R.W. v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. et al

Filing 22

ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss 18 be GRANTED IN PART without prejudice as to Counts III and IV, and DENIED IN PART in all other respects. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 3/6/2012. Plaintiff has ten (10) days to file a third amended complaint. Failure to timely file a third amended complaint will result in the dismissal of Counts III and IV with prejudice. (SS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

R.W.,

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:11-CV-1326-EAK-AEP

MICHELE SPINELLI,
an individual,
and

DAVID GEE,

Sheriff of Hillsborough County,
in his official capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second

Amended Complaint (Dkt. 18) and Plaintiffs response thereto (Dkt. 20). For the reasons set
forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART without prejudice as to

the claims against David Gee (Counts III and IV), and DENIED IN PART in all other respects.

The following facts, gleaned from Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 16), are taken as
true for purposes of this motion.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, R.W. (hereinafter "Plaintiff), was raped by an unidentified assailant on or

about January 27, 2007. (Dkt. 16, at ^ 24). After reporting the crime to the Tampa Police

Department (hereinafter "TPD"), Plaintiffwas taken to Tampa's Rape Crisis Center, where

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specimens were collected for evidence and a "rape kit" procedure was performed. (Dkt. 16, at fl
25-26). The attending physician prescribed Plaintiff two anti-conception pills. (Dkt. 16, at ^
27). At the direction of the attending physician, Plaintiff took the first anti-conception pill while
at the Rape Crisis Center and retained the other pill with instructions to ingest it twelve (12)
hours later. (Dkt. 16, at K30).

Thereafter, a TPD officer accompanied Plaintiff back to the scene of the crime to

investigate. (Dkt. 16, at ^ 31). At some point, however, the officer discovered that Plaintiff was
the subject of an arrest warrant for failure to appearand failure to pay restitution. After making

this discovery, the officer arrested Plaintiff and took her to the Hillsborough County Jail on

Orient Road in Tampa, Florida (hereinafter "Jail"). The remaining anti-conception pill was
taken from Plaintiff upon her arrival at the Jail. Michele Spinelli (hereinafter"Spinelli") worked
at the jail for a private contractor, and "was charged with decisions involving the care of the
Plaintiff, including whether or not to dispense the previously prescribed medication to the

Plaintiff." (Dkt. 16, at K36-37). Spinelli's exact position and duties at the Jail are not clear
from the complaint.

Plaintiff remained in jail overnight, and the next morning requested the anti-conception

pill from Spinelli explained that the doctor at the Rape Crisis Center had prescribed it to ensure
that Plaintiff did not become pregnant as the resultof the rape. (Dkt. 16, at 138). In response,

"Spinelli told the Plaintiffthat Spinelli would not give herthe pill because it was against her
(Spinelli's) religious beliefs." (Dkt. 16,at K39). Thus, Plaintiffwas allegedly denied the second
anti-conception pill on January 28, 2007. Plaintiffwas, however, permittedto take the pill the
day after, "just prior to her release" on January 29,2007, though who exactly allowed her to take

the pill is not stated in the complaint. (Dkt. 16, at U41-42). Plaintiff did not become pregnant as
the result of the rape.
In Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth a claim against Spinelli
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her right to privacy. Plaintiff alleges that, by

"wrongfully refusing to let the Plaintiff take the previously prescribed pill, Spinelli [] committed

an 'unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the

decision whether to bear or beget a child.'" (Dkt. 16, at ^ 46) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438,453 (1972)). Count II sets forth a claim against Spinelli under § 1983 for violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that "Spinelli's reason for
refusing to let the Plaintiff take the previously prescribed pill constituted intentional genderbased discrimination," (Dkt. 16 at \ 56), because"Spinelli would have, as she had in the past,

alloweda male seeking a gender changeto take the same medication," (Dkt. 16, at H58). Count
III sets forth a right to privacy claim against David Gee (hereinafter "Gee") under § 1983,

claiming that Spinelli made the unconstitutional decision to refuse Plaintiffthe second anti-

conception pill "as the person designated by Gee, in his official capacity as Sheriffof
Hillsborough County, with 'final policymaking authority' overwhether to provide previously

prescribed contraceptive medicine to inmates atthe Orient Road jail when such action was
contrary to Spinelli's own religious beliefs." (Dkt. 16, at\ 67). Finally, Count IV sets forth a
nearly identical claim against Gee under the Equal Protection Clause for violation of"Plaintiffs
federally protected rights prohibiting gender[-]based discrimination." (Dkt. 16, at f 74). As for
damages, Plaintiff curiously states the same boilerplate (and quite extensive) damages for each of
herclaims, arguing that as the result of herordeal, she suffered "bodily injury andresulting pain

and suffering, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of

life, expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of earnings, loss of

ability to earn money, and aggravation of a previously existing condition." (Dkt. 16, at ^ 52).
Plaintiff accordingly "demands judgement [sic] for nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages."
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiffs complaint lay out

