h e i s s u e s r a i s e d b y D e f e n d a n t s include:

1. State Law Wage Class Claims Violate The Rules Enabling Act Because They Abridge The Substantive R i g h t s C o n f e r r e d b y S e c t i o n 2 1 6 ( b ) of t h e F L S A ;

2.

State Law Wage Class Claims Are Preempted by

Federal Law;

3.

A n O p t - O u t C l a s s A c t i o n U n d e r R u l e 23 I s N o t

S u p e r i o r to O t h e r A v a i l a b l e M e t h o d s for A d j u d i c a t i o n ;

4.

In the Alternative,

The Court Should Decline To

Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law
Claims;

Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

5. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Seek Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Count VI);
6. Counts III and IV (FDUPTA) Fail to State A Claim

U p o n W h i c h R e l i e f C a n Be G r a n t e d (now C o u n t s V a n d VI);
7. C o u n t III ( U n j u s t E n r i c h m e n t ) a n d C o u n t I V ( C o n v e r s i o n ) F a i l to S t a t e A C l a i m U p o n W h i c h R e l i e f
Can Be Granted;
8. Plaintiffs' Retaliation Claims Arise Out of

S e p a r a t e F a c t s F r o m t h e O t h e r C l a i m s a n d M u s t Be
Severed;

9.
10.

P l a i n t i f f s L a c k S t a n d i n g to A s s e r t F D U P T A C l a i m s ;
Plaintiffs' FDUPTA Claims for Damages Should Be

Stricken.

A.

Rules Enabling Act

Defendants argue that permitting the state law wage claims ( C o u n t s III, IV, V, VI), to p r o c e e d as a c l a s s a c t i o n w o u l d

a b r i d g e or m o d i f y t h e s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s of a b s e n t c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n m e m b e r s w h o d o n o t e l e c t to a f f i r m a t i v e l y o p t - i n to t h e
action.

P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d that,

while the facts upon which the

s t a t e l a w c l a i m s a r e b a s e d a r e s i m i l a r to t h e f a c t s u n d e r l y i n g the FLSA claims, the remedy sought and the violation alleged are

entirely separate.

P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e that a n y s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t

to l i t i g a t e o v e r t i m e a n d m i n i m u m w a g e c l a i m s o n l y a g a i n s t
i n d i v i d u a l s w h o o p t - i n to a n a c t i o n c a n n o t p o s s i b l y b e a b r i d g e d

or m o d i f i e d b y a l l o w i n g a R u l e 23 o p t - o u t c l a s s to p r o c e e d w h i c h
seeks only straight time unpaid wages owed to Plaintiffs. claims for unpaid wages are based on Plaintiffs' work for which Plaintiffs were not compensated. The

time for repair

Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

B a s e d o n t h e d i f f e r e n c e in the r e l i e f s o u g h t ,
denies the Motions to Dismiss as to this issue.

the Court

B.

Implied Preemption

Defendants argue that the FLSA 216(b)

collective action

impliedly preempts Plaintiffs' state law class claims for u n p a i d
wages.

P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d that Plaintiffs' u n p a i d w a g e s c l a i m s a r e not d u p l i c a t i v e of, o r b a s e d upon, P l a i n t i f f s ' F L S A claims.

P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d that o t h e r c o u r t s h a v e f o u n d o n l y a p r o c e d u r a l
c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e S e c t i o n 216(b) a n d R u l e 23 m e c h a n i s m s , w h i c h

does not d e f e a t s u p p l e m e n t a l jurisdiction, a n d h a v e p e r m i t t e d
hybrid class actions.
Co., 448 F.3d 416

L i n d s a y v. G o v e r n m e n t E m p l o y e e s I n s u r a n c e
2006).

(C.A.D.C.

After consideration,
as to this issue.

the Court denies the Motions to Dismiss

C.

