Maldonado v. Mattress Firm, Inc. et al

Filing 50

ORDER: Defendant Mattress Firm's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), or in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration 37 is granted to the extent that the Court compels arbitration of Mal donado's claim against Mattress Firm. The Motion is otherwise denied. The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Mattress Firm as a party in this matter, and thereafter to close this case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 6/3/2013. (CH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LUIS MALDONADO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:13-cv-292-T-33AEP

MATTRESS FIRM, INC., CALLAHAN’S
EXPRESS DELIVERY, INC., and
PATRICK W. CALLAHAN,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court in consideration of
Defendant

Mattress

Firm’s

Pleadings

Pursuant

to

Motion

Federal

for

Rule

Judgment

of

Civil

on

the

Procedure

12(c), or in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration
(Doc.

#

Maldonado

37),

filed

filed

a

on

April

response

in

25,

2013.

opposition

Plaintiff
to

the

Luis

Motion

(Doc. # 43) on May 20, 2013, and an amended response (Doc.
# 44) on May 22, 2013.

Mattress Firm filed a reply, with

leave of court, on May 31, 2013.
reasons that follow,

(Doc. # 49).

the motion is

For the

granted in part and

denied in part.
I.

Background
On January 31, 2013, Maldonado initiated this action

against Defendants Mattress Firm, Inc., Callahan’s Express
Delivery, Inc., and Patrick W. Callahan to recover overtime
compensation in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Specifically, Maldonado claims that, “from at least

June 13, 2011 and continuing through June 1, 2012,” during
which

time

Defendants

employed

Maldonado

as

a

local

delivery driver, Defendants failed to compensate Maldonado
at a rate of one and one-half times Maldonado’s regular
rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single
work week.
On
Delivery

(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 33, 35).

March

20,

2013,

and

Patrick

Defendants

Callahan

(the

Callahan’s
Callahan

Express

Defendants)

filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (Doc. #
23)

based

on

an

“Independent

Contractor’s

Agreement”

between the Callahan Defendants and Maldonado. The Court
granted the motion to compel arbitration on April 24, 2013
(Doc. # 34). In the Order granting the Callahan Defendants’
motion, the Court directed “both Plaintiff Maldonado and
Defendant Mattress Firm . . . to advise the Court as to
their respective positions regarding whether this action
should be stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration
proceedings.”

(Id. at 18).

Shortly thereafter –- on April

25, 2013 -- Mattress Firm filed the instant Motion.
2

(Doc.

#

37).

Although

Mattress

Firm

does

not

directly

acknowledge within the Motion that it is intended to serve
as Mattress Firm’s response to the Court’s April 24, 2013,
Order, Mattress Firm has submitted no other filing that
might be construed as such a response.

Accordingly, the

Court construes the Motion as Mattress Firm’s notice of
opposition to a potential stay of this case.
On April 29, 2013, Maldonado filed a notice advising
the Court of his position “that the pending case against
Mattress Firm, Inc. should be stayed pending the outcome of
the

arbitration

proceedings

Callahan Defendants].”

between

Plaintiff

(Doc. # 38 at 1).

and

[the

The Court has

carefully reviewed the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
or in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration, the
response to the Motion, and the reply, and is otherwise
fully advised in the premises.
II.

Discussion
A.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil

Procedure

is

brought

“[a]fter

the

pleadings

closed –- but early enough not to delay trial.”
Civ. P. 12(c).

are

Fed. R.

“‘Judgment on the pleadings is proper when

no issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is
3

entitled

to

judgment
the

as

a

matter

pleadings

and

of
any

law

based

judicially

on

the

substance

of

noticed

facts.’”

Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 592 F.3d

1237, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Andrx Pharm., Inc. v.
Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2005)).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by
the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
See Szabo v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 8:10-cv-2167-T-33, 2011 WL
3875421 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2011) (citing Hawthorne v. Mac
Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)).
As with a motion to dismiss, the “[f]actual allegations
must

be

enough

to

raise

speculative level.”
544,

555

(2007).

a

right

to

relief

above

the

Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
“To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”
(citations

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
omitted).

Additionally,

a

trial

court

must

accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and
construe

the

plaintiff.

facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
Rule 12(d) instructs that when matters outside of the
4

pleadings

are

presented

to

the

court

on

a

motion

for

judgment on the pleadings, the motion must be treated as
one

for

summary

judgment.

See

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

12(d).

However, the motion “should only be treated as one for
summary judgment if the record is fully developed and the
non-moving party was given adequate notice of the court’s
decision.”

