Peeler v. KVH Industries, Inc.

Filing 54

ORDER: Plaintiff David Peeler's Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motions for Summary Judgment 49 is granted in part as provided herein. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 9/19/2013. (CH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
DAVID PEELER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:12-cv-1584-T-33TGW

KVH INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court in consideration of
Plaintiff

David

Peeler’s

Motion

for

Reconsideration

of

Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 49), filed on
August 19, 2013.

Defendant KVH Industries filed a response

in opposition to the Motion (Doc. # 50) on September 3,
2013.

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the

Motion

in

prejudgment

part

and

interest

defers
until

ruling
the

on

parties

the
have

issue

of

had

an

opportunity to introduce all relevant evidence at trial.
I.

Background
Peeler, formerly an independent contractor for KVH,

initiated this breach-of-contract action in April of 2012
to recover back commissions allegedly owed to Peeler by KVH

pursuant to an Agreement entered into between the parties
in 2003.

(Doc. # 2).

KVH

and

Peeler

filed

cross

motions

for

summary

judgment on June 6, 2013 (Doc. # 29), and June 7, 2013
(Doc. # 34), respectively.

Within its motion for summary

judgment, KVH argued that Peeler’s breach-of-contract claim
should

be

barred

either

by

(1)

Florida’s

limitations or (2) the doctrine of laches.
16, 22).

statute

of

(Doc. # 29 at

Peeler conversely argued in his motion that he

was entitled to summary judgment on his breach-of-contract
claim

because

the

relevant

Agreement

unambiguously

supported his theory of how his commissions should have
been paid.

(Doc. # 34 at 6).

As a secondary matter,

Peeler included within his summary judgment motion a brief
assertion

of

his

entitlement

to

prejudgment

statutory

interest should he be awarded damages as a prevailing party
in this litigation.

(Id. at 15).

KVH argued in response

to Peeler’s motion that an award of prejudgment interest to
Peeler would violate public policy and would not promote
the purpose of the applicable prejudgment interest statute
-- that is, to encourage early settlement of claims.
# 38 at 12).

2

(Doc.

On July 25, 2013, this Court entered an Order denying
each party’s motion for summary judgment and additionally
determining that an award of prejudgment interest in this
case would be inappropriate.

(Doc. # 48).

On August 19,

2013, Peeler filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration,
which requests that the Court reconsider its Order on the
motions

for

summary

judgment

only

as

to

the

Court’s

determination that an award of prejudgment interest would
be inappropriate in this case.
Peeler

argues

that

“the

(Doc. # 49).

interests

of

Specifically,

justice

require

correction of the [summary judgment] Order” because “the
Court overlooked and/or misapprehended certain facts in the
testimony of Mr. Peeler . . . .”

(Doc. # 49 at 2-3).

KVH filed a response in opposition to the Motion on
September 3, 2013, arguing that Peeler’s Motion “is not
based

on

one

of

the

limited

purposes

for

which

a

reconsideration may be sought pursuant to [Rule] 59(e),”
but

rather

Court

and

“rehashes
improperly

arguments
asks

already squarely decided.”

the

previously
Court

to

made

to

revisit

(Doc. # 50 at 1).

this

matters

The Court

has carefully reviewed the Motion as well as the response
and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
II.

Legal Standard
3

It is within the Court’s discretion to grant a motion
for reconsideration.
(11th

Cir.

Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 667

1990).

reconsideration

Arguments

must

be

balanced

achieve finality in litigation.
College

of

Osteopathic

in

favor

against

Id.

Medicine,

of

granting

the

desire

to

As stated in Florida
Inc.

v.

Dean

Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1998),
“[a] motion for reconsideration must demonstrate why the
court should reconsider its past decision and set forth
facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the
court to reverse its prior decision.”

Further, “in the

interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources, reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy to be
employed sparingly.”

Lamar Adver. of Mobile, Inc. v. City

of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480, 489 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
This

Court

reconsideration
Civil

Procedure

recognizes
of

a

prior

59(e):

three
order

“(1)

an

grounds
under

to

Federal

intervening

justify
Rule

of

change

in

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence, and
(3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.”
Fla. College of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at
1308.

In deciding a motion for reconsideration, “[t]his

Court will not reconsider its judgment when the motion for
4

reconsideration

fails

to

raise

new

issues

but,

instead,

relitigates that which the Court previously found lacking.”
Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:03-cv-2378-T17MAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37718, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
30, 2005).

In addition, “a motion for reconsideration is

not the proper forum for the party to vent dissatisfaction
with the Court’s reasoning.”

