Degraw v. Coats et al
Filing
11
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 5 Motion to dismiss. Please see order for details. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 6/6/2011. (SN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MICHAEL DEGRAW, individually and as )
Personal Representative of the Estate of
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JENNIFER DEGRAW. deceased.
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Plaintiff,
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JIM COATS in his official capacity as
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Sheriff of PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA)
BRIAN J. DIEBOLD, individually, and
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NICHOLAS J. BAEZ, individually,
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Defendants.
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CASE NO.: 8:11 -cv-720-EAK-MAP
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, (Doc. 5), and
Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, (Doc. 6). Defendants in this
matter are Jim Coats, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida; Brian J.
Diebold. individually: and Nicholas J. Baez, individually. Plaintiff is Michael DeGraw,
individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Jennifer DeGraw, deceased. For the
reasons set forth below. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter involves claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Mrs.
DeGraw's 8th and 14th Amendment rights, Florida Statute § 768.28, and the Florida Wrongful
Death Act, F.S. § 768.16. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging five counts in total, the first against
Mr. Diebold for false arrest and imprisonment, the second against Mr. Baez for false arrest and
imprisonment, the third against Sheriff Coats for false arrest and imprisonment, the fourth against
Sheriff Coats for wrongful death, and the fifth against Sheriff Coats for cruel and unusual
punishment by way of failure to provide adequate and necessary medical care. Essentially,
Plaintiffalleges that Deputies Diebold and Baez unlawfully arrested and detained Ms. DeGraw,
who was known to have severe mental and medical issues, and while in custody she died as a
result of inadequate supervision and medical care. (Doc. 6.)
On March 16, 2009. Deputies Diebold and Baez were dispatched by Pinellas CountySheriffs Office pursuant to a call for assistance from Mr. DeGraw. (Compl. 118.) He reported
that his wife was bi-polar, had discontinued taking her medication, and had become a danger to
herself and others. (Id 1119.) The deputies agreed with Mr. DeGraw and proceeded to attempt to
detain Mrs. DeGraw and transport her to a mental health facility, pursuant to Florida's Baker Act.
(Id. 120.) Mrs. DeGraw resisted being detained, prompting the deputies to physically restrain her
and deploy their Taser. (Id. 121.) They then placed her under arrest for battery on a lawenforcement officer and transported her to jail rather than to a mental health facility in accordance
with the Baker Act. (Id)
While at the jail, Mrs. DeGraw continued to refuse to take her medication or cooperate
with the medical staff. (Id. 1123, 25.) Plaintiff alleges that the nursing staff falsified records
showing they attempted to administer Mrs. DeGraw's medication when in fact they never
attempted to administer the medication. (Id. 127.) On March 24, 2009, at 6:30 a.m., Mrs.
DeGraw was found by Deputy Patricia Shoberg, on the floor, and unresponsive, at which time
Mrs. DeGraw was transported to Northside Hospital where she was declared dead. (Id. H28-29.)
Deputy Shoberg was charged with checking on Mrs. DeGraw every fifteen minutes between 7:00
p.m. and 7:00 a.m. but Plaintiff alleges that jail videos show that she did not perform the required
checks and falsified the "watch form." (Id. 130.) Plaintiffalleges that at all times the
nursing/medical staff and deputies knew of Mrs. DeGraw's serious mental health and medical
issues. (Id. 1122, 24. 26.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Any defendant to a complaint may move to dismiss such a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
for "failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiffs complaint must include"enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of circumstances that would entitle him to relief. Am.
Ass'n ofPeople with Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2002). A trial
court is required to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Illinois ex. Rel.
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 618, (2003). At this stage of litigation,
a court must accept the plaintiffs allegations as true and dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that
no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the
allegations. Id. In addition, when considering Plaintiffs state law claims, this Court must apply
Florida substantive law and federal procedure. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
DISCUSSION
I.
Counts I-III: False Arrest & False Imprisonment
In Counts I-III, Plaintiff alleges that Deputies Diebold and Baez, as well as Sheriff Coats
acting in his official capacity, are liable for the false arrest and imprisonment of Mrs. DeGraw.