Jozwiak v. Stryker Corp., No. 6:09-cv-1985-Orl-

19GJK, 2010 WL 743834, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010)
(citations omitted).
“The

court

has

a

broad

discretion

when

deciding

whether to treat a motion [for judgment on the pleadings]
as a motion for summary judgment even though supplementary
materials are filed by the parties and the court is not
required to take cognizance of them.”

In re Jet 1 Ctr.,

Inc., 319 B.R. 11, 16 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (citations
omitted); Hagerman v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., No. 1:06-CV-2246JEC, 2008 WL 839803, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2008); see
also 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1371, at 273 (3d ed. 2004) (“It is
within the district court’s discretion whether to accept
extra-pleading

matter

on

a

motion

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings and treat it as one for summary judgment or to
reject it and maintain the character of the motion as one
5

under Rule 12(c).”).
In this case, both Maldonado and Mattress Firm have
presented matters outside the pleadings for the Court to
consider in ruling on Mattress Firm’s Motion.
1, 44-1).

(Doc. ## 37-

However, the Court declines to consult these

supplementary materials at this early stage of litigation,
and

instead

consults

only

the

pleadings

in

resolving

Mattress Firm’s motion.
Upon reviewing the Complaint in this case, the Court
finds that Maldonado has alleged a prima facie claim under
29 U.S.C. § 207.

“To establish a prima facie case for FLSA

violations, a plaintiff must show three basic requirements:
(1)

an

employment

relationship,

(2)

that

the

employer

engaged in interstate commerce, and (3) that the employee
worked over forty hours a week but was not paid overtime
wages.”

Ramos v. Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc.,

No. 12-21693-CIV, 2012 WL 3834962, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
4, 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
Maldonado has satisfied this meager burden.
the

Complaint,

Maldonado

claims

that

he

Within

“worked

for

Defendants in excess of forty (40) hours within a work
week,”

and

continuing

that

“[f]rom

through

June

at
1,

least
2012,

6

June

13,

Defendants

2011

and

failed

to

compensate Plaintiff at a rate of one and one half times
Plaintiff’s regular rate” for the overtime hours allegedly
worked.
claims

(Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 35, 36).
that

Defendants,

all

of

Maldonado additionally

whom

are

alleged

to

be

engaged in the “production of goods for commerce,” hired
Maldonado “to work as a non-exempt local delivery driver,”
and

that

his

job

entailed

“making

local

deliveries

of

mattresses to the customers of Defendant [Mattress Firm] as
directed by all Defendants.”

(Id. at ¶¶ 33, 34).

These

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for overtime
wages under the FLSA.
LLC,

No.

See Sciacca v. Vectorworks Marine,

6:12-cv-1255-Orl-28DAB,

2013

WL

656325,

at

*4

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2013) (“A simple case of unpaid overtime
is not complicated to plead.”).
However,
plaintiff
asserting

Mattress

makes
that

compensation

joint
an

and/or

a

joint

argues

employer

entity

has

minimum

survive[ ] dismissal.”
allege

Firm

that,

allegations,

failed

wage

is

to
not

pay

plaintiffs

must

a

simply
overtime

sufficient

(Doc. # 49 at 1).

enterprise,

“[w]hen

to

“To properly
allege

facts

that the two businesses (1) performed related activities,
(2) through a unified operation or common control, and (3)
for

a

common

business

purpose.”
7

Vignoli

v.

Clifton

Apartments, Inc., No. 12-cv-24508-JLK, 2013 WL 1099030, at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2013) (internal quotation omitted).
The Court finds Maldonado’s allegations that he worked as a
delivery driver making local deliveries of mattresses to
customers of Mattress Firm at the collective direction of
all

Defendants

outlined in

sufficient

Vignoli.

to

satisfy

the

(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 34).

requirements
The Court

therefore denies Mattress Firm’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings,

and

proceeds

to

consider

Mattress

Firm’s

alternative Motion to Compel Arbitration.
B.

Motion to Compel Arbitration
1.

Equitable Estoppel

“A rule of contract law is that one who is not a party
to an agreement cannot enforce its terms against one who is
a party.

The right of enforcement generally belongs to

those who have purchased it by agreeing to be bound by the
terms of the contract themselves.”
South

Ins.

(internal

Co.,

648

citations

F.3d

1166,

omitted).

Lawson v. Life of the
1167

(11th

Cir.

2011)

“Most

legal

rules

have

exceptions, however, and this rule is no exception to the
rule of exceptions.”

Id.

Indeed, although “arbitration is a contractual right,
the lack of a written arbitration agreement between the
8

parties

is

not

arbitration.”

always

an

impediment

to

compelling

Bahena v. Am. Voyager Indem. Ins. Co., No.

