R.W. v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. et al

Filing 29

ORDER denying 24 Motion to dismiss and the Defendant has ten(10) days to answer the complaint. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 6/14/2012. (SN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OE FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

R.W.,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 8:1 l-CV-1326-EAK-AEP
v.

MICHELE SPINELLI,
an individual,
and

DAVID GEE,
Sheriff of Hillsborough County,
in his official capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

This Cause is before the Court on Defendant Sherriff David Gee's Motion to Dismiss

Counts 111 and IV of Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 24) and Plaintiffs response
thereto (Dkt. 26). The following, gleaned from the Plaintiffs complaints, are taken as true for
the purpose of this motion.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, R.W. (hereinafter "Plaintiff), was raped by an unidentified assailant on or

about January 27, 2007. (Dkt. 16, at TJ24). After reporting the crime to the Tampa Police
Department (hereinafter "TPD"), Plaintiff was taken to Tampa's Rape Crisis Center, where
specimens were collected for evidence and a "rape kit" procedure was performed. (Dkt. 16. at
1)25-26). The attending physician prescribed Plaintiff two anti-conception pills. (Dkt. 16, at

1J27). At the direction of the attending physician, Plaintiff took the first anti-conception pill

while at the Rape Crisis Center and retained the other pill with instructionsto ingest it twelve
(12) hours later. (Dkt. 16.at^30).

Thereafter, a TPD officer accompanied Plaintiff back to the scene of the crime to

investigate. (Dkt. 16, at 1[31). At some point, however, the officer discovered that Plaintiff was
the subject of an arrest warrant for failure to appear and failure to pay restitution. After making
this discovery, the officer arrested Plaintiff and took her to the Hillsborough County Jail on
Orient Road in Tampa, Florida (hereinafter "Jail"). The remaining anti-conception pill was taken

from Plaintiff upon her arrival at the Jail. Michele Spinelli (hereinafter "Spinelli") worked at the
jail for a private contractor, and "was charged with decisions involving the care of the Plaintiff,
including whether or not to dispense the previously prescribed medication to the Plaintiff." (Dkt.
16, at 1(36-37). Spinelli was allowed to hold her position by Sherriff David Gee. (Dkt. 23, at
1J68). She received no "guidance, supervision, or direction" from Gee on whether, given her

religious beliefs, she could withhold anti-conception medication, and Gee had no official policy
on the matter. (Dkt.23, at ^68).

Plaintiff remained in jail overnight, and the next morning requested the anti-conception
pill from Spinelli. Plaintiff explained that the doctor at the Rape Crisis Center had prescribed it
to ensure that Plaintiff did not become pregnant as the result of the rape. (Dkt. 16, at 1J38). In
response, "Spinelli told the Plaintiff that Spinelli would not give her the pill because it was

against her (Spinelli's) religious beliefs." (Dkt. 16, at 1J39). Thus. Plaintiff was allegedly denied
the second anti-conception pill on January 28, 2007. Plaintiff was, however, permitted to take
the pill the day after, "just prior to her release" on January 29, 2007, though who exactly allowed
her to take the pill is not stated in the complaint. (Dkt. 23, at 1)42). Plaintiff did not become
pregnant as a result of the rape.

In Count I of the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff sets forth a claim against Spinelli
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her right to privacy. Plaintiff alleges that, by

"wrongfully refusing to let the Plaintiff take the previously prescribed pill. Spinelli [] committed
an 'unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.'" (Dkt. 23. at 1|46) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438,453 (1972)). Count II sets forth a claim against Spinelli under § 1983 for violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that "Spinelli's reason for
refusing to let the Plaintiff take the previously prescribed pill constituted intentional gender
based discrimination." (Dkt. 23 at ^56), because "Spinelli would have, as she had in the past,
allowed a male seeking a gender change to take the same medication." (Dkt. 23, at 1J58). Count

III sets forth a right to privacy claim against David Gee (hereinafter "Gee") under § 1983.
claiming that Spinelli made the unconstitutional decision to refuse Plaintiff the second anticonception pill "as the person designated by Gee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Hillsborough County, with 'final policymaking authority' over whether to provide previously
prescribed contraceptive medicine to inmates at the Orient Road jail when such action was

contrary to Spinelli's own religious beliefs." (Dkt. 23, at ^[67). Finally, Count IV sets forth a
nearly identical claim against Gee under the Equal Protection Clause for violation of "Plaintiffs
federally protected rights prohibiting gender[-]based discrimination." (Dkt. 23, at \?6). As for
damages, Plaintiff curiously states the same boilerplate (and quite extensive) damages for each of
her claims, arguing that as the result of her ordeal, she "suffered bodily injury and resulting pain
and suffering, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of
life, expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of earnings, loss of

ability to earn money, and aggravation of a previously existing condition. Furthermore, Gee's

policy caused the Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress and the emotional distress was severe
because the Plaintiff reasonably believed Gee's policy was causing her to continue with a

pregnancy which would have been the product of a rape and caused her to suffer actual damages
consisting of, but not limited to, the cost of diagnostic testing, medical examinations, medical
treatments and psychological therapy, and general damages as well as. [sic]" (Dkt. 23, at }\82).
Plaintiff accordingly "demands judgement [sicj for nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages." (Dkt. 23. at ^83).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiffs complaint lay out
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to

"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). That said. "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss docs not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to

provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Therefore, "to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must now contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Am.
DentalAss'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss, courts must follow a simple, two-pronged approach:
"1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 'assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief" Id. at 1290 (quotingAshcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937,1950 (2009)). In sum, the "pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed
factual allegations,' but demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully harmed-me
accusation." Iqbal, 129S. Cl. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Counts III and IV against Gee on the grounds that Plaintiffs

claims are implausible and merely incant the legal conclusion that Spinelli is a final policy
maker. (Dkt 24, 4-6). Counts III and IV were dismissed from Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint for similar reasons. However, in this amended complaint, Plaintiff has plead
additional facts sufficient to render her claims plausible.