Id. at *11 (internal citation

and quotation omitted).
III. Discussion
In a diversity case, “[w]hether a successful claimant
is entitled to prejudgment interest is a question of state
law.”

Venn v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 99 F.3d

1058, 1066 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Royster Co. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 1984)).

The

parties agree that the award of prejudgment interest in
this

matter

turns

on

General Laws § 9-21-10.

the

application

of

Rhode

Island

That statute provides, in relevant

part:
(a) In any civil action in which a verdict is
rendered or a decision made for pecuniary
damages, there shall be added by the clerk of the
court to the amount of damages interest at a rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum thereon from
the date the cause of action accrued, which shall
be included in the judgment entered therein.
Post-judgment interest shall be calculated at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum and accrue
5

on both the principal amount of the judgment and
the prejudgment interest entered therein.
This
section shall not apply until entry of judgment
or to any contractual obligation where interest
is already provided.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-10.
as

to

whether

this

The parties disagree, however,

statute

mandates

the

imposition

of

prejudgment interest in this case.
A.

Discretionary Application

Peeler
language

argues

that

requiring

the

§

9-21-10

“contains

application

of

mandatory

interest

to

a

damage[s] award,” and cites Cardi Corp. v. State, 561 A.2d
384,

387

(R.I.

1989),

for

the

proposition

that

“the

awarding of [prejudgment] interest is a ministerial act for
the clerk of the court, not an issue to be decided by the
court.”

(Doc. # 49 at 3).

However, the Rhode Island

Supreme Court in Cardi analyzed § 9-21-10 in the context of
two issues inapposite to the instant case: (1) whether a
party must request the award of interest by motion and (2)
whether

the

“substantively
Thus,

in

“properly

interest

adjudicated.”

determining
and

award

that

already
Cardi,

prejudgment

automatically

awarded”

imposed

had

been

A.2d

at

387.

interest

had

been

561

upon

the

court’s

previous entry of judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
did not address the role that judicial discretion might
6

have played in determining, prior to the entry of judgment,
whether the claimant was entitled to prejudgment interest
based on fulfillment of the recognized statutory purposes
of § 9-21-10.
Peeler

Id.

additionally

cites

the

Rhode

Island

Supreme

Court’s decision in Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 95 R.I.
366 (1963), to bolster his position that the imposition of
prejudgment interest is mandatory.

In that case, which

reviewed a decision of the trial court denying a stay of
execution as to interest added by the clerk of that court
to a judgment for the plaintiff, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reasoned as follows:
In our opinion the statute is neither ambiguous
nor equivocal.
It speaks imperatively and
directly not to the court but to the clerk who is
ordered to add to the amount of damages, interest
thereon from the date of the writ.
This is a
purely
ministerial
act;
it
contemplates
no
judicial intervention.
The legislative fiat is
explicit
and
admits
of
no
conditions
or
reservations.
The claim for damages having been
duly reduced to judgment[,] the addition of
interest is peremptory.
*

*

*

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial
justice did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to construe the statute as authorizing the court
to inquire into the reasons for the delay and to
deny the plaintiff interest on the judgment for
her alleged culpability in whole or in part for

7

such delay.
He was correct in holding that the
court had no power under the statute to do this.
Kastal, 95 R.I. at 369.
Although

Kastal

would

seem

to

foreclose

any

possibility of judicial discretion in awarding prejudgment
interest under § 9-21-10, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has since employed such discretion in at least one case
where the court determined that an award of prejudgment
interest would be “inappropriate.”

In that case, Martin v.

Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 559 A.2d 1028 (R.I. 1989),
two family members of a deceased car accident victim sought
payment under their auto insurance policies, which provided
uninsured-motorist coverage, of the policy limits: $10,000
per person and $20,000 per accident.
accordance
defendant

with

this

insurance

Id. at 1029.

uninsured-motorist

company

“agreed

to

In

coverage,

the

compensate

the

insured or any member of his or her household for physical
injuries or death legally caused by an uninsured or hitand-run motorist.”

Id.

The defendant “conceded liability under both policies
and offered [the plaintiff] $20,000, the sum of the $10,000
policy

limits

of

[the

two

family

uninsured-motorist coverage.”

8

Id.

members’]

individual

However, one of the

family

members

declined

the

offer

and

instead

filed

a

declaratory judgment action to litigate whether a certain
state statute might effectively raise the policy limits in
her case.

Id.

