Wright v. Exxelot Corporation et al
Filing
25
ORDER granting 18 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The Clerk is directed to remand this matter to the state court and then close this case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 10/6/2011. (CR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JANIERE WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO:
8:11-cv-1665-T-33AEP
EXXELOT CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff
Janiere
Wright's
Complaint.
Motion
(Doc. # 18).
to
Remand
Plaintiff's
Amended
Defendant Ryla Teleservices, Inc.
filed a brief in opposition thereto.
(Doc. # 21).
On or about June 27, 2011, Wright commenced this action
in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and
for Hillsborough County, Florida, Case No. 11-7982.
Count I
of the complaint alleged a claim for unpaid wages brought by
Wright individually pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 448.08. Count II
asserted a collective action based on a cause of action for
overtime violations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. This
Fair Labor Standards Act claim in Count II was the basis for
Ryla's Notice of Removal filed on July 27, 2011.
(Doc. # 1).
Wright made a motion to remand this case based on the
original complaint, which argued that Count II was intended to
assert the same claim as in Count I, but on behalf of
individuals similarly situated to Wright, under Florida state
class action rules.
(Doc. # 9).
Wright asserted that this
inclusion of the FLSA statute was a scrivener's error.
(Id.)
The Court found credible Wright's representation that the
citation to the FLSA in Count II was a scrivener's error.
(Doc. # 15).
In its Order, the Court noted that Wright filed
a separate action in state court alleging both an individual
count and a collective action count pursuant to the FLSA,
which was also removed to this Court by Ryla.
Exxelot Corp., et al., 8:11-cv-1666-T-33MAP.
See Wright v.
The Court,
however, agreed with Ryla that this action could not be
remanded based on the scrivener's error.
Wright
must
first
amend
her
The Court held that
complaint
to
correct
the
scrivener's error before the Court could consider a motion to
remand to state court. (Doc. # 15). Wright filed her amended
complaint on September 2, 2011.
(Doc. # 17).
Wright, having amended her complaint to allege only state
law claims, now moves to remand the case to state court. Ryla
opposes the motion and argues that this Court still has
supplemental jurisdiction over the action; independently,
diversity jurisdiction exists; and remand would be imprudent
and lead to duplicative, inefficient and costly litigation in
2
different forums.
Although amending a complaint to drop all federal claims,
in removal cases, does not divest the Court of supplemental
jurisdiction, the Court may nevertheless decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
See Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311
F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Shelley v. City of
Headland, No. 1:09-CV-509-WKW, 2009 WL 2171898, at *2 (M.D.
Ala. July 21, 2009); Farrell v. G.M.A.C., No. 2:07-cv-817-FtM34DNF, 2008 WL 1766909, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2008). "The
court may decline to continue its exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction
because
presently exists.'"
'no
basis
for
federal
jurisdiction
Shelley, 2009 WL 2171898, at *2 (quoting
Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County,
Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1123 (11th Cir. 2005)).
In making this
decision, the Court should "take into account concerns of
comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the
like."
Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1267
(11th Cir. 2001)(citations omitted).
This case was removed to this Court on July 27, 2011.
Therefore, this case is still in the early stages of the
proceeding.
"[W]hen federal-law claims have dropped out of
the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims
3
remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of
jurisdiction." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 n.7 (1988); see also Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of
Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997)(state law
claims are best resolved by state court especially where
federal law claim is dismissed prior to trial).
In addition,
there is no evidence that Wright has attempted to manipulate
the forum, but instead it appears that she only committed a
scrivener's error in her complaint.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ.,
484 U.S. at 357 (a district court can consider whether a
plaintiff has engaged in any manipulative tactics in deciding
whether to remand a case where the plaintiff dismisses the
federal claims that were the basis for federal jurisdiction
and moves to remand).
Ryla asserts that the values of judicial economy and
convenience
would
be
served
by
this
Court
retaining
jurisdiction over both cases rather than having two parallel
cases proceeding in two different forums.
The Court finds
merit in this argument, but finds that the other relevant
factors outweigh this consideration.
The Court is cognizant
of the fact that a plaintiff is the master of her claim; she
may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state
law.
See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
4
(1987).
Absent a scrivener's error, Wright's intention was
exclusive reliance on state law. As such, the Court would not
have otherwise been in a position to even weigh the judicial
economy of parallel proceedings it now has before it.
"It is
well established that 'the pendency of an action in the state
court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in
the Federal court having jurisdiction.'"
Stabler v. Transp.
Ins. Co., No. # 06-0237-WS-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50540, at
*22 (S.D. Ala. July 21, 2006)(quoting Ambrosia Coal & Constr.
Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Ryla
next
argues
it
could
have
pled
diversity
jurisdiction as the basis for removal of this action from
state court, but did not do so because there was federal
question jurisdiction at the time of removal.
To establish
diversity jurisdiction, Ryla points to Wright's class action
claim in the amended complaint and argues that under §
1332(d)(2), federal courts have original jurisdiction over any
civil case pled as a class action in which (i) the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5 million, exclusive
of interest and costs; (ii) the putative class includes at
least 100 members; and (iii) any member of the putative class
is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
5
See 28
Ryla asserts that the amount in controversy in the case
at bar exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs.
Ryla calculates that Wright is seeking
$4,625 in unpaid wages.
Ryla then points to the fact that
Wright alleges that the putative class "is comprised of
hundreds, if not thousands, of customer service department
employees."
Am. Compl., Doc. # 17 at ¶ 17.
Ryla then
extrapolates that by multiplying Wright's alleged unpaid wages
times a thousand class members, the unpaid wages for the class
reaches at least $4,625,000.
Ryla goes on to double the
amount in light of a request for liquidated damages and notes
a request for attorneys' fees that should be considered. This
computation of the amount in controversy, however, involves
impermissible speculation.
See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483
F.3d 1184, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S.
1080 (2008).
Wright's allegation is that the putative class
is comprised of "hundreds" of customer service department
employees.
"Hundreds" could range anywhere from 200 to 900
employees.
Wright's inclusion of "if not thousands" is mere
speculation.
The Court finds that Ryla's computation is not
a reasonable extrapolation upon which the Court can deduce the
amount in controversy.
Inc.,
608
F.3d
744,
See Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II,
753-54
(11th
6
Cir.
2010).
"If
the
jurisdictional amount is neither stated clearly on the face of
the documents before the court, nor readily deducible from
them, the district court lacks jurisdiction and must remand to
state court."
Rae v. Perry, 392 Fed. Appx. 753, 755 (11th
Cir. 2010)(citing Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1210-11, 1219).
If diversity jurisdiction was the basis upon which Ryla
removed the action from state court in the first instance, the
Court
would
have
found
that
Ryla
had
not
proven
by
a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional amount.
See Williams v. Best Buy
Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
"If that
evidence is insufficient to establish that removal was proper
or that jurisdiction was present, neither the defendants nor
the court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the
notice's failings."
Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214-15.
Having found that no basis for federal jurisdiction
presently exists and taking into consideration concerns of
comity, judicial economy, convenience and fairness, this
Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these state court claims.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Plaintiff's Amended
7
Complaint (Doc. # 18) is GRANTED.
(2)
The Clerk is directed to remand this matter to the
state court and then close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 6th
day of October, 2011.
Copies:
All Counsel of Record
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