Counts III and IV of the Second Amended Complaint are styled as against David Gee in

his official capacity as Sheriff of Hillsborough County. (Dkt. 16, at ^|23). "Official-capacity
suits ... 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.'" Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N. Y.C. Dep'l of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Moreover, "in an official-capacity suit the entity's

'policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law." Id. at 166. In sum.
Plaintiffs claims against Gee are in actuality claims against the municipality of Hillsborough
County itself.
Under § 1983, citizens may sue any person acting under state "statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage" who has violated their constitutional or legal rights. 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Municipalities count as persons for the purpose of § 1983 claims. Monell 436 U.S. at 690.
Section 1983 violations must occur as a result of the "execution of a government's policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy." Id. Thus, the government cannot be held liable under a theory of

respondeat superior. City ofSt. Louis v. Praprolnik. 485 U.S. 112. 121 -22 (1988). Nor can it be
held liable merely because a particular official acts with discretion. See Oklahoma City v. '['utile.
471 U.S. 808. 822-24(1985).

However, the single action of a final policy-maker can represent official government

policy, even when the action is not meant to control later decisions. Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). Using "state and local positive law, as well as custom or

usage having the force of law," the trial judge determines, prior to trial, the authorized final
policy-maker. Jell v. Dallas Independent SchoolDist. 491 U.S. 707. 737 (1989) (quoting
Praprolnik, 485 U.S. at 121 n. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Final policy-makers are not
subject to review or constraint from superior officials. Praprolnik. 485 U.S. at 127; Mandel v.
Doe. 888 F.2d 783, 793-94 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that a physician's assistant at a road prison

who was solely responsible for medical care at the prison and whose decisions were subject to
"no supervision or review" "was the sole and final policymaker with respect to medical affairs at
the road prison."). While determining whether someone is a final policy-maker may be difficult,
since there are a "rich variety of ways in which the power of government is distributed among a
host of different officials and official bodies", there is always "some official or body that has the
responsibility for making law or setting policy in any given area of a local government's

business." Praprolnik, 485 U.S. at 124-25.
The term "policy' has a fairly broad definition for the purpose of § 1983. As commonly

used, the term may bring to mind a set of official rules and regulations passed down from "on
high". However, 'policy' simply involves "a course of action consciously chosen from among
various alternatives." and does not necessarily require an official declaration or authority over

other individuals. CityofOklahoma City v. Tutlle. 471 U.S. at 823; see also Pembaur, 475 U.S
at 481 n. 9.

In the third amended complaint. Plaintiff alleged the following additional facts to support
her claim that Spinelli was a final policy-maker: (1) Gee allowed Spinelli to work at the jail as

the only person on duty with the power to dispense anti-conceptive medication. (2) Gee did not

provide Spinelli with any guidance, supervision, or direction on whether she could refuse to
dispense anti-conceptive medication based on her religious beliefs, and (3) Gee did not

promulgate any policy on refusals to dispense anti-conceptive medication based on religious
beliefs. (Dkt. 23, at 1)68). None of these facts are mere labels or legal conclusions.

Taken as true, these three facts provide plausible grounds for relief. The holding of
Mandel, the broad definition of policy, and the fact that all governmental actions are the result of
some official policy, grant plausibility to the Plaintiffs claim. Even though Spinelli was

apparently some type of medical employee and seems to have no statutorily-grantcd. traditional
policy-making role. Mandel suggests that she may still be a final policy-maker. Even though her
act did not govern subsequent decisions ofjail employees, it plausibly falls under the definition

of'policy'. Gee, as the representative of the municipality, promulgated no policy on anticonceptive medication and provided no guidance or supervision to Spinelli on the matter. Given
that some entity must set policy for the government in each situation, Plaintiff has rendered
plausible the claim that Spinelli was designated the final policy-maker with respect to her
decision to withhold anti-conceptive medication for religious reasons.

That is not to say, of course, that the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on her claims. To the
contrary. Plaintiff faces several key evidentiary hurdles before liability will be proved. See, e.g.,

Fla. Family Ass'n, Inc. v. Sch. Bd.ofHillsborough Cnly, 494 F. Supp. 2d. 1311. 1323 (M.D. Fla.
2007) ("[S]imple or even heightened negligence is not sufficient to establish liability under [§

1983]."). But at this early juncture, the Court must take the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint as true. It has done just that here - nothing more. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the Defendant has ten

(10) days to answer the complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, FL this f^ol June, 2012

Copies to: All parties and counsel of record.