8:07-cv-1057-T-24-MSS,
Mar. 19, 2008).

2008

WL

780748,

at

*1

(M.D.

Fla.

“[T]here are certain limited exceptions,

such as equitable estoppel, that allow nonsignatories to a
contract to compel arbitration.”
Serv.

Corp.

1999)).

v.

Franklin,

177

Id. (quoting MS Dealer

F.3d

942,

947

(11th

Cir.

As the Eleventh Circuit explained in MS Dealer,

177 F.3d at 947:
Existing case law demonstrates that equitable
estoppel
allows
a
nonsignatory
to
compel
arbitration
in
two
different
circumstances.
First,
equitable
estoppel
applies
when
the
signatory to a written agreement containing an
arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the
written agreement in asserting [its] claims
against
the
nonsignatory.
.
.
.
Second,
application of equitable estoppel is warranted .
.
.
when
the
signatory
[to
the
contract
containing
the
arbitration
clause]
raises
allegations of . . . substantially interdependent
and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory
and one or more of the signatories to the
contract. Otherwise, the arbitration proceedings
[between the two signatories] would be rendered
meaningless and the federal policy in favor of
arbitration effectively thwarted.
Id. abrogated on other grounds, Arthur Andersen, LLP v.
Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); see also Escobal v.
Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 482 F. App’x 475, 476
(11th Cir. 2012) (finding that, although only the plaintiff

9

and the defendant cruise operator were signatories to the
arbitration
line

was

agreement,

capable

of

a

non-signatory

compelling

defendant

arbitration

cruise

because

the

plaintiff’s claim against the cruise line was “inextricably
intertwined”

with

the

plaintiff’s

signatory cruise operator).
arbitration
allows

him

[only]
to

‘if

against

the

However, “a nonparty may force

the

enforce

claims

relevant

the

state

agreement’

contract

to

law

arbitrate.”

Lawson, 648 F.3d at 1170 (quoting Carlisle, 556 U.S. at
632).
Under Florida law, a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement may compel a signatory to arbitrate under the
theory of equitable estoppel.

See Heller v. Aerospace,

LLC, No. 4D12-992, 2013 WL 1748545, at *2 (Fla. 4th DCA
Apr.

24,

2013)

(citing

Shetty

v.

Palm

Beach

Radiation

Oncology Assocs. Sunderam K. Shetty, M.D., P.A., 915 So. 2d
1233, 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

“‘Equitable estoppel is

warranted when the signatory to the contract containing the
arbitration clause raises allegations of concerted conduct
by

both

the

non-signatory

and

signatories to the contract.’”

one

or

more

of

the

Shetty, 915 So. 2d at 1235

(quoting Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210,
212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)).

The Court finds that, in this
10

case, the claims Maldonado asserts against Mattress Firm
arise

out

of

the

same

operative

facts

as

the

claims

fails

to

distinguish

previously compelled to arbitration.
Indeed,

Maldonado’s

Complaint

between the three Defendants in this action when alleging
the most fundamental elements of his FLSA claim; Maldonado
asserts that he “worked for Defendants in excess of forty
(40) hours within a work week,” that “Defendants failed to
compensate Plaintiff at a rate of one and one-half times
Plaintiff’s regular rate for all hours worked in excess of
forty (40) hours in a single work week,” that “Defendants
failed and continue[ ] to fail to maintain proper time
records as mandated by the FLSA,” and that “Defendants have
violated Title 29 U.S.C. § 207.”
38, 43) (emphasis added).

(Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 35, 36,

Because there is no independent

claim posed against Mattress Firm alone, the Court finds
this to be a case in which “the signatory to [a] contract
containing [an] arbitration clause raises allegations of
concerted conduct by both the non-signatory and one or more
of the signatories to the contract.”
1235.

Accordingly,

arbitration

Shetty, 915 So. 2d at
of

Maldonado’s

against Mattress Firm is warranted under Florida law.

11

claim

Although Maldonado asserts that “the issue of whether
Mattress Firm was Maldonado’s employer can be (and should
be) decided completely independently of whether [Maldonado]
is found to be an employee of the Callahan Defendants,” the
Court

declines

Maldonado’s

to

sanction

two

fundamentally

Defendants,

as

substantially

these

related
claims

overlapping

separate

issues

proceedings

on

against

the

claims
will

of

likely

fact.1

involve
The

Court

acknowledges the Eleventh Circuit’s warning that “a court
cannot

shoehorn

arbitration

pendent

based

efficiency.’”

on

non-arbitrable

‘its

own

this

case

clause]

[to
raises

economy

and

fits

neatly

However, the Court finds

within

the

exception recognized by Florida courts.
signatory

of

into

Community State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d

1241, 1271 n.32 (11th Cir. 2011).
that

views

claims

the

contract

allegations

1

abovementioned

That is, “when the

containing

the

of

.