C l a s s A c t i o n N o t S u p e r i o r M e a n s of A d j u d i c a t i o n

Defendants argue that the Court may certify a class under

Rule 23(b)(3) o n l y if it finds that "a class a c t i o n is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient

a d j u d i c a t i o n of the c o n t r o v e r s y . "

D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e that, as a

m a t t e r of law, an o p t - o u t class a c t i o n is not s u p e r i o r to the
F L S A ' s o p t - i n m e t h o d of a d j u d i c a t i o n .

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P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d that Defendants' a r g u m e n t s a r e p r e m a t u r e .

T h e C o u r t a g r e e s t h a t it is p r e m a t u r e t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t a c l a s s a c t i o n is n o t s u p e r i o r to o t h e r a v a i l a b l e m e t h o d s f o r t h e

f a i r a n d e f f i c i e n t a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h i s case.

The Court will

c o n s i d e r t h i s i s s u e w h e n a m o t i o n to c e r t i f y c l a s s u n d e r
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 is ruled on. The Court denies the Motions to

D i s m i s s w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e as to t h i s issue.

D.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that the Court should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.

D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e that Plaintiffs' s t a t e l a w c l a i m s s u b s t a n t i a l l y
predominate over Plaintiffs' FLSA claim. Defendants further

a r g u e t h a t the i n h e r e n t c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n p a r a l l e l o p t - i n F L S A c l a i m s a n d o p t - o u t R u l e 23 c l a i m s p r o v i d e s a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n

for the C o u r t to d e c l i n e to e x e r c i s e its s u p p l e m e n t a l
jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs respond that the constitutional "case or controversy" standard confers supplemental jurisdiction over all

s t a t e c l a i m s w h i c h a r i s e o u t of a c o m m o n n u c l e u s of o p e r a t i v e
fact with a substantial federal claim. Tamiami Partners Ltd. V.

M i c c o s u k e e T r i b e of I n d i a n s ,

177 F . 3 d 1 2 1 2

(llch Cir.

1999).

C l a i m s w h i c h a r i s e f r o m a "common n u c l e u s of o p e r a t i v e fact"
n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e " t h e s a m e w i t n e s s e s , p r e s e n t a t i o n of the s a m e

evidence, and d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the same, or v e r y s i m i l a r facts."
P a l m e r v. H o s p i t a l A u t h o r i t y of R a n d o l p h C o u n t y ,
1563-64 (llch C i r . 1994) .

22 F . 3 d 1559,

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In t h e e v e n t that,

at t h e d i s p o s i t i v e m o t i o n s t a g e ,

the

federal claims in this case are resolved,

the Court will consider

w h e t h e r t h e e x e r c i s e of s u p p l e m e n t a l j u r i s d i c t i o n is a p p r o p r i a t e . Without more information about any class certified on the state
law claims, the Court cannot determine whether those claims

predominate over the FLSA claims.

Therefore,

t h e M o t i o n s to

Dismiss are denied without prejudice as to the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction.

E.

Count III - Unjust Enrichment

Failure

to State

a

Claim

Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint contains

a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s h a d a g r e e m e n t s w i t h r e s p e c t to p a y
a n d t h e d e d u c t i o n s in q u e s t i o n . D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e that, w h e r e a n

e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t e x i s t s , a c l a i m for b r e a c h of a n i m p l i e d - i n - l a w
contract fails. S e e C r o s s v. S t r a d e r C o n s t r u c t i o n C o r p . , 768

S o . 2 d 4 6 5 (Fla. 2 d D C A 2000) ( " q u a s i - c o n t r a c t d a m a g e s c a n n o t be

a w a r d e d w h e n an e n f o r c e a b l e c o n t r a c t exists").

Defendants argue

that t h i s is not a p l e a d i n g defect that can be c o r r e c t e d t h r o u g h
amendment, s i n c e the e x i s t e n c e of a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n P l a i n t i f f Defendants since the

a n d K n i g h t p e r m e a t e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e c o m p l a i n t . a r g u e t h a t t h i s is n o t a c a s e of a l t e r n a t i v e p l e a d i n g ,

a l l e g a t i o n s of an e x p r e s s a g r e e m e n t p e r m e a t e the e q u i t a b l e
claims.

