Degraw v. Coats et al

Filing 202

ENDORSED ORDER denying 170 Defendant's Oral Motion for Directed Verdict; denying 178 Defendant's Renewed Oral Motion for Directed Verdict; denying as moot 180 Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict; denying 191 Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 5/20/2014. (rjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MICHAEL DEGRAW, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of JENNIFER
DEGRAW, Deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CASE NO.: 8:11-CV-720-T-17 MAP

BOB GUALTIERI, in his official capacity as
SHERIFF OF PINELLAS COUNTY,
FLORIDA,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER ON DEFENDAT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
This cause is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,
(the “Motion”) (Doc. # 191), filed February 27, 2014, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition, (Doc. #
194), filed March 17, 2014, and Defendant’s Reply, (Doc. # 201), filed March 31, 2014. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This matter involves claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Mrs.
DeGraw's 8th and 14th Amendment rights. (Doc. # 2). On March 16, 2009, Pinellas County
Sheriff Deputies Diebold and Baez were dispatched pursuant to a call for assistance with Mr.
Michael DeGraw. Id. Mr. DeGraw reported that his wife was bi-polar, had discontinued taking
her medication, and had become a danger to herself and others. Id. at ¶19. The deputies attempted
to detain Mrs. DeGraw and transport her to a mental health facility pursuant to Florida’s Baker
Act. Id. at ¶20. Mrs. DeGraw resisted being detained, which prompted the deputies to physically
restrain her and deploy a Taser. Id. at ¶21. Based on her resistance, the deputies placed Mrs.

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DeGraw under arrest for felonious battery on a law enforcement officer and transported her to
jail—rather than to a mental health facility in accordance with Florida’s Baker Act. Id.
While at the jail, Mrs. DeGraw continued to refuse to take her medication or cooperate
with the medical staff for the next eight days. Id. at ¶23, 25. Plaintiff alleged that the nursing staff
falsified records showing they attempted to administer Mrs. DeGraw's medication when in fact
they never attempted to administer the medication. Id. at ¶27. On March 24, 2009, at 6:30 a.m.,
Deputy Patricia Shoberg found Mrs. DeGraw on the floor and unresponsive, at which time Mrs.
DeGraw was transported to Northside Hospital where she was later declared deceased. Id. ¶28–
29. Deputy Shoberg was charged with checking on Mrs. DeGraw every fifteen minutes between
7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.; however, at trial, Plaintiff presented jail videos that demonstrated Deputy
Shoberg did not perform the required checks and falsified the “watch form.” Id. at ¶30. Plaintiff
alleged that at all times the nursing and medical staff, as well as the deputies, knew of Mrs.
DeGraw's serious mental health and medical issues. Id. ¶22, 24, and 26.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On March 18, 2011, Plaintiff Michael DeGraw, as personal representative of the estate of
Jennifer DeGraw, filed a complaint in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and for Pinellas County,
Florida, alleging five counts: Count I against Deputy Diebold for false arrest and imprisonment;
Count II against Deputy Baez for false arrest and imprisonment; Count III against then Sheriff Jim
Coats for false arrest and imprisonment; Count IV against then Sheriff Jim Coats for wrongful
death; and Count V against then Sheriff Jim Coats for cruel and unusual punishment by way of
failure to provide adequate and necessary medical care. Id. On April 5, 2011, the Defendants filed
a Notice of Removal to the Middle District of Florida based on federal question jurisdiction. (Doc.
# 1). Id. On June 6, 2011, the Court granted in part the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and

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dismissed Counts I–III, which terminated the cases against Deputies Diebold and Baez, and left
Counts IV and V against then Sheriff Jim Coats. (Doc. # 11). Current Sherriff Bob Gualtieri was
automatically substituted for then Sheriff Jim Coats, and sued in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Pinellas County.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