Plaintiff alleges that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Mrs. DeGraw when they
were called to her residence on March 16, 2009. (Compl. 135.) (PL's Resp. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss
at 2.) Defendant responds that Plaintiffs own complaint demonstrates the existence of probable
cause to arrest Mrs. DeGraw. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 3.)
Defendant correctly notes that where probable cause exists, no claim for false arrest or
imprisonment can be sustained under either federal or state law. Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d
1503, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1990); Bolanos v. Metro. Dade County, 677 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 3rd DCA
1996); see also Kingsland v. City ofMiami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) ("The existence
of probable cause at the time of arrest. . . constitutes an absolute bar to a § 1983 action for false
arrest."). The standard for determining probable cause is the same under Florida law and the law
of the Eleventh Circuit. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425. 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing United
States v. McDonald, 606 F.2d 552. 553 n.l (5th Cir. 1979)). Furthermore, the "validity of an
arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest." Lee v.
Farraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bailey v. Bd ofCounty Comm 'rs of
Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112. 1119 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992)). Thus, the fact that officers arrested
Mrs. DeGraw for battery on a law enforcement officer, while Defendants' motion discusses
resisting a law enforcement officer without violence, is immaterial.
The only real issue to be determined is whether there is probable cause, because if it
existed there can be no claim for false arrest or imprisonment. "Probable cause to arrest exists
when law enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to
warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime." Daniels
v. City ofHartford, Ala., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1052 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (citing Case v. Eslinger,
555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009)). Section 843.02, F.S.A., states: "whoever shall resist. ..
any officer ... in the lawful execution of any duty . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Based
on the plain meaning of Plaintiff s complaint, Mrs. DeGraw did indeed resist Deputies Diebold
and Baez when they attempted to detain her, at Mr. DeGraw's behest, pursuant to the Baker Act.
(Compl. 15.) Thus, probablecause existed for the deputies to arrest Mrs. DeGraw, creating an
absolute bar to claims for false arrest and imprisonment under either § 1983 or F.S. § 768.28. As
a result, it appears beyond a doubt that no set of facts would entitle Plaintiff to relief.
Plaintiff offers no more than conclusory allegations that Deputies Diebold and Baez were
without probable cause in arresting Mrs. DeGraw. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED with respect to Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiff s Complaint, those claims being
false arrest and imprisonment against Deputy Diebold, Deputy Baez, and Sheriff Coats
respectively.
II.
Count IV: Wrongful Death
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Coats, in his official capacity, is liable for the
wrongful death of Mrs. DeGraw. Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriffs Office knew of Mrs.
DeGraw's serious medical and mental health issues but failed to provide adequate care. (Compl.
123-31.) Specifically. Plaintiff alleges that the nursing staff at the jail did not make adequate
attempts to provide needed medication, (id. 11 25-27), and that jail staff did not adequately
supervise Mrs. DeGraw while she was in administrative isolation, (id. H 30-31.) Furthermore,
Plaintiff alleges that the decision to incarcerate, rather than hospitalize, Mrs. DeGraw was
negligent and a cause of her death. (Complaint 131.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs allegations of improper treatment by jail medical staff
should be considered under the standard of a medical malpractice action, as opposed to a simple
negligence action. (Dels.' Mot. Dismiss at 5.) As a result, F.S.A. § 766.104(1) requires a
certificate by counsel slating that a reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief that
grounds exist for such an action against each defendant. (Id. at 6.) Defendantargues that
Plaintiffhas not included such a certificate, nor has Plaintiffcomplied with the other pre-suit
requirements of Chapter 766, thus requiring the claim be dismissed. (Id. at 7.) Defendant also
argues that sovereign immunity precludes negligence liability resulting from the exercise of
discretionary police power, thus there is no liability for deciding to incarcerate instead of
hospitalize Mrs. DeGraw. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff responds by correctly noting that a plaintiff is permitted to plead alternative
theories based on the same set of operative facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2); see also United
Roaster. Inc. v. Colgate Palmolive Co.. 649 F.2d 985. 990 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff goes on to
point out that several of the alleged negligent acts were not medical in nature, for instance the
failure to properly supervise Mrs. DeGraw. thus a claim for simple negligence can be stated on
the facts plead. (PL's Resp. at 6.) Plaintiff also notes that most of the allegations that make up
the wrongful death claim do not involve discretionaiy actions by the Sheriffs Office, for instance
the failure to supervise Mrs. DeGraw or administer her medication. (Id. at 4-5.) As a result,
sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs claim for wrongful death. Accordingly, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiffs Complaint, alleging wrongful death against Sheriff
Coats in his official capacity, is DENIED.