"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to

"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957). That said, "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6)motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to

provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." BellAtl Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, "to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must now contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claimto relief that is plausible on its face.'" Am.
Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283,1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss, courts must follow a simple, two-pronged approach:
"1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint thatare merely legal conclusions; and 2) where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 'assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 1290 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937,1950 (2009)). In sum, the "pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require

'detailedfactual allegations,' but demands morethan an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISCUSSION

Defendants wage a three-pronged attack on the sufficiency of Plaintiffs complaint. First,
Defendants claim that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with

respect to Counts I and III for abridgement of the right to privacy. Next, Defendants argue the
same with regard to Counts II and IV, which plead violations of Plaintiffs Equal Protection

rights. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a municipal policy
sufficient to support § 1983 liability with regard to the claims against Gee (Counts III and IV).
As will be shown, the former two arguments must fail, but the third point is well-taken; the Court

will accordingly grant Defendants' motion and dismiss Counts III and IV without prejudice.
A. Right to Privacy

"Although '(t)he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,' the Court
has recognizedthat one aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
FourteenthAmendment is 'a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of

privacy.'" Carey v. Population Servs., Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113,152 (1973)). This guarantee of privacy includes "the interest in independence in

making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
An individual's decision to use or not to use contraception is undoubtedly among those

fundamental decisions protection by the right of privacy: indeed, "[i]f the right of privacy means

anything, it is the rightof the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972). Indeed, because
"decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conceptionare among the most private and

sensitive," they accordingly "hold[] a particularly important place in the history ofthe right of
privacy." Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III is premised on the fact that "Plaintiff
fails to allege facts demonstrating an 'undue burden' on her ability to terminate her pregnancy."
(Dkt. 18, at 5) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)). But

Defendants misconstrue the right of privacy as it relates to decisions regarding contraception: to

be sure, though restrictions on the right to an abortion areunconstitutional only if they pose an
"undue burden" on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, the "undue burden" analysis is

inapposite to the question of contraception where a woman seeks to prevent—not to terminate—

her pregnancy. Hence, Defendants' argument that Spinelli's actions did not place an undue
burdenon Plaintiffs right to terminate her pregnancy completely miss the mark, and their
Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III of the Second Amended Complaint must fail.
B. Equal Protection

Defendants' arguments with regard to the Equal Protection claims (Counts II and IV) are

also easily disposed of. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim uponwhich

reliefcan be granted because she fails to allege any discriminatory or invidious purpose. (Dkt.

18, at7-8). But as Defendants themselves have pointed out, a discriminatory purpose "implies
that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part

'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group" such as

women. Pers. Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979). The Second
Amended Complaint clearly contends that Spinelli would have giventhe same contraceptive to a
maleinmate, had in fact given the same contraceptive to male inmates seeking a gender change

in the past, and did not give the second contraceptive pill to Plaintiff "because the Plaintiff was a

female." (Dkt. 16, at ffl[ 56-59). Taking these factual allegations to be true, as the Court must at
this juncture, there is no doubt that Plaintiff states a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. See Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1290 (requiring that courts

assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
That said, and though it must accept Plaintiffs factual allegations as true, the Court

admonishes Plaintiffs counsel against making specious claims merely to survive dismissal, lest
Plaintiffs counsel find himself defending a future motion for sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11

(providing for sanctions against attorneys whose pleadings do not, "to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances," contain "factual contentions hav[ing] evidentiary support"). Indeed, it seems
remarkable that Plaintiff would have knowledge of Spinelli's having providing contraceptives to

male inmates seeking gender changes, especially in light of the various health privacy laws and

that protect inmates' health records. Cf Graham v. Witalec, Case No. 5:10-CV-65-RS-GRJ,
2011 WL 1335808, at ** 1-2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 7,2011) (noting that HIPAA protects prisoners'

medical records). At any rate, because the Court takes Plaintiffs factual claimsto be true and

those allegations are sufficient to defeat the instant 12(b)(6) attack, the Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state anEqual Protection claim upon which reliefcan be granted is denied.
Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs claims must also be dismissed because they

contain contradictory bases for reliefis similarly unavailing. First, there is nothing to saythat

Spinelli could nothave been motivated by both her religious beliefs andan animus towards
Plaintiffs status as a woman. In any event, "[a] party may state as many separate claims or

defenses as it has, regardless of consistency." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3). Insofar as Defendants
argue to the contrary, they are wrong.

