Arean v. Central Florida Investments, Inc.

Filing 85

ORDER denying 59 Defendant LaCour's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 12/5/2011. (CR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
VICTOR AREAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CASE NO:

8:10-cv-2244-T-33MAP

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS,
INC., CFI RESORT MANAGEMENT,
INC., CINNAMON COVE GP #26,
INC., and JENNIFER LACOUR
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Jennifer LaCour's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in
the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 59).

Plaintiffs

filed a response in opposition thereto (Doc. # 60).

For the

following reasons, the motion is denied.
I.

Background
Plaintiffs

filed

their

Fourth

Amended

Complaint

("Complaint") on May 26, 2011 (Doc. # 57) against LaCour and
three corporate entities, Central Florida Investments, Inc.,
CFI Resort Management, Inc., and Cinnamon Cove GP # 26, Inc.
The Complaint includes five counts.

Count I alleges a

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

Count II

alleges sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. Count III alleges retaliation pursuant to
Title

VII.

harassment
("FCRA").

Count
under

IV

the

seeks
Florida

relief
Civil

for

alleged

Rights

Act

sexual
of

1992

Count V alleges retaliation pursuant to the FCRA.

All the Counts are asserted against the three corporate
entities. The only claim against LaCour is a violation of the
FLSA contained in Count I.
In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the facts section of the
Complaint, Plaintiffs allege:
6.

At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were
"employees" of the Defendants within the
meaning of FLSA, Title VII, and the FCRA, and
Defendant LaCour was the supervisor of the
Plaintiffs.

7.

At all times material hereto, Defendants were
an "employer" within the meanings of the FLSA,
Title VII and the FCRA (excluding Defendant
LaCour).

8.

Defendants continue to be an "employer" within
the meaning of the FLSA, Title VII and the
FCRA (excluding Defendant LaCour).

Doc. # 57.
In Count I (FLSA), paragraph 19 alleges:
19.

Jennifer LaCour was the supervisor for
Victor Arean.

Doc. # 57.
LaCour now moves for a judgment on the pleadings or to
dismiss Count I with prejudice as a matter of law as to LaCour
2

because

Plaintiffs

have

not

alleged

employer as defined by the FLSA.

that

LaCour

was

an

Plaintiffs respond that, in

paragraphs 7 and 8, they meant to indicate that LaCour was not
an employer under the FCRA or Title VII as there is no
individual liability under those laws.

Plaintiffs argue that

they did not intend to exclude LaCour from their FLSA claim.
II.

Standard of Review
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(c)

directs

that

"[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to
delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

Judgment for the moving party is

appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

Doe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 815 F. Supp. 1448, 1449

(S.D. Fla. 1992).
accepted as true.

Allegations in the complaint must be
Id.

"When a motion filed pursuant to

[Rule] 12(c) raises a [Rule] 12(b)(6) defense, the court
should apply the same standard used to evaluate a [Rule]
12(b)(6) motion." Bryan Ashley Int'l, Inc. v. Shelby Williams
Indus., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 290, 291 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all
the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
3

Jackson v. Bellsouth

Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).

Further,

this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences
from the allegations in the complaint.
Health

&

Human

Servs.,

901

F.2d

Stephens v. Dep’t of

1571,

1573

(11th

Cir.

1990)(“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the]
complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken as
true.”).
However, the Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level...
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted).

Further, courts are not “bound to accept

as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan

v.

Allain,

478

U.S.

265,

286

(1986).

In

all,

determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will “be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

III. Discussion
In

an

FLSA

case,

a

plaintiff
4

may

seek

to

sue an

individual employer or multiple employers.

Kendrick v. Eagle

Int'l Group, LLC, No. 08-80909-CIV, 2009 WL 3855227, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009).

"The FLSA contemplates that there

may be several simultaneous employers who are responsible for
compliance with the FLSA."
U.S. 190, 195 (1973)).

Id. (citing Falk v. Brennan, 414
Under the FLSA, an "employer" is

defined as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee."

29

U.S.C. § 203(d).
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that "LaCour was the
supervisor of the Plaintiffs" and "LaCour was the supervisor
for Victor Arean."

(Doc. # 57 at ¶¶ 6 & 19).

These are the

same allegations regarding LaCour's role as an employer that
were contained in the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. # 30).
LaCour filed an Answer in response to the Third Amended
Complaint

(Doc.

#

34)

and

did

not

move

to

dismiss

the

identical allegations as insufficient when they appeared in
the Third Amended Complaint.
Although paragraphs 7 and 8, appearing for the first time
in the Fourth Amended Complaint, are inartfully pled, it is
apparent, based on the previous complaints, that Plaintiffs
are asserting that LaCour was an employer for purposes of the
FLSA.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently
5

alleged that LaCour is an employer under the FLSA, and the
motion is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendant Jennifer LaCour's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #
59) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 5th
day of December, 2011.

Copies:
All Counsel of Record

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