III.
Count V: Failure to Provide Adequate, Necessary Medical Care/Cruel & Unusual
Punishment in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriffs Office violated Mrs. DeGraw's Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide vital
medical care to Mrs. DeGraw and other inmates. (Compl. 1160-69.) Plaintiff further alleges that
Sheriff Coats was motivated by budgetary considerations, (id. 169), and was aware of "numerous
prior problems with the provision of medical care to inmates" at the jail, (id. 163). Accordingly,
Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference, on the part of the Sheriffs Office, to the medical needs of
Mrs. DeGraw. (Id. 165.)
Plaintiff advances several theories regarding Defendant's violation of § 1983, which
Defendant contests in turn, including municipal policy which violates the Eighth Amendment,
failure to supervise and train jail staff, and deliberate indifference on the part of Sheriff Coats.
(Defs.' Mot. at 8-9.) Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has not identified a municipal policy
that caused the injury. (Id. at 7.) Defendant next argues, with regard to failure to train jail staff,
that Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff Coats personally participated in the violation of Mrs.
DeGraw's rights or that there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to train and Mrs.
Degraw's death. (Id. at 8.) Finally, with regard to the allegations of deliberate indifference.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has alleged only an isolated occurrence, which is insufficient to
sustain a claim. (Id.)
Plaintiff responds that the institutional lack of care received by Mrs. DeGraw over the
course of eight days sufficiently establishes deliberate indifference to her rights. (PL's Resp. at
7.) Plaintiff goes on to reassert the substance of the Complaint: deliberate indifference to Mrs.
DeGraw's rights as a result of a policy or custom of the Sheriffs Office. (Id.)
Deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is a cognizable claim under § 1983
for cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). However, simple
negligence or malpractice on the part of the medical staff is not sufficient to state a claim under
§ 1983, the conduct must demonstrate deliberate indifference to the victim's medical needs.
Grace v. Wainwright, 761 F. Supp. 1520. 1526 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
Deliberate indifference requires (I) subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, (2)
disregard of that risk, and (3) conduct that is more than negligence. McElligotl v. Foley, 189 F.3d
1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, a showing of gross negligence does not satisfy the
requirement of "conduct that is more than negligence." Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d
1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiffs Complaint does assert several factual allegations which lend to support Count
V, including that Sheriff Coats was personally aware of prior problems with providing medical
care to inmates but has ignored these problems. (Compl. 163), that Sheriff Coats has allowed the
rationing of medical care, (id 164), and that Sheriff Coats has failed to appropriately supervise
the medical staff at the jail, (id). Plaintiff further alleges that jail staff knew of Mrs. DeGraw's
serious medical issues but disregarded them. (See id. 1124, 63-65.) This satisfies the first and
second requirements of deliberate indifference.
Although Plaintiff primarily alleges negligence on the part of jail medical staff in failing
to provide care for Mrs. DeGraw. several factual allegations exist in Plaintiffs Complaint which
support a finding of more than gross negligence. Specifically, allegations that jail staff did not
make adequate attempts to administer Mrs. DeGraw's medication, then falsified records to reflect
adequate attempts, supports a finding of more than gross negligence. (Id. 1125-27.) Thus, the
third requirement to show deliberate indifference is satisfied. As a result. Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs Complaint, with respect to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of § 1983, is DENIED. Accordingly, it is:
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED with respect to
Counts I, II, and III, and DENIED with respect to Counts IV and V. The Defendants Diebold and
Baez are dismissed from this action. The remaining Defendant shall file a response to the
complaint within ten days of this date.
,
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida this £p day of June, 2011.
Copies to: All parties and counsel of record.
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