Stauffer v. Hayes et al

Filing 36

ORDER: This case is dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to terminate all deadlines and motions and close this case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 4/25/2012. (MEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOHN STAUFFER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: 8:11-cv-2061-T-33EAJ

KAREN E. HAYES, D.O., A WOMAN’S
PLACE OF FORT COLLINS, PLLP,
PETER DUSBABEK, TODD VRIESMAN,
MONTGOMERY KOLODNY AMATUZIO &
DUSBABEK, LLP, J. BRADFORD
MARCH, MARCH OLIVE & PHARRIS,
LLP, LINDA COX, CHRISTINE
SKORBERG, CHERYL TRINE, and
CHERYL TRINE LAW FIRM, LLC,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants
Cheryl Trine and Cheryl Trine Law Firm, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint (Doc. # 19),
filed on January 12, 2012; Defendants Peter Dusbabek, Todd
Vreisman, and Montogomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio & Dusbabek, LLP’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 25), filed on February 13, 2012;
Defendants J. Bradford March and March, Olive & Pharris, LLP’s
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Verified Amended Complaint
(Doc. # 28), filed on February 12, 2012; and Defendants Karen
E. Hayes and A Woman’s Place of Fort Collins, PLLP’s Special
Appearance to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc.

# 33), filed on February 22, 2012.

Also before the Court is

Defendants Cheryl Trine and Cheryl Trine Law Firm, LLC’s
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Amended
Complaint (Doc. # 34), filed on March 28, 2012, as well as
Defendants J. Bradford March and March, Olive & Pharris, LLP’s
Supplemental

Motion

to

Dismiss

the

Plaintiff’s

Verified

Amended Complaint (Doc. # 35), filed on March 29, 2012.
Plaintiff did not file a response to any of the Motions
to Dismiss within the time prescribed by Local Rule 3.01.
However, in recognition of Plaintiff’s status as a pro se
party, on March 1, 2012, the Court afforded Plaintiff another
opportunity

to

respond

by

entering

an

Order

directing

Plaintiff to file a response to the Motions by March 15, 2012,
if in fact he opposed the Motions to Dismiss.

(Doc. # 24).

Despite the Court’s Order, Plaintiff did not file a response
in opposition to the Motions within the time prescribed by the
Order, nor

at

any

point since.

Accordingly,

considers the Motions to Dismiss as unopposed.

the

Court

For the

reasons that follow, the Court finds that it does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

This case is,

therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
I.

Background
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing his verified
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complaint against nine Defendants on September 12, 2011. (Doc.
# 1).

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 5,

2011, which eliminated four of the fifteen causes of action
alleged in the initial complaint, as well as Defendant Third
Federal Savings and Loan. (Doc. # 4).
According

to

the

Amended

Complaint,

“[a]ll

acts

complained herein arise out of Colorado state case postjudgment proceedings, Larimer County District Court Case No.
03CV1729.” (Id. at ¶ 14).
5,

2007,

parties,

a

final

Christine

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n July

judgment
Stauffer

was
and

entered
John

against

Stauffer”

only two
and

that

Defendants’ acts complained of in this action “occurred in the
aforementioned state case, during ‘post-judgment’ supplemental
‘Rule 69' C.R.C.P. proceedings, regarding the execution of the
July 5, 2007, final judgment.” (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16).

More

specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with several orders issued
by the trial court which allowed the court-appointed receiver
to retain the property of 11 non-parties in satisfaction of
the final judgment.

(Id. at ¶ 27).

Plaintiff claims that the

trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 11
non-parties, and thus, the trial court’s orders were void as
to those 11 non-parties.

(Id. at ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges

that he was “the general partner for all of the 11 separate
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entities’ limited partnerships and president of one of the
corporations who had all of their property taken by [the
receiver].” (Id. at ¶ 29).

Plaintiff subsequently appealed

the trial court’s decision and the Colorado Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on February 18, 2010.

(Id. at ¶¶ 42,

44). On September 13, 2010, the Colorado Supreme Court denied
Plaintiff’s Petition for Certiorari. (Id. at ¶ 52).
The Amended Complaint lists three claims for alleged
violations of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights under
the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
including

deprivation

of

property

without

due

process,

invasion of privacy, and “Deprivation of Right to Attorney
Representation with its own assets.”