.

.

arbitration
substantially

Notably, “Florida courts have applied equitable estoppel
to allow a non-signatory to compel a signatory to arbitrate
where
the
signatories
were
already
involved
in
arbitration.”
Marcus v. Fla. Bagels, LLC, No. 4D12-2971,
2013 WL 1748533, at *3 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 24, 2013) (citing
Shetty, 915 So. 2d at 1234-35; Armas, 842 So. 2d at 211-12;
Lash & Goldberg LLP v. Clarke, 88 So. 3d 426, 427-28 (Fla.
4th DCA 2012); MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 177 F.3d at 945
n.1.). This consideration applies in the instant case, in
which Maldonado’s claim against the Callahan Defendants has
already been compelled to arbitration.
12

interdependent

and

concerted

misconduct

by

both

the

nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the
contract,”

equitable

estoppel

allows

a

nonsignatory

to

compel arbitration.

Bahena, 2008 WL 780748, at *2; Shetty,

915 So. 2d at 1235.

By failing to distinguish between the

actions of the Defendants in his FLSA Complaint, Maldonado
has effectively asserted such “interdependent and concerted
misconduct” by Mattress Firm and the Callahan Defendants.
To

refute

Mattress

Firm’s

assertion

that

equitable

estoppel is appropriate to compel arbitration in this case,
Maldonado argues that, in Lawson v. Life of the South Ins.
Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1167-68 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh
Circuit “explained that many of [its] decisions involving
the

question

of

whether

a

non-party

can

enforce

an

arbitration clause against a party have not made clear that
the applicable state law provides the rule of decision for
that question,” and that some of those decisions “are cited
by Mattress Firm, including [MS Dealer].”
13).

(Doc. # 44 at

The Court agrees with Maldonado’s characterization of

Lawson.

In that case, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that

[m]any of this Court’s decisions involving the
question of whether a non-party can enforce an
arbitration clause against a party have not made
clear that the applicable state law provides the
rule of decision for that question. However, the
13

Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Carlisle, which
postdates all of those decisions of this Court,
clarifies that state law governs that question,
and to the extent any of our earlier decisions
indicate to the contrary, those indications are
overruled or at least undermined to the point of
abrogation by Carlisle.
648 F.3d at 1170-71 (internal citations omitted).

However,

Maldonado does not argue that Florida law would prevent
application of equitable estoppel in this case, nor does
Maldonado indicate any portion of the Motion at issue which
contradicts Lawson’s warning that state law governs whether
a non-party can enforce an arbitration clause against a
party.

Accordingly, this argument has no bearing on the

Court’s analysis.
B.

Waiver

“[T]here are three elements to consider in determining
whether

to

arbitration

compel
provision

arbitration:
exists,

(2)

(1)

whether

whether

a

there

valid
is

an

arbitrable issue, and (3) whether the right to arbitrate
has been waived.”

Shetty, 915 So. 2d at 1234.

do not dispute the first two elements.
argues

that

Mattress

Firm

waived

the

The parties

However, Maldonado
right

to

compel

arbitration “by filing an answer and seeking a ruling from
this

Court

regarding

(Doc. # 44 at 16).

the

ultimate

merits

of

the

case.”

To support the argument that filing
14

an answer to a complaint constitutes an act inconsistent
with

a

defendant’s

intent

to

arbitrate,

Maldonado

cites

Garcia v. Acosta Tractors, Inc., No. 12-21111-CIV, 2013 WL
462713 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2013).
defendants
with

the

were

signatories

Plaintiff.

See

to
id.

In Garcia, however, the
an

arbitration

(“[F]or

agreement

approximately

six

months, the Defendants herein not only did not request that
the action be submitted to arbitration, despite their right
to

do

clauses

so

under

signed

the
by

clear

the

language

Plaintiffs,

of
the

the

arbitration

Defendants

also

proceeded in a manner which seemingly manifested an intent
to not proceed to arbitration, including failing to refer
to arbitration in their Answer [and] attending a settlement
conference

before

the

undersigned

.

.

.

.”)

(emphasis

added).
In contrast, Mattress Firm recognizes that is not a
signatory to any arbitration agreement with Maldonado that
might apply to the FLSA claims at issue.
previously

discussed,

Mattress

Firm

Consequently, as
seeks

to

compel

arbitration of these claims through the theory of equitable
estoppel.

