Pierre v. GC Services Limited Partnership

Filing 8

ORDER denying 6 --motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday on 8/22/2012. (BK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LUDA PIERRE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 8:12-cv-1596-T-23EAJ

GC SERVICES, L.P.,
Defendant.
/

ORDER
Luda Pierre alleges that her former employer, GC Services, L.P., failed to
reinstate her after a medical leave. Pierre sues GC Services under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) both for interfering with Pierre’s right to medical leave
and for retaliating against Pierre because of her medical leave. GC Services moves
(Doc. 6) to dismiss the interference claim.
To state a claim of interference, an employee must allege that the employer
denied or interfered with the employee’s rights under the FMLA. Strickland v. Water
Works & Sewer Bd. of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001). According to
GC Services, “by acknowledging she took FMLA leave, [Pierre] has tacitly conceded
GC Services did not deny [Pierre] any right.” That is nonsense. “The FMLA does
not provide leave for leave’s sake.” Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th

Cir. 2011). Minimal research reveals that a failure to reinstate an employee after her
medical leave constitutes a typical FMLA interference claim.*
The motion (Doc. 6) is DENIED.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 22, 2012.

See, e.g., Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2010) (“neither
party disputes that [the plaintiff] made a prima facie showing of an FMLA interference claim, in that
she demonstrated she was not reinstated to the same position she held prior to taking her FMLA
leave”); Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1208-09 (11th Cir.) (reversing a summary judgment against a plaintiff
whose interference claim was “based on the substantive FMLA right to reinstatement”); Simpson v.
Office of Chief Judge of Cir. Court of Will Cnty., 559 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2009) (“firing an employee
to prevent her from exercising her right to return to her prior position can certainly interfere with
that employee’s FMLA rights”); Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778 (collecting authority) (“the right to
reinstatement . . . is the linchpin of [the right not to suffer interference] because the FMLA . . .
provides leave with an expectation that an employee will return to work after the leave ends”); Edgar
v. JAC Products, Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 511 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[the FMLA] benefits [unlawfully interfered
with] are usually the 12 weeks leave . . . and restoration to the employee’s previous position or an
equivalent one”); Arban v. West Pub. Co., 345 F.3d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hodgens v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998)) (“the issue is simply whether the employer
provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA – for example, . . . reinstatement after
taking a medical leave”); Ashe v. Aronov Homes, Inc., 354 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1263-66 (M.D. Ala. 2004)
(explaining that an employee fired after a medical leave may sue for both retaliation and
interference).
*

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