Oxendine v. Snow et al
Filing
17
ORDER granting 15 Defendant's Motion for summary judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff and thereafter shall close this case. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 10/28/2013. (LN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MATTHEW WAYNE OXENDINE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:13-cv-426-T-30TGW
DEPUTY JARROD SNOW,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Deputy Jared Snow’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 15). Pro se Plaintiff Matthew Wayne Oxendine neglected to
file a response to Defendant’s motion. The Court presumes that Oxendine has abandoned
this action, given the Plea Agreement and his plea of guilty as to Count One of the
Indictment in the related criminal case. See U.S. v. Matthew Oxendine, Case 8:13-cr-76VMC-TBM, Dkts. 68 and 69. Nonetheless, the Court concludes, based on the merits of the
motion, that Snow is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2013, Oxendine filed the instant civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Oxendine alleges that Deputy Snow violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Oxendine’s amended complaint, Deputy
Snow entered Oxendine’s home without consent and without a warrant.
(Dkt. 7).
Specifically, on November 17, 2012, Oxendine was arrested by deputies from the Hernando
County Sheriff’s Office on charges related to the manufacture and possession of
methamphetamine, the cultivation of marijuana, the possession of a firearm by a felon, and
the possession of drug paraphernalia. Deputy Snow was one of the Hernando County
Deputies involved in Oxendine’s arrest. Oxendine alleges that Deputy Snow entered his
mobile home and grabbed him and pulled him out of his back door without a warrant.
On February 7, 2013, the United States of America filed an Indictment in the Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division (Case 8:13-cr-76-VMC-TBM) against Oxendine on
charges of manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine arising out of his
arrest on November 17, 2012. On April 30, 2013, Oxendine’s counsel filed a motion to
suppress the evidence that was seized at the mobile home. In that motion, Oxendine argued
that Deputy Snow violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. See U.S. v. Matthew Oxendine, Case 8:13-cr-76-VMC-TBM, Dkt. 28.
On July 1, 2013, Magistrate Judge Thomas McCoun held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to suppress and considered testimony and argument at the hearing, including
witnesses called by the United States: Deputy Snow, Deputy Lamia, Deputy Stevens, as well
as witnesses called by Oxendine: H.B. Oxendine, Tina Areniecke and Deputy O’Brian. Id.
at Dkt. 45.
On July 15, 2013, Judge McCoun issued a report and recommendation on the motion
to suppress. Judge McCoun concluded that there was adequate probable cause and exigent
circumstances to permit the warrantless entry into the residence by Deputy Snow. He also
concluded that Deputy Snow’s warrantless entry was permissible and consistent with the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at Dkt. 46. As a result, Judge McCoun recommended that the court
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deny Oxendine’s motion to suppress. Id. On August 20, 2013, the district court adopted and
approved the report and recommendation and denied Oxendine’s motion to suppress. Id. at
Dkt. 63.
Deputy Snow now moves for summary judgment because Oxendine’s claim in this
case is barred by collateral estoppel. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes
that Oxendine’s section 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel because this issue was
fully and fairly litigated in Oxendine’s criminal case.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW1
Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action
will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences
in its favor. Id. at 255.
1
The summary judgment standard of review applies to the extent that Deputy Snow’s motion
is filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
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A district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that a
motion for summary judgment was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the
motion. Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 629, 632 (11th Cir.
1988) (per curiam). The district court need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary
materials on file at the time the motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is
supported by evidentiary materials. Id. At the least, the district court must review all of the
evidentiary materials submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment. Jaroma v.
Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court cannot grant a
motion for summary judgment merely for lack of any response by the opposing party, since
the district court must review the motion and the supporting papers to determine whether
they establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”). In addition, so that there can
be an effective review of the case on appeal, the district court’s order granting summary
judgment must “indicate that the merits of the motion were addressed.” Dunlap, 858 F.2d
at 632.
DISCUSSION
Oxendine’s section 1983 claim fails on the merits. As Deputy Snow points out, the
claim is barred by collateral estoppel because, in the criminal case against Oxendine, the
court found that Deputy Snow had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of
Oxendine’s residence and did not violate Oxendine’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by doing so.
“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is an affirmative defense barring a party
from re-litigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if that
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action differs significantly from the first one.” Hires v. City of St. Petersburg, 2008 WL
2042514, at *3-*5 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2008). Collateral estoppel applies to civil rights
actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-05, 101
S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). There are three prerequisites to a determination of
collateral estoppel: “(1) ... the issue at stake [must] be identical to the one involved in the
prior litigation; (2) ... the issue [must] have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and
(3) ... the determination of the issue in the prior litigation [must] have been a critical and
necessary part of the judgment in that earlier decision.” Precision Air Parts v. Avco Corp.,
736 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d
731, 733 (11th Cir.1982)).
In Hires, a case procedurally similar to the instant case, the plaintiff, Morris Hires,
alleged in a civil section 1983 action that officers from the City of St. Petersburg Police
Department violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they allegedly detained and arrested
him without probable cause. 2008 WL 2042514 at *1. Hires was charged with possessing
a firearm as a felon and possession of cocaine and filed a motion to suppress evidence in the
criminal case. Id. at *2. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the district
court concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest Hires and there was no violation
of Hires’ Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at *2-*3.
In the civil lawsuit, the district court granted summary judgment in the officer’s favor
on the issue of whether he had probable cause to stop and arrest Hires. Specifically, the court
concluded that “Hires is collaterally estopped from relitigating his claim that Officer Lord
did not have probable cause to stop and arrest him on the night of March 14, 2006 in his
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present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint.” Id. at *5. The court noted that: “[t]he parties were
fully heard at the hearing on the motion to suppress; the court supported its decision with a
reasoned opinion; and the decision was subject to appeal.” Id. Thus, the three prerequisites
to establish collateral estoppel were met. Id.
Here, like in Hires, the issue of whether Deputy Snow had probable cause to conduct
a warrantless search and seizure was fully and fairly litigated at the evidentiary hearing in
front of Judge McCoun on July 1, 2013. Judge McCoun’s findings, which the district court
adopted in full, preclude and bar Oxendine from re-litigating the identical issue in this civil
case.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.
Defendant Deputy Jared Snow’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 15) is
granted.
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant
and against Plaintiff and thereafter shall close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on October 28, 2013.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Even\2013\13-cv-426.msj.frm
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