CAE USA, Inc. v. XL Insurance Company Limited
Filing
30
ORDER denying 3 Motion to dismiss or stay; denying 13 Motion for determination of foreign law. Signed by Judge Susan C Bucklew on 5/17/2011. (JD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CAE USA, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:11-cv-64-T-24 TBM
XL INSURANCE COMPANY
LIMITED,
Defendant.
___________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint Based
on International Comity and Forum Non Conveniens, or Alternatively, Motion to Stay. (Doc.
No. 3). Plaintiff opposes this motion (Doc. No. 14), and Defendant has filed a reply thereto
(Doc. No. 19). Additionally, Defendant filed a Motion for Determination of Foreign Law.1
(Doc. No. 13). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. No. 15), to which Defendant has filed a reply
(Doc. No. 20). Thereafter, the Court ordered supplemental briefing (Doc. No. 24), and the
parties filed supplemental briefs (Doc. No. 27, 29).
I. Background
Plaintiff CAE USA, Inc. is a Florida corporation that obtained insurance from Defendant
XL Insurance Company Limited, a foreign insurance company incorporated in England. (Doc.
No. 2, ¶ 1; Doc. No. 5, ¶ 2). Defendant is authorized as an insurance company in Canada and
1
This motion raises arguments that relate to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint
Based on International Comity and Forum Non Conveniens, or Alternatively, Motion to Stay.
As such, the Court will consider the motions together and will not separately analyze
Defendant’s Motion for Determination of Foreign Law.
delivered the insurance policy at issue to Plaintiff’s parent corporation, CAE, Inc., in Canada.
(Doc. No. 6, ¶ 2, 4). According to Plaintiff, the insurance policy provides excess employer’s
liability coverage for bodily injuries to its employees. (Doc. No. 2, ¶ 7, 10).
While the policy was in force, one of Plaintiff’s employees, Aramis Diaz, was injured on
the job. (Doc. No. 2, ¶ 11). Diaz allegedly fell backward into an empty elevator shaft on the
second floor of a job site and was injured. (Doc. No. 2-4, ¶ 11). Thereafter, Diaz filed suit
against Plaintiff, alleging a claim of “virtually certain tort.” (Doc. No. 2-4). This type of claim
is an exception to the exclusiveness of liability offered by workers’ compensation law. As such,
an employer can be held liable if it “engaged in conduct that the employer knew, based on prior
similar accidents . . . , was virtually certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and the
employee was not aware of the risk because the danger was not apparent and the employer
deliberately concealed or misrepresented the danger so as to prevent the employee from
exercising informed judgment about whether to perform the work.” Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)(b)(2).
Plaintiff notified Defendant of Diaz’s claim. On July 29, 2010, Defendant responded by
completely denying coverage, because Canadian law provides that an insurer is never liable to
compensate for injury resulting from the insured’s intentional fault. (Doc. No. 2, ¶ 13; Doc. No.
2-5, Ex. D). Thereafter, on October 22, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Institute Proceedings
in Declaratory Judgment in Canada. (Doc. No. 6, ¶ 2). Defendant amended the motion and
served the amended motion on Plaintiff on November 30, 2010. (Doc. No. 6, ¶ 2). However,
prior to receiving the motion, on November 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, in which it
requests a declaratory judgment that the insurance policy provides coverage for Diaz’s claim and
asserts a breach of contract claim. (Doc. No. 2).
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II. Motion to Dismiss or Stay
In response to the complaint in the instant case, Defendant filed the instant motion to
dismiss based on international abstention and forum non conveniens, or alternatively, to stay this
case. Specifically, Defendant asks that this Court dismiss this case so that the parties’ dispute
can be litigated in Canada, or stay this case while Defendant’s previously filed lawsuit against
Plaintiff in Canada proceeds. As explained below, the motion is denied.
A. Choice of Law
At the outset, the Court notes that a choice of law issue exists in this case. The Court had
the parties submit supplemental briefing on the issue. Plaintiff contends that the interpretation of
the underlying insurance policy will require the application of Florida law, while Defendant
argues that Canadian law applies.