In determining whether the defendant insurance company
was required to pay prejudgment interest in accordance with
§ 9-21-10 on the amount owed to the plaintiff, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
Statutes
that
award
prejudgment
interest
generally serve the dual purposes of encouraging
the early settlement of claims and compensating
plaintiffs for waiting for recompense to which
they were legally entitled.
The award of
interest in this case would promote neither of
the purposes of § 9-21-10.
[The defendant
insurance company], soon after [the decedent’s]
death, made a bona fide effort to settle the
claim
by
offering
his
estate
the
$10,000
uninsured-motorist limit of [the family members’]
policies.
Also, although the estate has been
delayed in the receipt of the insurance proceeds,
the delay was caused entirely by the litigation
[one family member] commenced.
In a situation
such as this the awarding of prejudgment interest
would be inappropriate.
Id. at 1031 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In the years following the Martin decision, several
courts faced with interpreting § 9-21-10 have attempted to
reconcile the mandatory-application language of the statute
with the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s position, evident in
Martin, that the award of prejudgment interest is a matter
9

of judicial discretion.
have

produced

These attempts at reconciliation

seemingly

paradoxical

assessments.

For

instance, in Commercial Associates v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc.,
801

F.

Supp.

district

939,

court

943

(D.R.I.

summarized

the

1992),
statute’s

a

Rhode

Island

application

as

follows: “In short, R.I. Gen. Laws. § 9-21-10 requires the
clerk

to

judgment

include
as

a

prejudgment

matter

of

interest

course.

in

However,

every
it

civil

does

not

abrogate the court’s discretion to determine whether or to
what

extent

a

prevailing

claimant

may

be

entitled

to

prejudgment interest.” Id.
In another Rhode Island district court case, Buckley
v. Brown Plastics Machinery, LLC, 368 F. Supp. 2d 167, 16970 (D.R.I. 2005), the court similarly explained:
[W]hile § 9-21-10 appears to mandate that the
clerk shall include prejudgment interest in every
civil judgment in accordance with the terms of
the statute, this section has been interpreted so
as not to abrogate the court’s discretion to
determine whether or to what extent a prevailing
party may be entitled to such prejudgment
interest.
In this case, there is no compelling
reason to ignore the directive of the statute . .
. .
Id.; see also Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 564 (1st
Cir. 1978) (acknowledging that the district court imposed
prejudgment

interest

after

finding

10

that

such

imposition

“would be fair and equitable under the circumstances of
this case.”).
Thus,

although

consistently

the

stated

Rhode

that

Island

prejudgment

Supreme
interest

Court
is

“has

not

an

element of damages but is purely statutory, peremptorily
added to the compensatory damages award by the clerk,” Oden
v. Schwartz, No. 2011-167-Appeal, 2013 WL 2109929, at *17
(R.I.

May

16,

application

of

2013),
§

that

9-21-10

court

has

also,

“inappropriate”

by

deeming

under

certain

factual circumstances, Martin, 559 A.2d at 1031, endorsed
the

principle

determine

that

whether

a

court

prejudgment

maintains
interest

discretion

under

§

to

9-21-10

should be imposed.
A federal court sitting in diversity is required to
apply the law as declared by the state’s highest court.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182
F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

In the absence of authority

directly on point, this Court must “determine the issues of
state law as we believe the [state] Supreme Court would.”
Id.

After due consideration of the relevant Rhode Island

law, this Court adheres to its previous reliance on Martin
in finding that an award of prejudgment interest may be
11

inappropriate

in

a

case

where

such

award

would

promote

neither of the statutory objectives recognized by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.
B.

(Doc. # 48 at 47).

Factual Basis

Peeler alternatively argues that, even if the Court
has

discretion

in

imposing

prejudgment

interest,

“this

Court erred in determining that Peeler did not respond to
KVH’s offer to further evaluate Peeler’s claim and finding
that an award of prejudgment interest to Peeler would not
promote the statutory objective of encouraging settlement.”
(Doc. # 49 at 5).

Specifically, Peeler maintains that he

“did follow up with KVH again following KVH’s June 10,
2005, letter when it offered to further evaluate Peeler’s
claim” by way of a letter from Peeler’s counsel nearly one
year later, in May of 2006.

(Id.).