Plaintiffs respond that courts will not dismiss a claim for

u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t w h e r e t h e e x i s t e n c e o r v a l i d i t y of a c o n t r a c t
is d i s p u t e d .
818504 at *7

See In re Burton Wiand Receivership Cases,
(M.D. Fla. 2008) .

2008 WL

10

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In the Second Amended Complaint,

Plaintiffs allege:

13. D e f e n d a n t K n i g h t E n t e r p r i s e s , is a telecommunications company that contracts with Bright House and other cable companies to i n s t a l l , r e p a i r , o r c o n s t r u c t t h e facilities for high-speed internet, cable television, and telephone service for Bright
House and other such cable television

companies.

14. Knight Enterprises, with the knowledge a n d a p p r o v a l of B r i g h t H o u s e , p u r p o r t s to c o n t r a c t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s to p e r f o r m s u c h installation, repair, construction, and supervisory work associated with monitoring s u c h q u a l i t y of t h o s e s e r v i c e s . The d e f e n d a n t s p u r p o r t to call t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s "independent contractors", not employees, t h e r e b y a v o i d i n g a n y o b l i g a t i o n to p a y p a y r o l l taxes, w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n insurance, health insurance, unemployment insurance, overtime and other such benefits. P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e t h a t P l a i n t i f f s ' a l l e g a t i o n s do n o t m e n t i o n an e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n P l a i n t i f f s a n d D e f e n d a n t s , a n d the a b o v e
allegations, b y m e a n s of t h e p h r a s e " p u r p o r t s t o c o n t r a c t "

e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t is d i s p u t e d . T h e C o u r t u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s p h r a s e to m e a n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s

e n t e r e d i n t o s o m e a g r e e m e n t that m a y h a v e f a c i a l v a l i d i t y b u t
which may be legally invalid and unenforceable.

In order to state a cause of action for unjust enrichment,

P l a i n t i f f s m u s t p l e a d f a c t s s h o w i n g that:
a benefit on Defendants; benefit;

1)

Plaintiffs conferred

2) D e f e n d a n t s h a d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e

3) D e f e n d a n t s a c c e p t e d o r r e t a i n e d t h e b e n e f i t
a n d 4) circumstances are such that it would be

conferred;

i n e q u i t a b l e f o r D e f e n d a n t s to r e t a i n t h e
11

benefit without paying

Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

f a i r v a l u e f o r it.

Plaintiffs have alleged that Plaintiffs spent

time performing repair work on prior job assignments without b e i n g paid, and monies were improperly deducted from Plaintiffs'

paychecks and retainers.

At t h i s p o i n t ,

it is u n c l e a r w h e t h e r e a c h P l a i n t i f f e n t e r e d Plaintiffs should know If

into an express contract with Defendants.

whether or not Plaintiffs signed an express written contract. P l a i n t i f f s d i d so, t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r a c t s Other factual allegations

h a v e n o t b e e n p r o v i d e d to t h e C o u r t .

in t h e S e c o n d A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t e s t a b l i s h t h a t s o m e P l a i n t i f f s performed services and received compensation from Defendants for a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of t i m e . From those allegations, the Court

infers that there was some understanding between Plaintiffs and
Defendants. It would assist the Court to know the date when each

P l a i n t i f f c o m m e n c e d p e r f o r m i n g s e r v i c e s f o r D e f e n d a n t s in exchange for compensation, whether a written agreement was
executed, when any such agreement was executed, and the terms

within any such agreement.

T h e C o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h e p r o o f of a n e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t
between parties to a contract defeats a claim for unjust

enrichment.
contract

In this case the existence and validity of the
and Defendants are at issue.

between Plaintiffs

P l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d P l a i n t i f f s are r e a l l y " e m p l o y e e s " a n d n o t

"independent contractors" a l t h o u g h their c o n t r a c t s m a y f a c i a l l y
d e s i g n a t e P l a i n t i f f s as "independent contractors." Until an

e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t is p r o v e n , u n d e r w h i c h an a d e q u a t e r e m e d y at l a w
is a v a i l a b l e , is p r e m a t u r e .
Dismiss as

a motion to dismiss a claim for unjust enrichment The Court therefore denies Defendants'
III.