Since this case is in this Court based on diversity subject matter jurisdiction, this Court
must apply Florida’s choice of law rules governing the interpretation of insurance contracts to
determine whether Florida or Canada’s law applies in this case. See Shapiro v. Associated
International Insurance Co., 899 F.2d 1116, 1118 (11th Cir. 1990). Florida applies the rule of lex
loci contractus when determining choice of law in contract cases. Under that rule, Canadian law
applies (since the insurance policy was delivered in Canada), unless Plaintiff shows that the
public policy exception is implicated.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2006),
the Florida Supreme Court explained the public policy exception:
Florida courts have carved out a narrow exception to the lex loci rule. We long
ago held that the rules of comity may not be departed from, unless in certain cases
for the purpose of necessary protection of our own citizens, or of enforcing some
paramount rule of public policy. This has become known as the public policy
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exception. It requires both a Florida citizen in need of protection and a paramount
Florida public policy. In the context of insurance contracts, at least, one more
requirement also must be met: the insurer must be on reasonable notice that the
insured is a Florida citizen. . . . Accordingly, in applying the exception, courts
consider whether the insured notified the insurer . . . [that] the insured risk is or
will be primarily located in Florida.
Id. at 1165 (internal citations omitted).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a Florida citizen and that Defendant was aware of
that. The issue is whether the application of Canadian law will result in an inequitable insurance
contract that is contrary to some specific public policy of Florida. Plaintiff contends that the
application of Canadian law is contrary to Florida public policy because: (1) Canadian law
(Article 2464 of the Civil Code of Quebec) mandates that an insurer is never liable to
compensate for an injury resulting from an insured’s intentional fault;2 but (2) Florida does not
relieve an insurer of its coverage obligations simply because an injury results from the insured’s
intentional act. Plaintiff’s argument, however, is flawed.
Plaintiff argues that Florida law draws a distinction between injuries sustained by an
intentional act (which may be insurable when the resulting injury was not intended) and injuries
that are specifically intended (which are not insurable). However, Plaintiff has not shown that
the Canadian law’s automatic exclusion from coverage for injuries resulting from an insured’s
“intentional fault” is inconsistent with Florida’s law or Florida’s public policy. Plaintiff did not
provide this Court with any Canadian case law that interprets Article 2464 and shows whether
2
Defendant argues that Article 2464 of the Civil Code of Quebec mandates that an insurer
is never liable to compensate for an injury resulting from an insured’s intentional fault, and for
the purposes of determining choice of law only, Plaintiff and the Court assume that this
construction of Canadian law is correct.
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that law automatically excludes insurance coverage for both intentional injuries and intentional
acts. Furthermore, “Florida courts have long held that the public policy of [Florida] prohibits an
insured from being indemnified from a loss resulting from its own true intentional acts.” Griffin
Brothers Co. v. Mohammed, 918 So. 2d 425, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)(citations omitted).
Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has noted that insurers remain free to broaden
the scope of intentional injury exclusions within their policies. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
PCR Inc., 889 So. 2d 779, 796 n.18 (Fla. 2004). Such acknowledgment by the Florida Supreme
Court undermines Plaintiff’s argument that Florida’s public policy would protect against
excluding coverage for intentional fault.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the application of Canadian
law will result in an inequitable insurance contract that is contrary to some specific public policy
of Florida. As such, the Court finds that the public policy exception to the rule of lex loci
contractus is not implicated, and as a result, Canadian law will apply to the interpretation of the
insurance policy at issue in this case.3
B. International Abstention
Defendant argues that this case should be dismissed due to international abstention in
favor of the pending proceedings in Canada. Plaintiff points out that “[a]bstention is the
exception instead of the rule and ‘courts regularly permit parallel proceedings in an American
court and a foreign court.’ Abstention, therefore, is not to be undertaken lightly.” Ortega
3
The Court does not have access to a Canadian legal database, nor is this Court fluent in
French (as Canadian cases are often written in French). As such, in the future, the parties are
obligated to supply the Court with all of the relevant Canadian case law (translated to English)
that is necessary for the Court to decide the issues that arise in this case.
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Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Communications, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000)(quoting
Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518, 1521 (11th Cir. 1994)).
In Turner, the Eleventh Circuit explained the proper analysis when faced with the issue
of international abstention:
Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred upon them. Nevertheless, in some private international disputes the
prudent and just action for a federal court is to abstain from the exercise of
jurisdiction. Therefore, federal courts have begun to fashion principles that guide
courts' actions in cases of concurrent jurisdiction in a federal court and the court
of a foreign nation.
*
*
*
[C]ourts have sought to fashion principles that will promote three readily
identifiable goals in the area of concurrent international jurisdiction: (1) a proper
level of respect for the acts of our fellow sovereign nations–a rather vague
concept referred to in American jurisprudence as international comity; (2) fairness
to litigants; and (3) efficient use of scarce judicial resources.
Turner, 25 F.3d at 1518 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court will analyze each of
these factors as they relate to this case.
