Preston v. Public Storage, Inc. et al

Filing 17

ORDER dismissing case without prejudice under Rooker Feldman doctrine re 1 Complaint, and denying all motions as moot. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 12/27/2012. (JM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ANNE PRESTON,
Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

PUBLIC STORAGE, INC.,
etal.,
Defendants.

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on:

Dkt. 3
Dkt. 16

Motion to Consolidate; Motion to E-File and Fax; Motion
to Disqualify Counsel
Motion to Strike Motion to Bar Counsel

Plaintiff Anne Preston has filed two related cases which are before the

undersigned: Case No. 8:12-CV-2287-T-17MAP and Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T17TGW.

In the Complaints in both cases, Plaintiffalleges federal question jurisdiction.
In Case No. 8:12-CV-2287-T-17MAP, Plaintiff alleges violations 15 U.S.C. Sees.
41-58, 15 U.S.C. Sees. 1667-1667f, and 15 U.S.C. Sees. 1666-1666J. Plaintiff also

alleges violations of Florida statutes: Ch. 501.201, Ch. 501.202(1,2,3); Ch.
501.204(1,2); Ch. 671.210(1-46); Ch. 671.203; Ch. 817.29; Ch. 817.481; Ch, 817.61;
Ch. 817.62, and Ch. 817.64, Florida Statutes.

Plaintiff also alleges that "this action is

for claims of violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as enabled through and pursuant to 42

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(a)(3)." Plaintiff requests a jury trial, alleges
a direct connection between Defendants' actions and the harm that resulted, and states

that the action is for damages in excess of $50,000.
In Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW, Plaintiff alleges that the action is for

breach of contract, and under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as enabled through and pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(a)(3). Plaintiff requests a jury trial, alleges
a direct connection between Defendants' actions and the harm that resulted, and states

that the action is for damages in excess of $50,000.

In Case No. 8:12-CV-2287-T-17MAP, Plaintiff Preston alleges:

5. The facts of this case and Plaintiff's breach of contract

care are intertwined and are based on the same set of

operative facts. This is an appeal of sorts from the state
courts that denied Plaintiff due process and justice. It was
brought before the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
District in Tampa, Florida. The court forced Plaintiff to
rewrite her complaint 4 times, and each time, Plaintiff
attempted to clarify for the court what her case was about,
namely the laws and statutes previously stated....
6. The case was dismissed with prejudice without a reason
or explanation. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not
apply since Plaintiff was never given a "full and fair
opportunity to be heard on the issues...."

Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the state court case to the
Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and Plaintiff then sought
further review from the Florida Supreme Court, which declined to consider Plaintiff's
case on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff attempted

to reopen Plaintiff's case in the trial court, which was denied, and sought recusal of the
trial judge, which was denied. Plaintiff disagreed with the trial court's rulings on those

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

issues and other issues. Plaintiff sought further review in the Second District Court of

Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and sought further review before the Florida
Supreme Court, which declined to consider Plaintiff's case due to lack of jurisdiction.
In Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW, Plaintiff alleges:

3. The facts of this case and those of her credit card fraud case are

intertwined, and are based on the same set of operative facts. This is an

appeal of sorts from the state courts that denied Plaintiff due process and
justice according to the U.S. Constitution, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, and the Florida statutes....

Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff attempted to reopen her fraud case in state court to sue for
breach of contract, but at a hearing, while Plaintiff was granted a few minutes to argue
her fraud case, the court refused to hear any argument on Plaintiff's breach of contract
claim before the court dismissed the fraud and breach of contract claims with prejudice.

Plaintiff states that Plaintiff was denied due process since the court refused any hearing
whatsoever on her contract case. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff brought both cases back

to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. Plaintiff alleges
that motions for rehearing, clarification and reconsideration were denied.

Plaintiff

alleges that Plaintiff sought review before the Florida Supreme Court, which declined
consideration due to lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff's Complaint involves "amendments to the
Constitution, contract law and state statutes," [therefore] "Plaintiff is now turning to the
federal court for the rights, due process and justice she should have been granted at
the state level."

I. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule
3

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, can be a facial attack or a factual attack. In
a facial attack, the factual allegations of the Complaint are taken as true. In a factual

attack, the Court may consider matters outside the Complaint, and is free to weigh
evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In a factual
attack, the allegations of the Complaint are not presumptively true. Where the attack

on jurisdiction implicates the merits of the plaintiff's federal cause of action, the Court
should find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the

merits of plaintiffs case, proceeding under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56. The exceptions to
this rule are narrowly drawn, and are intended to allow jurisdictional dismissals only in
those cases where the federal claim is clearly immaterial or insubstantial. See
Williamson v. Tucker. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.). cert, denied. 454 U.S. 897 (1981).

The Court notes that Plaintiff Preston is proceeding p_ro se; Plaintiff's pleadings

are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney, and will be

liberally construed. Hughes v. Lott. 350 F.3d 1157. 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Discussion

The Court has a duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the

claims presented before ruling on the merits of a claim. Taylor v. Appleton. 30 F.3d

1365, 1366 (11,h Cir. 1994). If jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the Court cannot
proceed at all; its sole remaining duty is to state it lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the
case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't. 523 U.S. 83. 94 (1998). The specific
allegations in the Complaints in both cases prompted the Court to consider subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte.