Motions to

to Count

12

Case F.

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM IV Conversion

Count

Failure

to

State A

Claim

Under Florida law,

conversion is an intentional tort

c o n s i s t i n g of an u n a u t h o r i z e d act w h i c h d e p r i v e s a n o t h e r of his
property, permanently or for an indefinite time. S e n f i e l d v.

B a n k of N o v a S c o t i a T r u s t Co.
1160-61 (Fla. 3rd D C A 1 9 8 4 ) .

(Cayman,

Ltd.,

4 5 0 S o . 2 d 1157,

The essence of the tort is not the

a c q u i s i t i o n of the p r o p e r t y ; rather, it is the w r o n g f u l
d e p r i v a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y . Growers, Inc., 33 S o . 2 d 858 S t a r F r u i t Co. V. E a g l e L a k e (1948). Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs' c o n v e r s i o n c l a i m is for r e c o v e r y of an o r d i n a r y debt
based on an agreement. Defendants argue that a mere obligation

to p a y m o n e y m a y n o t b e e n f o r c e d b y a c o n v e r s i o n a c t i o n .
See Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So.2d 646 (Fla. 4th D C A

1970); Schere v. Laborers' Int'l. Union, 746 F.Supp. 73, 84 (N.D.
Fla. 1988).

P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d that F l o r i d a c o u r t s h a v e r e c o g n i z e d that e m p l o y e e s c l a i m i n g t h e y are o w e d u n p a i d w a g e s m a y b r i n g c o m m o n l a w c l a i m s s u c h as conversion.
Inc., Serv., 2008 WL 2222319 Inc., (M.D. Fla.

See Short v. B r y n A l a n Studios,
2 0 0 8 ) ; E d w a r d s v. N i l e s S a l e s & 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Ocean

439 F.Supp.2d 1202,

Club Community Association,
(Fla. 3rd D C A 2 0 0 6 ) .

Inc. v. Curtis,

935 S o . 2 d 513, 5 1 5 - 1 6

The C o u r t n o t e s that there is a u t h o r i t y for a c o n v e r s i o n

claim relating to u n p a i d wages.

Where n e i t h e r the pleadings nor
a claim for conversion

p r o o f d e s c r i b e o r i d e n t i f y s p e c i f i c money, cannot succeed.

At t h i s time, o n l y the a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e S e c o n d
After

A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t a r e a v a i l a b l e to t h e C o u r t .

13

Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

consideration,

the Court denies the Motions to Dismiss as to the

conversion claim.

G.

Count V

- FDUPTA - Damages

1.

Standing

D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h a t P l a i n t i f f s do n o t h a v e s t a n d i n g to
a s s e r t F D U P T A c l a i m s b e c a u s e P l a i n t i f f s a r e p r o v i d e r s of s e r v i c e s

a n d not a c o n s u m e r w h o h a s p u r c h a s e d g o o d s o r s e r v i c e s .
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs therefore do not have standing
to assert a FDUPTA claim. See Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd.,

635 F . S u p p . 2 d 1 3 3 9

(S.D.

Fla.

2009) .

Plaintiffs contend Plaintiffs have standing to sue under the
FDUPTA.

The Court notes

the discussion in Kelly v.

Palmer,

Reifler &

Associates,

P.A.,

681 F.Supp.2d 1356

(S.D. Fla.

2010),

supporting

a b r o a d e n i n g of t h e s t a t u t e b e y o n d i n d i v i d u a l c o n s u m e r s a n d
businesses. After consideration, the Court denies the Motions to

D i s m i s s as t o s t a n d i n g .

2.

Failure

to

State

a

Claim

D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h a t D e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t a w a r e of a n y c a s e
w h i c h w o u l d s u p p o r t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e m i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of

a p e r s o n was a d e c e p t i v e a n d / o r u n f a i r p r a c t i c e .

