Joule v. General Insurance Company of America et al

Filing 52

ORDER denying 47 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 10/28/2011. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
BRITTNEY JOULE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:11-cv-216-T-33EAJ

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA and AMERICAN STATES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Dismiss Justin C. Johnson & Associates, P.A.’s
Quantum Meruit and Charging Liens for Lack of Jurisdiction
(Doc. # 47), which was filed on October 19, 2011.

Justin C.

Johnson & Associates, P.A. (hereafter, “the P.A.”) filed a
Response in Opposition to the Motion on October 25, 2011.
(Doc. # 50).

For the reasons that follow, the Court denies

the Motion.
I.

Background
Joule, the victim of sexual molestation at a dance

studio, received a $950,000.00 state court settlement and
then, through an assignment, received the dance studio’s bad
faith

insurance

cause

insurance companies.

of

action

against

the

Defendant

(Doc. # 25 at ¶¶ 8, 19, 26).

Joule

initiated a bad faith insurance case against the Defendant

insurance companies in state court on November 1, 2010, and
Defendant insurance companies removed the action to this Court
on January 18, 2011. (Doc. ## 1, 2).1

On July 7, 2011, Justin

C. Johnson filed a Notice of Quantum Meruit Lien (Doc. # 15)
and a Notice of Formal Charging Lien (Doc. # 16). Joule filed
an amended complaint on August 31, 2011, (Doc. # 25), and the
case settled on September 14, 2011. (Doc. # 29).
On September 20, 2011, the P.A. filed a Motion to Prevent
Disbursement of Settlement Proceeds. (Doc. # 30).

Therein,

the P.A. contended: “Joule retained undersigned counsel . . .
on November 11, 2005 to prosecute her personal injury claims.
[The P.A.] expended costs preparing [Plaintiff’s] case for
trial in state court.

On August 20, 2010, former employees

and current counsel for [Plaintiff] improperly solicited
[Plaintiff] to switch representation to their law firm.” (Doc.
# 30 at 1-2). Joule selected Emerson Straw as her counsel and
discharged the P.A. on or about August 23, 2010. Id.
The P.A. essentially contends that it is entitled to a

1

At the time of removal, the Court had diversity
jurisdiction because Joule and the Defendant insurance
companies are citizens of different states, and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
Diversity jurisdiction no
longer exists because the Defendant insurance companies have
been dismissed from this case. The P.A., Emerson Straw, and
Plaintiff are all citizens of Florida.
2

portion of the settlement proceeds and seeks an Order from
this Court determining whether the P.A. has perfected its
charging lien, and if so, the amount of said lien.

Emerson

Straw disputes the P.A.’s entitlement to any portion of the
settlement proceeds.
This Court has entered several Orders thus far concerning
the current fee dispute.

The Court authorized Defendant

insurance companies to disburse settlement proceeds to Emerson
Straw (Doc. # 40); the Court has directed the attorneys in
this fee dispute to meet and confer regarding the settlement
proceeds and discovery matters (Doc. # 41); and the Court has
directed payment of certain settlement proceeds to Plaintiff
Joule, among other matters. (Doc. # 44).

At this juncture,

Emerson Straw seeks an Order dismissing the present fee
dispute for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II.

Analysis
Emerson Straw argues that “[t]his Court does not have

jurisdiction over the P.A.’s liens because the P.A.’s services
were exclusively provided in the state Court before accrual of
the instant Federal Court case.” (Doc. # 47 at 2).

The P.A.

correctly counters that the Court’s jurisdiction is predicated
upon supplemental jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367:
“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have
3

original

jurisdiction,

the

district

courts

shall

have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related

to

claims

in

the

action

jurisdiction

that

they

form

controversy.”

See

also

Montpellier

part

within

such

original

of

same

case

the

Farm,

Ltd.

v.

or

Crane

Environmental, Inc., No. 07-22815-CIV, 2009 WL 722238, at * 23 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2009)(“one well recognized application
of this narrow doctrine [of supplemental jurisdiction] is the
resolution of disputes between a party to a federal lawsuit
and that party’s attorneys over the proper amount of fees due
the attorneys for work performed in the lawsuit.”) (citing
Zaklama v. Mt. Sinani Med. Ctr., 906 F.2d 650 (11th Cir.
1990)).
As in Montpellier, the fact that the P.A. did not
formally represent Plaintiff Joule in the present bad faith
case does not preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction
because the P.A. is seeking to impose a charging lien for
services

rendered

in

this

case

(as

opposed

to

rendered in the prior state court proceedings).
722238, at *4.

services
2009 WL

Finally, as one Florida appellate court has

observed, “for a lien to be enforceable, an attorney must
prove his or her services resulted in ‘tangible fruits.’
Whether the attorney’s services produced ‘tangible fruits’ is
4

an issue of proof, but is not an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction.”

Richman

Greer

Weil

Brumbaugh

Mirabito

&

Christensen, P.A. v. Chernak, 991 So.2d 875, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008).

So, too, in this case, the Court has jurisdiction to

make a determination as to whether the P.A. can prove that its
services produced “tangible fruits” for Plaintiff Joule.2
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Plaintiff’s

Motion

to

Dismiss

Justin

C.

Johnson

&

Associates, P.A.’s Quantum Meruit and Charging Liens for Lack
of Jurisdiction (Doc. # 47) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
28th day of October, 2011.

Copies: All Counsel of Record
2

In this regard, the Court finds particularly relevant
the P.A.’s assertion that “the bad faith action and the
underlying actions are inextricably intertwined. . . .
[A]ccording to Plaintiff’s primary counsel of record in the
instant bad faith case [Robert J. Mayes, Esq.], all of the
documents relied upon to prove that Defendants breached their
contractual duty to defend Carty [dance studio] were created
by the P.A. during its representation of Plaintiff.” (Doc. #
50 at 7-8). Mayes’s affidavit is consistent with the P.A.’s
argument. (Doc. # 48-1).
5