The Court takes judicial notice of the dockets of Case No. 08-CA-010042, Anne
Preston v. Public Storage, Inc. et al., and Case No. 11-CA-06033, Anne Preston v.
Public Storage, Inc., et al, in Hillsborough County Circuit Court.

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final
state court decision. Velardo v. Fremont Investment & Loan. 298 Fed. App'x 890, 892

(1 1th Cir. 2008). In Nicholas v. Shafe. 558 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11* Cir. 2009)(quoting
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.. 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals "delineat[ed] the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine: 'cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.'"

In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.. 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005),

the United States Supreme Court held that:

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is confined to cases of the

kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review

and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not
otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or
augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal
courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state
court actions."

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies "both to federal claims raised in state court and

to those 'inextricably intertwined ' with the state court's judgment. Casale v. Tillman,

558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11* Cir. 2009. A claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a
previously rendered state court judgment: "(1) where the success of the federal claim
would 'effectively nullify' the state-court judgment; and (2) where the federal claim
'succeeds only to the extent that the state wrongly decided the issues.'" Fiqueroa v.
Merscorp. Inc.. 766 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2011). A federal claim will not be

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

deemed "inextricably intertwined" with the state-court judgment to the extent that the
party did not have a "reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state
proceedings." Casale. 558 F.3d 1260.
1. Procedural Requirements of Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

In both Complaints, Plaintiff Preston alleges a violation of due process and equal

protection. Plaintiff Preston further alleges violations of federal and state statutes in
Case No. 8:12-CV-2287-T-17MAP, and alleges a breach of contract claim in Case No.

8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW. The parties before the Court are the same parties in the
state court actions.

Plaintiff Preston has included a detailed statement of the background of the

litigation in Hillsborough County Circuit Court. The Court notes that the trial court
permitted p_ro se Plaintiff Preston to amend her Complaint four times. Plaintiff Preston
commenced the case on 5/2/2008 and the case was dismissed with prejudice on

2/25/2010. Plaintiff Preston pursued an appeal of the dismissal of Plaintiffs claims with

prejudice in the Second District Court of Appeals, and Florida Supreme Court. The
mandate was entered on 6/6/2011, and the Florida Supreme Court's Order was entered
on 6/27/2011. Plaintiff Preston pursued an appeal of the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs

Motion to Reopen. The mandate of the Second District Court of Appeals was entered
on 7/2/2012, and the Florida Supreme Court's Order was entered on 9/5/2012. When

Plaintiff became aware of a possible breach of contract claim, Plaintiff Preston raised
that issue before the trial court in a separate case, which was dismissed with prejudice
on 7/15/2011. The mandate of the Second District Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court was entered on 7/3/2012, and the Order from the Florida Supreme Court was
entered on 9/5/2012.

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

2. Federal Claims are "Inextricably Intertwined" With Prior State-Court Judgments

The allegations of the Complaints that involve alleged denial of due process and
equal protection are directed to decisions of the trial court during the course of litigation
in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, not actions taken by Defendants prior to the
commencement of litigation in Hillsborough County Circuit Court.

Plaintiff Preston

disagrees with the rulings of the trial court, the Second District Court of Appeals and the
Florida Supreme Court.

For the due process and equal protection claims to succeed,

the Court would have to find that the decisions of the state court dismissing Plaintiffs'

complaints were wrong. Only the state appellate court or the United States Supreme
Court can review the decisions of the Florida trial court.

Plaintiff's claims in both state cases include Plaintiffs claims for Defendants'

alleged fraud and breach of contract. In the federal court cases, Plaintiff's allegations
of violations of federal statutes are directed to Defendants' alleged fraud, and to breach
of contract. Even if Plaintiff Preston alleged violation of state statutes in Plaintiffs state

cases, and did not identify alleged violations of federal statutes, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims which were, or should have been,

central to the state court decision, even if those claims seek a form of relief that might
not have been available from the state court. "State and federal courts are free to

decide federal law issues for themselves (unless and until the United States Supreme

Court settles the matter.) See Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs.. Inc., 346 F.3d
1024, 1033 (11th Cir. 2003).

3. Plaintiff Had a Reasonable Opportunity to Raise Plaintiff's Claims in State Court

Plaintiff Preston had a reasonable opportunity to raise Plaintiff's federal claims in

the state proceedings.

The state court dockets show Plaintiffs participation in the

litigation in state court, both in the trial court and the appellate court. The trial court

Case No. 8:12-CV-2288-T-17TGW

granted leave to Plaintiff Preston to amend Plaintiff's complaint four times, after which
the state court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff Preston pursued

an appeal of the trial court's rulings; the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the
rulings. Plaintiff Preston filed a second case in state court to raise Plaintiffs breach of
contract claim, and appealed the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. A

party's ability to raise a claim on appeal constitute^] a reasonable opportunity to raise

the claim. Rice v. Grubbs. 158 F. App'x 163, 165 (11* Cir. 2005).
After consideration, the Court concludes that this case is an attempt to nullify a

final state court judgment, and is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Therefore
the Court will dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that this case is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court
shall close this case.

The Court denies the Motion to Consolidate,

Motion to E-File

and Fax, Motion to Bar Counsel, and Motion to strike as moot.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida on this

^ / day of December, 2012.

ELIZATgETHJA. KOVACHEVICH
United States District Judge

Copies to:
All parties and counsel of record