Plaintiff also alleges

eight state law claims in the Amended Complaint.

The various

Defendants Plaintiff has named in this action include the
opposing

party

and

the

court-appointed

receiver

in

the

Colorado state case, as well as the attorneys and their law
firms who represented Plaintiff’s opponents and the receiver
in the state case.
In

essence,

Plaintiff

claims

that

the

trial

court

improperly allowed the receiver to retain the 11 non-parties’
property

and

that

Defendants

knowingly

and

intentionally

violated his rights “by utilizing the Receiver Order to take
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all

of

the

non-parties’

property.”

(Id.

at

¶¶

55-63).

Plaintiff further claims that Defendants invaded his privacy
rights when they “received, by way of Colorado state court
order” production of the non-parties’ private and confidential
business information and “fil[ed] much of said information in
the public court case file, open for all to see.” (Id. at ¶¶
64-65).

Finally,

deprivation

of

Plaintiff

property

by

claims

Defendants

that

the

alleged

rendered Plaintiff

unable to afford an attorney in this case and in two current
Colorado

state

constitutional
Plaintiff

seeks

appeals,
right
an

to

thereby
an

depriving

attorney.

injunction

(Id.

enjoining

him
at

of
¶

his

74).

Defendants

from

violating his federal constitutional rights and seeks damages
in excess of $406,000.
II.

Standard of Review
Federal

courts

are

courts

of

limited

jurisdiction.

“[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its
statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must
zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and
should

itself

raise

the

question

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt
about jurisdiction arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “a court must dismiss a
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case without ever reaching the merits if it concludes that it
has no jurisdiction.” Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259
F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Capitol Leasing Co.
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir.
1993)).
III. Discussion
Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction in this case in light of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The Court agrees. As the Eleventh Circuit has
explained:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal
courts, other than the United States Supreme Court,
have no authority to review the final judgments of
state courts. The doctrine extends not only to
constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a
state court, but also to claims that are
“inextricably intertwined” with a state court
judgment.
A
federal
claim
is
inextricably
intertwined with a state court judgment if the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the
state court wrongly decided the issues before it.
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000).
Some courts have held that the doctrine does not apply if
the plaintiff had no “reasonable opportunity to raise his
federal claim in state proceedings.” Wood v. Orange County,
715

F.2d

1543,

determination
relationship

1547
should

to

the

(11th

Cir.

“focus
issues

on

1983).
the

involved
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in

Nonetheless,
federal
the

the

claim’s

state

court

proceeding, instead of on the type of relief sought by the
plaintiff.” Goodman, 259 F.2d at 1333.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his federal
constitutional rights under the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments
and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by utilizing the state trial
court’s Receiver Order to take his property without due
process.

However, the Court finds that these claims “succeed

only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues before it.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172. In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, for example, that “the trial
court did not have in personam jurisdiction over the 11 nonparties, and thus, the trial court’s Orders were void Orders
as to those 11 non-parties, and the Court Receiver could not
deprive those 11 non-parties of all of their property.” (Doc.
# 4 at ¶ 26).

Plaintiff also expressly states that “[a]ll

acts complained herein arise out of [the] Colorado state case
post-judgment proceedings . . . regarding execution on the
July 5, 2007, final judgment.”

(Id. at ¶¶ 14-15).

This Court

can only conclude that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are
premised solely on the final judgment of the Colorado state
court, review of which is prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.

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Plaintiff’s

claims

of

invasion

of

privacy

and

“Deprivation of Right to Attorney Representation with its own
assets” are similarly barred.
doctrine

precludes

complaining
rendered

of

“cases

injuries

before

the

Simply put, the Rooker-Feldman

brought

caused

federal

by

by

state-court

state-court

district

court

losers

judgments

proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Because Plaintiff’s federal claims for relief are barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court determines that it
does

not

have

jurisdiction

in

this

matter.

Lacking

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court also
cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 962 (11th
Cir.

1999).

The

Court

therefore

dismisses

the

Amended

Complaint with prejudice as to all claims and Defendants.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
This case is dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to terminate all
deadlines and motions and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 25th
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day of April, 2012.

Copies:

All Parties and Counsel of Record

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