1. International Comity
The first factor the Court considers when determining whether to decline to exercise
jurisdiction on international abstention grounds is international comity. The Turner court stated
the following regarding international comity:
In the context of international abstention case law, the meaning of international
comity is derived from the . . . Supreme Court case [Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895),] on the recognition of judgments rendered in a foreign nation.
General comity concerns include: (1) whether the judgment was rendered via
fraud; (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing
proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3) whether the foreign
judgment is prejudicial, in the sense of violating American public policy because
it is repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just.
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Turner, 25 F.3d at1519 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged that there has been
any fraud in connection with the Canadian proceedings, nor has it argued that the Canadian court
is not a competent court utilizing proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence. Likewise,
Plaintiff does not contend that a judgment from the Canadian court would violate American
public policy.
However, Plaintiff argues that international comity is not a basis for abstention in this
case, because there has not yet been a judgment issued in the Canadian case for this Court to
respect and defer to. The Turner court noted, without explicitly taking a position, that some
courts consider the principles of international abstention in light of “a general rule that federal
courts should assume jurisdiction in parallel proceedings until a judgment is reached in one
court.”4 Id. at 1518 n.9 (citations omitted). Given the early stage of the Canadian proceedings
and the fact that no judgment has been issued in that case, this Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s
argument that the need for international abstention is less apparent. See In re CP Ships Ltd.,
Securities Litigation, 2008 WL 4663363, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2008)(declining to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction on international comity grounds due, in part, to the fact that the
parallel Canadian proceedings had not yet rendered a judgment on the merits).
Furthermore, this Court should also consider the relative strengths of U.S. and Canadian
interests. See Turner, 25 F.3d at 1521. The Court concludes that Canada’s ties to this dispute
4
The Turner court did not have to specifically address whether a federal court should
assume jurisdiction in parallel proceedings if a judgment has not been reached in the foreign
proceedings, because the foreign proceedings in the Turner case had already resulted in a
decision on the merits. See Turner, 25 F.3d at 1518.
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are not more significant than the United States’ ties. While the Court acknowledges that
Defendant is authorized to do business in Canada and issued the policy in Canada, the Court
recognizes that this dispute involves a United States plaintiff and an insured risk located in the
United States. Furthermore, the Court notes that Defendant argues that Canada is the better
forum for the parties’ dispute because Canadian law will be applied in this case, but this Court
assures the parties that it is capable of applying Canadian law to this case. Therefore, based on
the above, this Court finds that the international comity factor does not really weigh in favor of
abstention.
2. Fairness to the Litigants
The second factor the Court considers when determining whether to decline to exercise
jurisdiction on international abstention grounds is fairness to the litigants. “With respect to the
goal of fairness, relevant considerations include: (1) the order in which the suits were filed; (2)
the more convenient forum; and (3) the possibility of prejudice to parties resulting from
abstention.” Id. at 1521-22 (internal citations omitted).
With regards to the order in which the lawsuits were filed, the Canadian case was filed
first. However, it was only filed seventeen days before the instant case. Whether this Court
should abstain cannot be based solely on the fact that the Canadian case was filed such a short
time earlier. See id. at 1522 (citations omitted); Hayes Lemmerz International-Georgia, Inc. v.
Punch Property International NV, 2010 WL 375155, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2010)(citation
omitted). As such, this consideration weighs only slightly in favor of abstention.
With regards to the more convenient forum, the Court finds that this forum is more
convenient for Plaintiff, since Plaintiff is a Florida corporation. The Canadian forum is less
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convenient overall than this Court, as Defendant is not located in Canada–it is only authorized to
do business there. Therefore, this consideration does not weigh in favor of abstention.
The Court must also consider the possibility of prejudice to the parties that may result
from abstention, and the Court should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction if abstention
would limit “the ability of the parties to fully and fairly litigate their claims.” Turner, 25 F.3d at
1522 (citation omitted). While Plaintiff has not shown that it would be prejudiced by litigating
this dispute in Canada, such a consideration does not overcome the fact that this Court is a more
convenient forum overall. Accordingly, the Court finds that the fairness to the litigants factor
does not weigh in favor of abstention.
3. Efficient Use of Scarce Judicial Resources
The third factor the Court considers when determining whether to decline to exercise
jurisdiction on international abstention grounds is the efficient use of scarce judicial resources.
“Criteria relevant to efficiency include (1) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (2) the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (3) whether the actions have parties and issues in
common; and (4) whether the alternative forum is likely to render a prompt disposition.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). As explained below, the efficiency factor does not weigh for or
against abstention.