Defendants

further argue that Plaintiffs were never in a consumer relationship with Defendant Knight.

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Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

Plaintiffs respond that other courts have held that an employer's conduct can give rise to claims of both

misclassification and unfair trade practices. G r o u n d P a c k a g e System, WL 2 2 4 2 2 3 1 ,

S e e In re F e d E x

Inc. E m p l o y m e n t P r a c t i c e s L i t i g a t i o n , 2 0 0 9 Plaintiffs further argue

* 2 4 - 2 5 (N.D. Ind. 2009) .

that, u n d e r F l o r i d a law, a c t i o n s that o f f e n d e s t a b l i s h e d p u b l i c p o l i c y c a n c o n s t i t u t e u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e s u n d e r FDUPTA.
S a m u e l s v. K i n g M o t o r Co. O f F o r t L a u d e r d a l e ,
(4th D C A 2 0 0 1 ) .

782 S o . 2 d 489,

499

D e f e n d a n t B r i g h t H o u s e a r g u e s that P l a i n t i f f s c a n n o t a l l e g e
or s h o w a n y c o n t r a c t w i t h B r i g h t H o u s e t h a t w o u l d s u b j e c t D e f e n d a n t B r i g h t H o u s e to a c l a i m for F D U P T A d a m a g e s ; D e f e n d a n t

B r i g h t H o u s e a r g u e s that P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e o n l y t h a t P l a i n t i f f s w o r k e d for D e f e n d a n t J e f f r y Knight, Inc. in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h its
work for Bright House.

To state a claim for violation of FDUPTA,

Plaintiffs must

allege: 1) a d e c e p t i v e act or u n f a i r p r a c t i c e ; 2) c a u s a t i o n ; a n d

3) actual damages.

A deceptive practice is one that is likely to

m i s l e a d consumers, a n d an u n f a i r p r a c t i c e is one o f f e n d s
e s t a b l i s h e d p u b l i s h e d policy, "or is i m m o r a l , u n e t h i c a l ,

oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to
consumers." Rollins, Inc. v. B u t l a n d , 950 S o . 2 d 850, 8 6 9 (Fla.

2d DCA 2 006) .

The Court has considered what acts of Defendants

in "trade or commerce" would constitute a deceptive or u n f a i r practice as to Plaintiffs. It is fair to assume that the Knight

Defendants a d v e r t i s e d for "independent contractors" to provide
s e r v i c e s in e x c h a n g e for money, and a l l e g e d l y e x e r t e d a c t u a l control o v e r Plaintiffs.. P l a i n t i f f s have f u r t h e r a l l e g e d that

all D e f e n d a n t s r e q u i r e d P l a i n t i f f s to p e r f o r m r e p a i r s e r v i c e s
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Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

without compensating Plaintiffs.

A s to D e f e n d a n t B r i g h t H o u s e ,

in t h e S e c o n d A m e n d e d

C o m p l a i n t P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e that

"Defendant Knight Enterprises,

w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e a n d a p p r o v a l of B r i g h t H o u s e , p u r p o r t s to c o n t r a c t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s to p e r f o r m s u c h i n s t a l l a t i o n , r e p a i r , construction and supervisory work associated with monitoring such
q u a l i t y of t h o s e s e r v i c e s . T h e d e f e n d a n t s p u r p o r t to c a l l t h e s e thereby

individuals "independent contractors", not employees, a v o i d i n g a n y o b l i g a t i o n to p a y p a y r o l l t a x e s , compensation insurance, health insurance, workers'

unemployment insurance, Plaintiffs

overtime and other such benefits."

(Dkt. 39, p. 4).

f u r t h e r a l l e g e t h a t D e f e n d a n t B r i g h t H o u s e r e q u i r e s P l a i n t i f f s to correct deficiencies and make repairs without being paid for the time, a n d in t h e e v e n t D e f e n d a n t B r i g h t H o u s e d e c i d e s t h a t a j o b

was not correctly completed, Defendant Knight Enterprises makes deductions from retainers held for Plaintiffs by Defendant Knight
Enterprises. After consideration, the Court finds that

P l a i n t i f f s h a v e s u f f i c i e n t l y a l l e g e d t h e d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of
Defendant Bright House (Dkt. 39, p. 6).