Defendant filed his Answer with accompanying

affirmative defenses on June 16, 2011. (Doc. # 12).
On August 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Doc. # 16).
The Court initially denied that motion, but eventually granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint to allege hedonic damages. (Doc. # 39). Plaintiff amended his complaint; Count I
alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations, and Count II alleged violations of the Florida Wrongful Death
Act. (Doc. # 41). Defendant moved for summary judgment on the issue of hedonic damages and
Mrs. DeGraw’s pain and suffering, as alleged in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 49). After
consideration of both the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Reply,
the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and dismissed any claims
for hedonic damages and Mrs. DeGraw’s pain and suffering. (Doc. # 62). The parties then
consented to remand Count II to state court, which solely left the alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983
violations for trial by jury in this Court. (Doc. # 100).
The jury trial began February 3, 2014, (Doc. # 154), and spanned nine days. (Doc. # 182).
During the course of the trial, Plaintiff’s attorneys highlighted a number of deficiencies in
Defendant’s office’s handling of Mrs. DeGraw’s arrest and subsequent detention, including, but
certainly not limited to: skipped and forged wellness checks; the failure to distinguish the proper
nature of Mrs. DeGraw’s medications; and the failure to identify Mrs. DeGraw’s basis for lack of
cooperation and refusal to consume food or nutrients. On February 14, 2014, the jury found
Defendant liable for the violations, and awarded $975,000.00 in damages. (Doc. # 183).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1), after a party has been fully heard on
an issue during a jury trial, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if it finds
that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on
that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); Cleveland v. Home Shopping Networks, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189,
1192 (11th Cir. 2004). Undertaking this analysis, a court reviews all of the evidence in the record
and “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” in this case, the
Plaintiff. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 148–151 (2000)).
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable
to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive said motion, a plaintiff must present evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to
find in the plaintiff’s favor on each and every element of the claim. Bogle v. Orange County Bd.
Of County Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653, 659 (11th Cir. 1998).
ANALYSIS
The jury was presented with five factual inquiries, and was required to answer all five in
the affirmative before awarding compensatory damages:
First, whether Jennifer DeGraw had a serious medical need;
Second, whether Jim Coats, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County
and predecessor to Bob Gualtieri, knew that Jennifer DeGraw had a serious medical
need that posed a risk of serious harm;
Third, whether Jim Coats, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County and
predecessor to Bob Gualtieri, was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
need;

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Fourth, whether Jim Coats, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County and
predecessor to Bob Gualtieri, acted under color of law when he failed to provide
necessary medical care for Jennifer DeGraw’s serious medical need; and
Fifth, whether Jim Coats’ conduct, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas
County and predecessor to Bog Gualtieri, caused Jennifer DeGraw’s injuries.
(Doc. # 183). In the subject Motion, Defendant did not dispute whether Jennifer DeGraw had a
serious medical need, and therefore the Court declines to address that issue further. See Unitherm
Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400–404 (2006). Rather, Defendant
asserts Plaintiff failed to establish: 1) Officials showed deliberate indifference; 2) Any alleged
deliberate indifference was the byproduct of a policy or custom of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s
Office; and 3) That policy or custom was the moving force of the alleged constitution violation.
(Doc. # 191).
1. Plaintiff Established Legally Sufficient Evidence to Prove Officials Showed
Deliberate Indifference to Jennifer DeGraw’s Serious Medical Need
To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff is required to show that the officials
subjectively knew about and disregarded a risk of harm to the detainee. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 829 (1994); Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Bozeman
v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005)). The conduct amounting to disregard for a risk
of harm must surpass gross negligence. Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1330. The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that a need could be “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled on
other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). When that need for medical treatment
is obvious, “medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all may constitute
deliberate indifference.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Ancata v.

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Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has also found deliberate indifference where “medical treatment is so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive so as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to
fundamental fairness.” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1544 (citing Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058
(11th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, deliberate indifference may be found
when a doctor decides “to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment.” Adams, 61 F.3d
at 1544 (citing Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989).
The evidence adduced at trial concerning deliberate indifference, in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, presents a legally sufficient basis upon which a jury could find for the
Plaintiff. First and foremost, the entire basis for the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office’s contact
with Mrs. DeGraw was her husband’s concern that she stopped taking her medication and posed a
threat to herself and others. Furthermore, members of the jail’s psychiatric team, including Ms.
Jennifer Trivoli, testified Mrs. DeGraw was constantly observed on the floor, half dressed,
rambling incessantly, pacing nightly, and often unresponsive to commands or requests; Mrs.
DeGraw was “not reality based” when she spoke or interacted with staff; and the jail staff had
access to Plaintiff’s medical records. Based on her observations, findings, and conclusions, Ms.
Trivoli met with and reviewed her observations, findings, and conclusions with Dr. Richard Miller,
D.O., who ultimately concluded Mrs. DeGraw had a serious medical need that required some form
of treatment for her psychosis or bi-polar disorder; however, although Mrs. DeGraw was not taking
her medicine or consuming food or nutrients, jail policy allowed Dr. Miller to wait up to fourteen
days to review and treat a patient, and Dr. Miller relied on that policy to not seek any change in
Mrs. DeGraw’s treatment. These actions and decisions—or lack thereof—in addition to the
evidence enumerated in Plaintiff’s Response, (Doc. # 194, pp. 5–14), overwhelmingly demonstrate

