Dodd v. Matthews

Filing 81

ORDER: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count VII is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 7/31/2013. (LRM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
BRIAN DODD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:12-cv-2054-T-33TGW

KELLY MATTHEWS, ET AL.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. Because
the

claims

remaining

in

this

action

depend

on

determinations of state law, the Court in its discretion
declines

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction

over

Plaintiff Brian Dodd’s remaining claims. Accordingly, this
case is dismissed without prejudice.
I.

Background
On September 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit against

Kelly

Matthews,

Plaintiff

alleging

Dodd’s

copyright

allegedly

infringement

copyright

protected

as

to

works

related to his time spent at Straight, Inc. (Doc. # 1), a
facility Plaintiff later refers to as a “boot camp” (Doc. #
6 at ¶ 95).
On

September

25,

2013,

Plaintiff

filed

an

Amended

Complaint, adding Alex Layne, Webdiva Technologies, LLC,
Christopher

Oroza,

Andrew

Penczner,

and

Human

Element

Productions as Defendants involved in Plaintiff’s claims of
copyright infringement. (Id. at ¶ 1). The Amended Complaint
also added Thomas Dodd and Mary Anne Ford as Defendants in
this case. (Id. at ¶ 2). However, Plaintiff does not allege
copyright infringement against Defendant Dodd and Defendant
Ford.

Instead,

Plaintiff

states

that

he

is

“suing

for

equitable relief and for damages” arising from Defendant
Dodd

and

Defendant

Ford’s

alleged

“human

rights

abuses,

including unlawful detention and parental kidnapping, and
the common tort law of the state of Florida.” (Id.). The
claims against Defendant Dodd and Defendant Ford again stem
from

Plaintiff

Dodd’s

alleged

imprisonment

at

Straight,

Inc. (Id. at ¶¶ 94-114).
The Amended Complaint contains seven numbered sections
labeled as “causes of action” that the Court interprets as
seven

separate

counts.

(Id.).

Only

the

section

titled

“Seventh Cause of Action[,] Defendants Thomas Dodd and Mary
Anne Ford[,] Tort for Negligent Infliction of Distress /
Parasitic Damages” includes allegations against Defendant
Dodd and Defendant Ford. (Id. at 13). In the interest of
clarity,

the

Court

will

refer

to

that

claims contained therein as “Count VII.”

2

section

and

the

On

July

mediation

12,

2013,

conference.1

the

parties

(Doc.

#

75).

participated
As

a

in

result

a
of

mediation, Plaintiff reached a settlement agreement with
Defendants

Kelly

Matthews,

Alex

Layne,

Webdiva

Technologies, LLC, Christopher Oroza, Andrew Penczner, and
Human Element Productions. (Id.). Pursuant to the parties’
Joint

Stipulation

of

Dismissal

(Doc.

#

76),

the

Court

dismissed the case as to the aforementioned Defendants on
July 16, 2013 (Doc. # 77). Accordingly,

only

Count VII

against Defendant Dodd and Defendant Ford remains before
the Court.
II.

Legal Standard
The Court sua sponte may raise a jurisdictional defect

at any time. Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039 (11th
Cir. 1992). “[I]n any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction,”

district courts

also

have supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction

1

that

they

form

part

of

the

same

case

or

Defendant Mary Anne Ford failed to attend the Court
ordered mediation conference.
2
To the extent that Plaintiff also intends to state a
claim against Defendants Dodd and Ford under the Parental
Kidnapping Protection Act of 1980 (Doc. # 6 at ¶ 113), that
statute is intended to give full faith and credit to other
states’ custody determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
3
Accordingly, it is not applicable as a cause of action

controversy
district

.

.

court

.
may

.”

28

U.S.C.

decline

§

to

1367(a).

exercise

However,

a

supplemental

jurisdiction over such a claim if “the district court has
dismissed

all

claims

over

which

it

has

original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
“The

dismissal

of

a

plaintiff’s

underlying

federal

question claim does not deprive the court of supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Fisher
v. SP One, Ltd., No. 8:11-cv-1889, 2013 WL 268684 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 24, 2013) (internal quotation omitted). Instead,
pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§

1367(c),

a

court

“has

the

discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over

non-diverse

dismissed

all

state
claims

law

claims,

over

which

where
it

the

court

had

has

original

jurisdiction, but the court is not required to dismiss the
case.”

Id.

(citing

Baggett

v.

First

Nat’l

Bank

of

Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Although a district court may choose not to dismiss
such a case, “state courts, not federal courts, should be
the final arbiters of state law.” Ingram v. School Bd. of
Miami–Dade Cnty., 167 F. App’x 107, 108 (11th Cir. 2006);
see also Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1255 n. 8 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
4

U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.”)); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d
1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The decision to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state claims rests
within

the

discretion

of

the

district

court.

We

have

encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state
claims

when,

dismissed
1367(c)

as

prior
applies,

here,
to

the

trial.”).

federal

claims

Nevertheless,

considerations

of

have

been

“[w]here

judicial

§

economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity may influence the court’s
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” Baggett,
117 F.3d at 1353.
III. Analysis
Although the Amended Complaint is somewhat unclear, it
appears that Plaintiff intends Count VII to state claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress against both
Defendant Dodd and Defendant Ford.2

Intentional infliction

of emotional distress is a state law claim and the claims

2

To the extent that Plaintiff also intends to state a
claim against Defendants Dodd and Ford under the Parental
Kidnapping Protection Act of 1980 (Doc. # 6 at ¶ 113), that
statute is intended to give full faith and credit to other
states’ custody determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
Accordingly, it is not applicable as a cause of action
under the facts of this case.
5

against Defendant Dodd and Defendant Ford were before this
Court supplemental to Plaintiff’s federal copyright claims.
Because the Court has now dismissed the copyright claims
over which it had original jurisdiction, there remains no
original

federal

jurisdiction

to

support

the

Court’s

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims contained in Count VII. See Baggett, 117 F.3d at
1352. Additionally, as the Amended Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff and Defendant Ford are both residents of Florida,
the Court also lacks diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C

§

1332(a)

over

the

remaining

claims.

See

Holston

Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068,
1070

(11th

Cir.

requirements

of

2012)
§

(“To

meet

1332(a),

the

the

jurisdictional

citizenship

of

each

plaintiff must be different from that of each defendant.”)
(emphasis added).
Resolution
intentional

of

Plaintiff’s

infliction

determinations

of

of

state

remaining

emotional

law.

distress

Because

“state

claims
depends
courts,

for
on
not

federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law,”
Ingram, 167 F. App’x at 108, and because the Court finds
that principles of judicial economy and comity weigh in
favor

of

the

Court

declining
6

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction

over

Plaintiff’s

state

law

claims

against

Defendants Dodd and Ford. Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Count

VII

although

without
this

jurisdiction

Court

over

decision

does

state

claim

a

prejudice.
declines

purely

not
for

Plaintiff

state

preclude

to
law

exercise
claims,

Plaintiff

intentional

is

from

infliction

advised

that

supplemental
this

Court’s

attempting
of

to

emotional

distress in state court.
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state
law

claims

for

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress. Count VII is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk is directed to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
31st day of July, 2013.

Copies:

All Counsel and Parties of Record

7