Because Mattress Firm is not, and does not claim

to be, a party to the arbitration agreement in this case,
the Court finds Garcia inapposite.
15

Mattress Firm filed its

Motion

for

Judgment

on

the

Pleadings

or,

in

the

Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration only one month
after the Callahan Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, Compel Arbitration, to which the
Callahan Defendants attached the relevant agreement.

The

Court accordingly finds that, given the circumstances of
this case, Mattress Firm has not acted inconsistently with
its intent to arbitrate the dispute.
C.

“Specific Exclusion”

Lastly,
Mattress
because

Maldonado

Firm
“the

should

argues
not

[Independent

be

that

its

compelled

Contractor’s

claims
to

against

arbitration

Agreement]

shows

that Mattress Firm was specifically excluded while other
clients

of

reference.”
Maldonado

the

subsection

Defendants

(Doc. # 44 at 13).

cites

Agreement.

Callahan

to

two

under

the

heading

incorporated

provisions

within

the

The first provision is a
“Non-Competition.”

subsection provides:
10. Non-Competition.
During and after the term
of this Agreement, and for a period of six months
after
the
termination
of
this
Agreement;
Contractor shall not:
10.1 directly or indirectly, with or without
compensation, engage in, be employed by or
16

by

To support this argument,

particular

(Id. at 3, 13).

are

That

have any interest . . . in any business,
company or firm engaged in a business
similar to the Company’s within a radius of
fifty miles of any premises[ ] of the
Company at or from which the Company
business is carried on at the date of the
termination of this Agreement including but
not limited to: IKEA, OFFICE DEPOT and 3PD.
(Agreement Doc. # 37-2 at ¶¶ 10, 10.1).
this

non-competition

provision

The Court finds

irrelevant

disposition of the instant Motion.

to

the

The legal basis for

Mattress Firm’s Motion to Compel Arbitration -– equitable
estoppel –- does not rely on any mention or omission of
Mattress Firm as a “business, company or firm engaged in a
business

similar

to

[that

of

the

Callahan

Defendants],”

especially in light of the Agreement’s “including-but-notlimited-to” language.
The

second

“Benefits;

provision

Binding

is

Effects,”

a

paragraph

which

entitled

provides:

“This

Agreement shall be binding upon and shall operate[ ] for
the

benefit

executors,

of

the

parties

administrators,

(Id. at ¶ 22).

hereto

and

their

successors,

and

respective
assigns[.]”

The Court is equally unconvinced that this

provision somehow precludes application of the doctrine of
equitable

estoppel

to

compel

arbitration

FLSA claims against Mattress Firm.

17

of

Maldonado’s

Again, Mattress Firm

does not claim entitlement to any arbitration rights under
the

Agreement.

The

contents

of

this

paragraph

are

immaterial to the Court’s application of equitable estoppel
in the instant case.
III. Conclusion
The Court grants Mattress Firm’s Motion to the extent
that

the

Court

compels

arbitration

claims against Mattress Firm.
not

a

party

to

the

of

Maldonado’s

FLSA

Although Mattress Firm is

Independent

Contractor’s

Agreement

between Maldonado and the Callahan Defendants, the Court
finds that employing the theory of equitable estoppel to
require Maldonado to arbitrate his claims against Mattress
Firm is appropriate in this case.

Because Maldonado’s FLSA

claims against Mattress Firm are inextricably intertwined
with

his

claims

against

the

Callahan

Defendants,

and

because the Court has already determined that enforcement
of

the

arbitration

agreement

between

Maldonado

and

the

Callahan Defendants is appropriate in this case, the Court
grants

Mattress

Accordingly,

the

Firm’s

Motion

to

Compel

Court

directs

the

Clerk

Arbitration.
to

terminate

Defendant Mattress Firm as a party in this matter, and
thereafter to close this case.

See Kozma v. Hunter Scott

Fin., LLC, No. 09-80502-CIV, 2010 WL 724498, at *2 (S.D.
18

Fla. Feb. 25, 2010) (“The . . . Eleventh Circuit has not
directly addressed this issue, but has frequently affirmed
where

the

dismissed
Indians

district
the

of

court

underlying

Fla.

v.

compelled

case.”);

Cypress,

No.

arbitration

Miccosukee

and

Tribe

of

2013

WL

12-cv-22439,

2158422, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2013) (same).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Defendant Mattress Firm’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c),

or

in

the

Alternative,

Motion

to

Compel

Arbitration (Doc. # 37) is granted to the extent that
the

Court

against

compels

Mattress

arbitration
Firm.

The

of

Maldonado’s

Motion

is

claim

otherwise

denied.
(2)

The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Mattress
Firm as a party in this matter, and thereafter to
close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

3rd day of June, 2013.

Copies: All Counsel of Record
19