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Defendant’s deliberate indifference to Mrs. DeGraw’s serious medical need. Dr. Miller’s and the
entirety of the jail staff’s conduct far surpassed gross negligence when Dr. Miller determined Mrs.
DeGraw was suffering from psychosis or bi-polar disorder, which was so obvious that even Ms.
Trivoli—legally considered a lay person at trial—easily recognized the necessity for Dr. Miller’s
attention, and the ensuing medical care was so cursory, or at the very least grossly inadequate, so
as to amount to no treatment at all. Dr. Miller did not exercise his professional judgment in his
determination of the course of treatment; rather, he made no such determination nor exercise of
professional judgment, and relied on the fourteen-day policy to delay taking three minutes to walk
down the hall and observe Mrs. DeGraw to determine the appropriate course of treatment.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Plaintiff established legally sufficient evidence to prove officials
showed deliberate indifference to Mrs. DeGraw’s serious medical need when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.
2. Plaintiff Established Legally Sufficient Evidence to Prove the Deliberate Indifference
was a Byproduct of, and Moving Force Behind, the Policies of the Pinellas County
Sheriff’s Office
For supervisor liability, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has provided the five
following circumstances when liability could attach, one of which must be present at the time
constitutional rights are violated:
1. The supervisor personally participated in the violation of a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights;
2. A history of widespread abuse, meaning abuse that was obvious, flagrant,
rampant, and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences, put the
supervisor on notice of the need to take corrective action and he failed to do so;
3. The supervisor intentionally implemented an “official policy or custom” that
resulted in a subordinate acting with deliberate indifference, meaning reckless
disregard, to a plaintiff’s constitutional right;
4. The supervisor directed a subordinate to take the action that resulted in the
violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right; or
5. The supervisor knew that a subordinate would take actions in violation of a
plaintiff’s constitutional right and failed to stop the subordinate from doing so.

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Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, 5.8; Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1270
(11th Cir. 2007). There is no question that circumstances one, four, and five are inapplicable to
the current set of facts and evidence adduced at trial—there was no testimony or evidence
presented to suggest Jim Coats personally participated in the violation, directed any subordinates
to undertake the actions that resulted in the violation, or actually knew any subordinate would take
actions that resulted in the violation. Therefore, the Court is faced with the remaining two
possibilities: 1) A history of widespread abuse existed to put Jim Coats on notice of the need to
take corrective action; or 2) Jim Coats intentionally implemented the policy or custom that resulted
in deliberate indifference. Id.; see Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). For
either to result in liability to the Sheriff’s Office, a causal connection between the actions of the
supervisory official and the alleged deprivation must exist. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227,
1241 (11th Cir. 1985); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
Defendant correctly states the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that supervisory
liability may only attach when the implementation of a policy is “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] as to
its known or obvious consequences.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2004).
The primary policy at issue is Policy 13.39, which required an evaluation as soon as possible, no
later than 14 days. Plaintiff has not alleged Policy 13.39 is unconstitutional, and therefore
“considerably more proof than the single incident [is] necessary…to establish both the requisite
fault…and the causal connection between the policy and the constitutional deprivation.” City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985). “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional
activity is not sufficient to impose liability” for a widespread practice or custom. Id. at 823–824;
see Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991).

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Sheriff Jim Coats testified at trial he was aware of mentally ill and unstable individuals
entering the jail “all the time,” and conceded the jail did not meet the statutory qualifications for
receiving mentally ill and unstable individuals. Further, as Deputy Diebold testified, it was the
policy of the Sheriff’s Office to arrest and jail any offender accused of a felony, regardless of the
circumstances. When these two particular policies collide, the result is potentially catastrophic,
like the present case. While there was no direct evidence adduced at trial to suggest a widespread
abuse so as to require corrective action, the consequence of detaining a person under Florida’s
Baker Act presents an obvious scenario—a person suffering from a mental condition requiring
serious and immediate medical attention lacks the ability to comprehend her surroundings or
reasons for detention. Lacking this ability to comprehend, she could conceivably lash out at law
enforcement officers and resist arrest with extreme violence, including kicking, punching, or
scratching. Unfortunately, that is precisely the scenario that transpired. As Jim Coats testified
these individuals entered the jail “all the time,” the jail was not properly situated to satisfy statutory
qualifications, and the jail’s physicians constantly affirmed the 14-day requirement, the jury had a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find the deliberate indifference was a byproduct of, and
moving force behind, the policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED;
2. Defendant’s Oral Motion, (Doc. # 170), and Renewed Oral Motion for Directed
Verdict, (Doc. # 178), is DENIED for the reasons stated herein; and
3. Plaintiff’s Oral Motion for Directed Verdict, (Doc. # 180), is DENIED as MOOT.

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DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 20th day of May, 2014.

_____________________________________
ELIZABETH A. KOVACHEVICH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:

All parties and counsel of record

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