Peeler mischaracterizes this Court’s factual findings.
In its discussion of the appropriateness of an award of
prejudgment interest in this case, the Court reasoned as
follows:
At least once, in response to Peeler’s demands in
April of 2005, KVH offered “to further evaluate
[Peeler’s] claim,” provided Peeler would furnish
KVH with “a copy of the fully executed January
2003 agreement, as well as any other documents
upon which [he] rel[ied].” (June 10, 2005 Letter
Doc. # 32-11 at 3).
Peeler, apparently not
12

interested in pursuing KVH’s offer to further
evaluate his claim at that time, declined to
provide the requested documents.
(Peeler Dep.
Doc. # 30-2 at 19).
Thus, the Court finds that
awarding prejudgment interest to Peeler would not
promote the statutory objective of encouraging
early settlement.
Furthermore, much -- if not
all -- of Peeler’s “waiting” regarding his claims
in this matter can be attributed to his own delay
in filing this action.
The Court accordingly
finds no cause to award prejudgment interest in
this case.
(Doc. # 48 at 46-47).

Thus, the Court did not state that

Peeler failed to “follow up” with KVH at any time after
receiving the June 10, 2005 letter, as Peeler contends, but
instead

noted

that

Peeler

“declined

to

provide

the

requested documents” to KVH, which Peeler does not argue is
an erroneous factual finding.

Instead, Peeler attempts to

persuade the Court that Peeler’s next communication with
KVH, nearly one year later, in May of 2006,1 constitutes the
sort of active correspondence that warrants the imposition
of prejudgment interest against KVH for failing to settle
this claim sooner.

1

Notably, the letter sent to KVH from Peeler’s counsel in
May of 2006 also failed to provide the documentation KVH
requested in June of 2005. (May 5, 2006 Letter Doc. # 3212).
Instead, the letter made a demand for the total
amount
of
back
commissions
claimed
by
Peeler
and
additionally requested access to certain KVH software.
(Id. at 2).
13

Furthermore, Peeler emphasizes that, “between 2006 and
2010, . . . he was unable to find an attorney that would
follow through on filing an action against KVH,” having met
with “at least three” attorneys in an attempt to pursue the
instant

breach-of-contract

Peeler

additionally

various

hardships

claim.

reminds
between

the
2008

(Doc.
Court
and

#

that
2010,

49
he

at

7).

suffered

including

a

foreclosure action and a lawsuit brought by his partner in
a

flower

shop

business.

(Id.).

To

the

extent

Peeler

asserts that the Court “overlooked” this testimony (Doc. #
49 at 7), Peeler is incorrect; the Court expressly included
within the summary judgment Order these causes for Peeler’s
delay in bringing this action.

(See Doc. # 48 at 34-35).

Regardless of the reasons for delay, however, Peeler
maintains

that

a

plaintiff’s

delay

should

not

impact

a

court’s analysis when determining whether § 9-21-10 applies
in a given case.

Specifically, Peeler notes that the First

Circuit in Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.
1978), relying on the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision
in Kastal, “dismissed [the] defendant’s argument that [the]
defendant stands at the mercy of a plaintiff who may decide
to delay filing a claim since interest runs from the date

14

of the cause of action rather than the date of filing.”
(Doc. # 49 at 4).
In Roy, the defendant challenged the constitutionality
of

§

9-21-10,

arguing

that

the

mandatory

language

permitting accrual of interest from the date of an injury
“deprives [a] defendant of its property without due process
and denies it equal protection of the laws.”
at 1135.
infirmity

Roy, 584 F.2d

The First Circuit, finding “no constitutional
in

the

statute,”

referenced

the

Rhode

Island

Supreme Court’s decision in Kastal for the principle that
“possible

prejudice

resulting

from

a

dilatory

plaintiff

[is] not a reason to render the statute open to alternate
construction.”
As

Id. at 1135-36.

explained

above,

the

Court

is

tasked

with

interpreting Roy and Kastal in light of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Martin.
highly
whether

fact-dependent
an

award

nature

of

of

the

prejudgment

Due to the

determination
interest

as

would

to
be

appropriate in a given case, the Court, in an abundance of
fairness to Peeler, will reserve this determination until
such time as the parties have had an opportunity to present
all relevant evidence at trial.
IV.

Conclusion
15

The Court adheres to its previous determination that
an award of prejudgment interest may be inappropriate where
such award would promote neither of the statutory purposes
of § 9-21-10 recognized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Martin, 559 A.2d at 1031.

However, in an abundance of

fairness to Peeler, the Court defers its determination of
whether

or

to

what

extent

Peeler

may

be

entitled

to

prejudgment interest until such time as the parties have
had

an

opportunity

to

present

all

relevant

evidence

at

trial.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Plaintiff David Peeler’s Motion for Reconsideration of
Order

on

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment

(Doc.

#

49)

is

GRANTED in part as provided herein.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
19th day of September, 2013.

Copies: All Counsel of Record

16