The federal forum is equally inconvenient for Defendant as the Canadian forum is
inconvenient for Plaintiff. Furthermore, the instant lawsuit is not a part of a larger dispute
between the parties, and as such, allowing this case to proceed will not result in piecemeal
litigation. Finally, this Court is not aware of how quickly the Canadian court will render a
prompt decision. Therefore, these considerations do not weigh for or against abstention.
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4. Conclusion Regarding International Abstention
This Court is mindful that “[a]bstention is the exception instead of the rule.” Ortega
Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1265. After considering the factors of international comity, fairness to the
litigants, and efficient use of scarce judicial resources, the Court finds that international
abstention is not warranted, because: (1) the Canadian proceeding was filed only days before the
instant case; (2) a judgment has not yet been rendered in the Canadian proceeding; (3) the United
States has stronger ties to this case than Canada, since Plaintiff is a United States citizen and
Defendant is not a citizen of Canada; and (4) this Court is the more convenient forum.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this case on international abstention grounds is
denied.
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Next, Defendant argues that this case should be dismissed due to forum non conveniens.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the framework to be used when analyzing such a motion:
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court has inherent power to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case when an adequate, alternative forum is
available. The court must weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial in
each forum, considering factors of private and public interest. The analytic
method the district court should employ has been well-summarized as follows:
As a prerequisite, the court must establish whether an adequate alternative forum
exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case. Next, the trial judge
must consider all relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the balance a
strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs' initial forum choice. If the trial
judge finds this balance of private interests to be in equipoise or near equipoise,
he must then determine whether or not factors of public interest tip the balance in
favor of a trial in a foreign forum. If he decides that the balance favors such a
foreign forum, the trial judge must finally ensure that plaintiffs can reinstate their
suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.
*
*
*
Since the touchstone of forum non conveniens analysis is convenience,
controlling weight cannot be given to any one factor in the balancing process or
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the doctrine would lose much of the flexibility that is its essence. The Supreme
Court has indicated that, in considering the private interests of the litigants, some
important considerations are: relative ease of access to sources of proof; ability to
obtain witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if relevant; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
The Court also listed certain public interest factors bearing upon the forum's
interest in entertaining the lawsuit: court congestion and jury duty generated by
controversies having no relation to the forum; the desirability of having localized
controversies decided at home; and the difficulties attendant resolving conflict-oflaws problems and applying foreign law. It is evident that these lists were not
intended to be exhaustive, but merely to suggest the range of relevant considerations.
C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1983)(internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court will analyze each of the factors set forth
above.
1. Availability of an Adequate Alternative Forum
The first factor that this Court must consider is whether Defendant has shown that
Canada is an available and adequate alternative forum. See Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d
1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). “An alternative forum is ‘available’ to the plaintiff when the foreign
court can assert jurisdiction over the litigation sought to be transferred.” Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, as long as the defendant is subject to process in the alternative forum, the forum is
considered available, because “the forum non conveniens test generally assumes that the plaintiff
who brought suit in the challenged venue will be the plaintiff in the proposed alternative forum.”
Rolls-Royce Commercial Marine, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 2010 WL 5067608, at * 3
(S.D. Fla. Dec.7, 2010)(citation omitted). Since Defendant already has a pending case against
Plaintiff in Canada, Plaintiff can simply file counterclaims in that case, and as such, it appears
11
that Canada can assert jurisdiction over Defendant.5 See id.
Next, the Court must consider the adequacy of the Canadian forum. An alternative forum
is not adequate if “‘the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.’” Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981)). However, perfection is not required. See id. (citation
omitted). Plaintiff has not argued that the Canadian forum is inadequate, and Defendant has
submitted cases from the Canadian courts showing that such courts handle requests for
declaratory relief in insurance coverage disputes. Accordingly, this Court finds that the
Canadian forum is an available and adequate alternative forum.
2. Private Interest Factors
Next, this Court must consider the private interest factors. In doing so, “the plaintiffs’
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed ‘unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant.’” SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097,
1101 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). The
Eleventh Circuit has stated that before dismissing a case that has a U.S. plaintiff based on forum
non conveniens, a court should “require positive evidence of unusually extreme circumstances,
5
Plaintiff argues that Canada is not an available forum because Canada does not have
jurisdiction over the case filed by Defendant. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to
Section 3150 of the Quebec Civil Code, which states that the Canadian court “has jurisdiction to
hear an action based on a contract of insurance where the holder [or] the insured . . . of the
contract is domiciled or a resident in Quebec.” Defendant contends that since Plaintiff’s parent
company is the policyholder (Plaintiff is a named additional insured) and a resident of Quebec,
the Canadian court had jurisdiction over the case. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any
case law showing Defendant’s interpretation of § 3150 to be incorrect. Therefore, for the
purpose of this motion, the Court will assume that the Canadian court has jurisdiction over
Defendant’s case (and as such, Plaintiff could file a counterclaim in that case).