C Claims Against Defendant Gee

Counts III and IV of the Second Amended Complaint are styled as against David Gee in

his official capacityas Sheriff of Hillsborough County. (Dkt. 16, at K23). "Official-capacity

suits ... 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent.'" Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C.

Dep't ofSocialServs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Moreover, "in an official-capacity suit
the entity's 'policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law." Id. at
166. In sum, Plaintiffs claims against Gee are in actuality claims againstthe municipality of
Hillsborough County itself.

But to prevail on her claim against Gee under § 1983, Plaintiffmust prove that actions
taken under color of state law deprived her of a federal right, and that an official policy—"a

municipal policy of some nature"—caused the constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. "In
other words, a municipality may not be found liable simply because one of its employees
committed a tort." Bd. ofCnty. Comm 'rs v. Brown, 520U.S. 397,405 (1997). Put yet another
way:

Section 1983 liability may not be premised solely upon a respondeat superior
theory—i.e., a countymay not be held liable solely by virtue ofthe employment
relationship linking it to the offending employee. Rather, only deprivations
undertaken pursuant to governmental "custom" or"policy" may lead to the
imposition of governmental liability.

Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 791 (11th Cir. 1989). In certain situations, however, municipal

liability can be imposed for the single decision of a municipal official, so long as that official is
endowed with final policymaking authority. Id. at792 (citing CityofSt. Louis v. Praprotnik,

485 U.S. 112,127 (1988)). Though this is a question of state law, "the first step of the inquiry is
to identify those individuals whose decisions represent the official policy of the local

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governmental unit." Id. at 793-94 (finding that a physician's assistant at a road prison who was
solely responsible for medical care at the prison and whose decisions were subject to "no
supervision or review" "was the sole and final policymaker with respect to medical affairs at the

road prison").

Given those elementary principles, the Court need not belabor the point, because it is

plain that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains none of the predicate facts necessary
to support the claims against Defendant Gee under § 1983. Plaintiff contends that Spinelli made
the "decision [to deny the contraception] as the person designated by Gee, in his official capacity

as Sheriff of Hillsborough County, with 'final policymaking authority' over whether to provide

preciously prescribed contraceptive medication to inmates at the Orient Road jail." (Dkt. 16, at
Iffl 67,73). This Court must, however, disregard such unadorned legal conclusions, leaving
Plaintiff with nothing at all upon which to base § 1983 liability against Gee. See Am. Dental

Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1290 (explaining that the first step in any court's Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry is to

"eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions"). Plaintiffs

Complaint, for example, never explains Spinelli's position atthe Jail, whether shewas subject to
supervision, orhow, as a matter offact, she is alleged to have in any way been"the sole and final
policymaker with respect to medical affairs" atthe Jail. Mandel, 888 F.2d at794. In fact, the

allegation that Plaintiff actually received the second anti-conception pill while still in jail casts
doubt on Spinelli's alleged role as a final policymaker. (Dkt. 16, at%42). This Court has no
choice butto grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in part and dismiss Counts III and IV against
Defendant Gee.

Finally, the Court notes incidentally that, even thougheach count of Plaintiffs complaint

contains the same, copied-and-pasted prayer for reliefalleging Plaintiffsuffered "bodily injury

and resulting pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of capacity for
the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of
earnings, loss of ability to earn money, and aggravation of a previously existing condition," (Dkt.
16, at f 52), there are no facts of any sort set forth in the Complaint that would support any

actual damages at all. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978). Thus, and though the
Court assumes Plaintiffs counsel is already cognizant of this fact, the Court wishes for the

Plaintiff to be personally aware that, should she ultimately prevail on her claims, her damages
will in all likelihood be limited to "nominal damages not to exceed one dollar," in addition to
costs and fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. Having said that, it is nonetheless
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 18) be GRANTED IN PART

without prejudice as to Counts III and IV, and DENIED IN PART in all other respects. Plaintiff
has ten (10) days to file a third amended complaint. Failure to timely file a third amended
complaint will result in the dismissal of Counts III and IV with prejudice.

&

AC

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida this C& of March, 2012

Copies to: All parties and counsel of record.
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