After consideration,
as to the FDUPTA claim.

the Court denies the Motions to Dismiss

3.

Damages

Defendants argue that the damages sought by Plaintiffs are not damages allowed by FDUPTA, w h i c h d e f i n e s " a c t u a l d a m a g e s " as

" t h e d i f f e r e n c e in m a r k e t v a l u e of t h e p r o d u c t o r s e r v i c e in t h e
condition in which it was delivered and its market value condition in which it should have been delivered." in the

Defendants

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Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

a r g u e that "actual damages" do not i n c l u d e a c t u a l c o n s e q u e n t i a l
damages. O r k i n E x t e r m i n a t i n g C o m p a n y v. D e l G u i d i c e , 790 So.2d

1158, 1 1 6 2
2002) .

(Fla. 5th D C A 2001), r e v i e w d e n i e d ,

8 2 1 S o . 2 d 294

(Fla.

P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d t h a t the d i m i n i s h e d v a l u e of w h a t o n e

r e c e i v e s as a r e s u l t of an u n f a i r trade p r a c t i c e m a y be
considered actual damages. Plaintiffs argue that Plaintiffs

w e r e l e d to b e l i e v e b y K n i g h t a n d B r i g h t H o u s e t h a t t h e y w o u l d b e

entering into an independent contractor relationship, but were actually entering into an employment relationship. Plaintiffs

contend Plaintiffs suffered actual damages from the diminished v a l u e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p P l a i n t i f f s w e r e a l l o w e d t o e n t e r i n t o .

P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e t h a t P l a i n t i f f s were r e q u i r e d to use e q u i p m e n t
s p e c i f i e d b y K n i g h t a n d B r i g h t House, w e r e r e q u i r e d to w o r k u n d e r
a time schedule set by Knight and Bright House, a n d to m a i n t a i n

t h e i r e q u i p m e n t in a m a n n e r s p e c i f i e d b y K n i g h t a n d B r i g h t H o u s e .

In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ,

Plaintiffs argue that Knight Defendants

and Bright House prevented Plaintiffs from entering into an employment relationship, independent contractors, b y f o r c i n g P l a i n t i f f s to w o r k as which diminished the value of the

r e l a t i o n s h i p P l a i n t i f f s e n t e r e d into.

P l a i n t i f f s f u r t h e r a r g u e t h a t it is t o o e a r l y to d e t e r m i n e

w h e t h e r Plaintiffs' d a m a g e s are a c t u a l or c o n s e q u e n t i a l .

The C o u r t has no s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the d a m a g e s
s o u g h t b y e a c h P l a i n t i f f at t h i s t i m e .
Court denies the Motions

After consideration,
issue.

the

to Dismiss as to this

17

Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

H.

C o u n t VI

- FDUPTA - Injunction

Standing
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek an injunction under FDUPTA. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs must establish:

1) a n i n j u r y in fact,

w h i c h is

c o n c r e t e a n d p a r t i c u l a r i z e d a n d a c t u a l o r i m m i n e n t ; 2) a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i n j u r y a n d t h e c a u s a l c o n d u c t ; a n d 3)
substantial likelihood that a favorable decision will redress

a
the

injury.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs'

injuries,

if p r o v e n ,

are compensable with damages.

Declaratory and injunctive relief

will not redress the injury.

P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e t h a t at t h e t i m e t h e C o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d ,
Plaintiff Dan Lawrence and Plaintiff Phillip Zapata were still

employed by Defendants,
standing.

a n d t h i s f a c t is s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h

Plaintiffs further argue that other courts have held that

F D U P T A a l l o w s a n y p e r s o n , r e g a r d l e s s of a s h o w i n g of a n o n g o i n g
practice, to seek injunctive relief.

The Court notes

the discussion

in Galstaldi v.