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and should be thoroughly convinced that material injustice is manifest before . . . deny[ing] a
United States citizen access to the courts of this country.” Id. at 1101-02 (quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Wilson v. Island Seas Investments, Ltd., 590 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2009). Since Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, this factor already weighs strongly in Plaintiff’s
favor and against dismissal.
Additionally, the Court must consider the other private interest factors, such as “the
relative ease of access to sources of proof, access to unwilling and willing witnesses, ability to
compel testimony, the possibility of view of premises, and the enforceability of a judgment.”
Wilson, 590 F.3d at 1270 (citations omitted). The Court notes that these factors are not
exhaustive and that the Court should be flexible in applying them. See id. (citation omitted).
Defendant does not argue that litigating in Florida will be problematic regarding
obtaining access to evidence or witnesses. (Doc. No. 3, p. 7). The only private interest factor
that Defendant focuses on is the cost of translating Canadian cases to English for this Court.
However, the inconvenience of translating cases for the Court is minor compared to the
inconvenience of forcing a United States plaintiff to prosecute its claims in another country.6
Accordingly, the Court finds that the private interest factor weighs strongly in Plaintiff’s favor
and against dismissal.
3. Public Interest Factors
Since the Court has found that the private interest factor weighs heavily in Plaintiff’s
6
Defendant argues that it would not be inconvenient for Plaintiff to litigate in Canada,
because Plaintiff’s parent company is located in Canada. However, Defendant does not cite any
case law to support the proposition that the Court can look at a related entity’s residence when
determining the convenience of the litigating parties.
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favor, the Court is not required to analyze the public interest factor. However, the Court will
consider the public interest factor, and in doing so, the Court considers: “court congestion and
jury duty generated by controversies having no relation to the forum; the desirability of having
localized controversies decided at home; and the difficulties attendant resolving conflict-of-laws
problems and applying foreign law.” La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1307 (citation omitted). The
Court notes that these factors are not exhaustive. See id. (citation omitted).
Defendant correctly argues that one of the factors for the Court to consider is the choice
of forum’s law to be applied to the merits of the case. This Court has concluded that Canadian
law will be applied when determining the merits of this case. “[W]hile the application of foreign
law is an important factor to be considered in weighing the public interests, this factor cannot be
accorded dispositive weight.” SME Racks, 382 F.3d at 1104-05.
Also relevant to the analysis of the public interest factor is the sovereigns’ interests in
deciding the dispute. See id. at 1104 (citation omitted). The United States has a strong interest
in ensuring that Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, is able to pursue its claims in the United States. See id.
(citation omitted). Presumably, Canada has an interest in how Canadian contracts and Canadian
laws are interpreted. However, Canada’s interests do not outweigh the United States’ interest.
Defendant also argues that dismissal of this case would relieve this Court’s docket
congestion. The Court acknowledges that this case may ultimately end up wasting judicial
resources if the Canadian court renders a judgment first, which this Court will have to respect on
international comity grounds. However, since this case and the Canadian case were filed very
close in time, and this Court does not know how quickly the Canadian case will proceed, it is not
certain that litigating this case will result in a waste of judicial resources.
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4. Weighing All of the Factors
After considering the private and public interest factors, the Court finds that, overall, the
factors weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. The Court reaches this conclusion because: (1) Plaintiff is a
United States citizen; and (2) there is an absence of evidence of unusually extreme
circumstances, such that the Court is not thoroughly convinced that material injustice is
manifest. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for dismissal due to forum non conveniens is
denied.
D. Stay of Proceedings
Next, Defendant argues that this case should be stayed pending the resolution of the
Canadian proceedings. However, the Court finds that staying the proceedings is not warranted.
As such, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to stay this case.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
(1)
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint Based on International Comity and
Forum Non Conveniens, or Alternatively, Motion to Stay (Doc. No. 3) is
DENIED.
(2)
Defendant’s Motion for Determination of Foreign Law (Doc. No. 13) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 17th day of May, 2011.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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