Sunvest

C o m m u n i t i e s , LLC,

637 F.Supp.2d 1045

(S.D. Fla.

2010) .

The

statute provides that anyone aggrieved may seek an injunction.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts w h i c h e s t a b l i s h A r t i c l e III s t a n d i n g . A declaration that

Defendants' conduct violates the FDUPTA would prevent Defendants f r o m c o n t i n u i n g a n y c o n d u c t w h i c h v i o l a t e s t h e F D U P T A in t h e
future.

Case

No.

8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

After consideration,
as to this issue.

the Court denies the Motions

to Dismiss

I.

Count

VII

-

Retaliation

In the Second Amended Complaint,
s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of

Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants terminated

this action,

Plaintiffs Daniel Lawrence and Phillip Zapata.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

21,

Defendants move to sever the

r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m b e c a u s e it a r i s e s o u t of s e p a r a t e f a c t s f r o m

the other claims in this action.

Defendants argue that

P l a i n t i f f s d o n o t a l l e g e t h e d e c i s i o n s in q u e s t i o n w e r e m a d e at

the s a m e time, decisionmaker.

f o r t h e s a m e reasons, a n d w e r e d e c i d e d b y t h e s a m e D e f e n d a n t s f u r t h e r a r g u e t h a t the S e c o n d A m e n d e d

Complaint contains no allegations that the other named Plaintiffs w e r e s u b j e c t to s i m i l a r a c t i o n s . Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs'

r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m d o e s not m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r

permissive joinder in that the factual allegations are based on
s e p a r a t e a c t s of D e f e n d a n t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o e a c h P l a i n t i f f , and

t h e r e a r e n o c o m m o n q u e s t i o n s of l a w o r f a c t .

P l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d t h a t the r e t a l i a t o r y m i s c o n d u c t a l l e g e d
in t h e S e c o n d A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t a r i s e s as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h i s

lawsuit, a n d Plaintiffs' r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m is i n e x t r i c a b l y
intertwined with the facts of this case. Plaintiffs further

a r g u e t h a t u n l e s s P l a i n t i f f s a r e f o u n d to be e m p l o y e e s ,
retaliation claim is not available to Plaintiffs.

the

In order to prove the retaliation claim,

Plaintiffs must

p r o v e t h a t they:

1)

e n g a g e d in a c t i v i t y p r o t e c t e d u n d e r t h e FLSA;
19

Case

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8:09-CV-1985-T-17TBM

2)

s u b s e q u e n t l y s u f f e r e d a d v e r s e a c t i o n b y t h e e m p l o y e r ; a n d 3)

a

causal connection existed between their protected activity and
the adverse employment action. S e e W o l f v. C o c a - C o l a C o . , 200

F . 3 d 1337,

1342-1343

(11th Cir. 2000).

P e r m i s s i v e j o i n d e r r e q u i r e s t h a t a c l a i m a r i s e o u t of t h e

s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n o r o c c u r r e n c e , or s e r i e s of o c c u r r e n c e s , a l o n g
w i t h c o m m o n q u e s t i o n s of f a c t o r law. The retaliation claims

a s s e r t e d d o n o t a r i s e o u t of t h e s a m e f a c t s a s t h e o t h e r c l a i m s ,

a l t h o u g h t h e c l a i m is n o t c o m p l e t e l y u n r e l a t e d .
consideration,

After

the Court denies the Motion to Sever without

prejudice. discovery.

T h e C o u r t w i l l e v a l u a t e s e v e r a n c e a f t e r t h e c l o s e of Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Defendants'

Motions to Dismiss,

Motion to

S t r i k e a n d M o t i o n t o S e v e r (Dkts.

62,

66)

are denied.

The Clerk

of C o u r t s h a l l a m e n d t h e s t y l e of t h i s c a s e t o r e m o v e P l a i n t i f f s
Peter Carter and Daniel Lawrence.

D O N E a n d O R D E R E D in C h a m b e r s ,
d a y of S e p t e m b e r , 2010.

in Tampa,

Florida on this

C o p i e s to: All parties and counse

20